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Abstract
Following an acute crisis, a number o f the later works o f August Strindberg became 
marked by a deep religiosity, at once Christian and eclectic. The religious turn, 
evident in a number o f his later plays, is accompanied by a radical development o f  
Strindberg’s dramaturgy in his “dream plays.” These imaginative, poetic plays 
disrupt logical narrative and character-development. In effect they undermine the 
* salvific motifs woven into the fabric o f  these writings. These are paradoxically 
f  Christian, therefore, because although intensely religious, they are dramas that take 
place after the death o f  God. Drawing on Strindberg’s paintings and novels as well as
I
his plays, this thesis investigates the ramifications o f the death o f God in a number o f  
Strindberg’s later plays. To do so it also draws on the writings o f  both theologians 
and dramatic practitioners who all in their different ways are responding to the same 
situation confronted in Strindberg’s writing. In doing so, it emerges how far 
Strindberg anticipates the religious and spiritual crises o f  the following century. 
Finally, I attempt to put Strindberg into the context o f the post-postmodem condition, 
f  reflecting both on what this has to say to Strindberg, and what Strindberg has to say to
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Abstract
Following an acute crisis, a number of the later works of August Strindberg became 
marked by a deep religiosity, at once Cliristian and eclectic. The religious turn, 
evident in a number of his later plays, is accompanied by a radical development of 
Stiindberg’s dramaturgy in his “dream plays.” These imaginative, poetic plays 
dismpt logical narrative and character-development. In effect they undermine the 
salvific motifs woven into the fabric of these writings. These are paradoxically 
Christian, therefore, because although intensely religious, they are dramas that take 
place after the death of God. Drawing on Strindberg’s paintings and novels as well as 
his plays, this thesis investigates the ramifications of the death of God in a number of 
Strindberg’s later plays. To do so it also draws on the writings of both theologians 
and dramatic practitioners who all in their different ways are responding to the same 
situation confronted in Strindberg’s writing. In doing so, it emerges how far 
Strindberg anticipates the religious and spiritual crises of the following century. 
Finally, I attempt to put Strindberg into the context of the post-postmodem condition, 
reflecting both on what this has to say to Strindberg, and what Strindberg has to say to 
it.
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A note on the texts and translations used
Until recently, the standard Swedish edition of Strindberg was the Samlade Shifter, 
edited by John Landquist. This has now been supplanted by the “national edition,” 
the Samlade Verk. The latter amounts to seventy-two volumes, a few of which have 
yet to be published. Wliilst Glasgow University Library has a number of volumes 
from the Samlade Verk, it has far from a full collection. On the other hand, although 
it does not have any of the Landquist edition, it does contain a complete set of the 
Shifter, edited by the eminent Strmdberg scholar Guimar Brandell. In doing this 
thesis, I have had to use whatever copy came to hand. Hence I sometimes refer to the 
Slmfter, sometimes the Samlade Verk, and sometimes to paperback editions of the 
plays. On other occasions I have had recourse to privately owned volumes horn the
Samlade Skrifter. This is admittedly messy, but was unfortunately the best way to
make use of the resources available to me. Strindberg’s letters, however, are referred
,to in the standard edition edited by Torsten Eklund and Bjorn Meidal. I refer to them 
in the footnotes as Brev.
i |
In some places I have used translations. The principle I used here was always to refer 
to the original Swedish for the texts that fonn the main subject of this thesis. For 
some of Strindberg’s other writings, such as his fii'st major play Master Olof and his 
Inferno (which he in fact wrote in French) I have used English translations. Finally, I 
have also refen ed to the original Swedish for works outside the main focus of this 
thesis where no English translation was available. This was the case with 
Strindberg’s letters and his A Blue Book. Wlien a reference does not mention a
tianslator, the tianslation is my own. In these cases I have tried to make the 
translation as literal as possible without losing the sense of the Swedish.
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1. Introduction
The Swedish playwright, poet, painter, essayist and novelist, August Strindberg, 
. . . .reverted to Cliristianity in 1896. He was by this time living as an exile in Paris, a 
notorious misogynist, blasphemer and atheist. Internationally, he had made his name 
as a writer with a series of violent and compelling naturalistic di amas. However, by 
the time of his conversion, he had given up literature, pursuing instead an eccentric 
programme of chemical and alchemical experiments and seeking (unsuccessfully) 
recognition as a scientist. His conversion followed a series of increasingly severe 
break-downs in what has come to be Icnown as his Tnferno-crisis’. One major 
consequence of this crisis and conversion was that Strindberg began to write plays 
again, at a frenetic pace that was even for him extraordinary. Between 1898 and 
1909, Strindberg wrote histoiy plays, fairy-tale-like pieces, and a number ofbizaiTe 
quasi-religious pieces that he himself called ‘dream plays.’ It is a selection of the 
latter that this thesis investigates.
:g
The path of Strindberg’s conversion back to Christianity can seem deceptively clear. 
As a young man he became first a fr ee-thinker, then an avowed atheist, but following 
a spii’itual and psychological crisis he converted and became an avowed Christian -  
an experience reflected in a number of subsequent writings. However, an 
examination of some of Strindberg’s later plays complicates this picture. His so 
called ‘dream plays’ break up their own narrative coherence along with the unity of 
thefr characters. While they recycle and rework themes of guilt and salvation, the 
significance of the latter in particular has shifted to the point of becoming empty of 
meaning. These are plays haunted by the crucifixion and the promise of atonement.
Indeed, the crucifixion comes to stand for the characteristic human experience -  to 
live is to suffer crucifixion. But this is crucifixion without the promise of the 
resurrection. Rather, certain motifs and images reappear -  the motif of the 
scapegoat, the images of crucifixion and apocalyptic fire. Instead of a narrative of 
salvation whose coherence as it were guarantees the authenticity of its salvific claims, 
these plays rehearse a partial Passion naivative in which final atonement never arrives. 
The breaking-up of naiTative coherence with the corresponding break-down of 
character as a unified subject undermine the salvific themes that Strindberg explores.^ 
In this, these plays confi'ont an oddly postmodern theological predicament. The 
Passion narrative can no longer serve as a template for salvation. Not only this, but 
the language of salvation becomes paradoxical: the holy and the damned become 
confounded, as do Clu ist and Lucifer. The archetypal figure here is Cain, cursed for 
his fr atricide, yet marked by God and therefore also holy. These paradoxes arguably 
exist already in the Bible, but Clii'istianity has tended to suppress them. The telos of 
salvific history separates the wheat fr om the chaff, the holy fr'om the damned. 
Strindberg’s later plays tlu*ow this teleological guarantee into doubt, and so they are
paradoxically religious; profoundly Christian in their focus on cmcifixion at precisely
the point where they threaten to undo the theological fr-amework of Chiistian
2redemption. Haunted by the Passion, they endlessly rehearse suspended narratives of
 -
’ It is true that even in his naturalistic phase character was for Strindberg incoherent and self­
contradictory. By the time of the later plays, however, the context has changed. Instead of dramas that 
pretend to a scientific rigour, the plays I deal with are obsessed with damnation and redemption. At 
this point, Strindberg’s views on character come into sharp contrast with the requirements of a salvific 
narrative, and therefore become all the more significant from a theological point of view.
This raises another question -  how far were Strindberg’s later, post-Inferno plays a genuine 
break from his earlier work? A detailed discussion of this is beyond my scope, except to observe that 
despite continuities that run throughout Strindberg’s wr itings, tire difference between, for example, 
Miss Julie and To Damascus is so obvious that I do not tliink it needs defending. The significance of 
the change in Strindberg’s dramatic technique is, however, both important and fascinating. I spend 
some time exploring this, especially in chapter 2.
 ^Redemption through Christ is the central and characteristic feature of Christian orthodoxy and dogma. 
As such it is embedded in a coherent network of ideas -  about humanity, God, history, sin -  and it is
salvation. Thus, despite Strindberg’s overt theism, his dream plays inhabit a different 
territory, that of a kind of a-theism.^
These plays, then, problematise a metaphysically coherent theology. They do so in a 
way that anticipates some recent responses to Christian theism. The undermining of 
narrative and of stable identity anticipates the postmodern dismembering of coherent, 
self-enclosed and self-validating texts. They do this not with postmodern glee, 
however, but with a mournful air. Although at times they consciously attack theology 
as an all-encompassing system, the di*eam plays long for a vanished coherence. They 
do so even as they undermine the claims of the grandest of grand narratives. This 
emerges especially in the plays’ Platonic streak: parallel to the suspended nan*atives 
of salvation runs a ‘broken’ or ‘fallen’ Platonism. In his plays, Strindberg repeatedly 
voices the suspicion that the world is a copy; however, the copy has gone wrong.
This world is made of deceitful appearances in which nothing is as it seems: rather, 
the world and everything in it form an unstable, ever-changing surface. The original 
from which the world is copied is truthfril and stable, but beyond our reach. This is 
one dimension of the term ‘dream play,’ a play in which the world is perceived as 
dream-like appearance. These suspended narratives open a number of possible 
conclusions -  that they are exercises in nostalgia; that they are ultimately tragic, in 
that they long for a stability and coherence that always remain beyond our grasp; or
the coherence of this network that had by Strindberg’s time come under strain. Aspects of this 
network, and indeed Christianity as a coherent net of ideas, come under attack in Strindberg’s work, as 
will become apparent in the course of this thesis, I also discuss this further later in the Introduction.
 ^ By this, I do not mean the kind of rationalist rejection of religion promoted by Richard Dawkins, 
among others. Rather, I mean an ill-defined territory suspended between the poles o f theism and 
atheism, something like the half-belief o f Peter Baelz or the a/theism of Mark C. Taylor, both of which 
I discuss below. In Stiindberg’s case, it seems to me that Christianity presented him with a 
Kierkegaardian either/or, but he remains suspended between them, unable to choose. I discuss this, 
also, below.
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that an obscure salvific promise does in fact lurk, however dimly, beyond the 
apparently irredeemable fragmentation.
The rest of this introduction looks into the history preceding Strindberg’s fracturing of 
coherent naivative and coherent identities. This is in part a matter of Strindberg’s own 
personal history. Strindberg was always a highly autobiographical writer, and the 
religious turn of his late plays has, not suiprisingly, roots in his early life. Some 
account of his life is therefore an indispensable background to his writings. The 
relation of Strindberg’s life and writing is a vexed question, which we will touch on in 
the coui'se of the introduction. My aim is to some extent to wrench Strindberg’s 
writings away fr om his life history. The particular reason for this is that so much 
Strindberg scholarship, especially the earlier scholarship, reads the plays as 
autobiography. This biographical context can become too naiTow, particularly in a 
study like this one where it may serve as a sort of straitjacket for the text, creating a 
kind of coherence in terms of Strindberg’s life where in the play there is a meaningful 
incoherence. This is reinforced by a suspicion that taking a too biographical approach 
may ultimately tell us little about why anyone should read Strindberg now.
Strindberg is in some ways a very modern figure, something that will I hope emerge 
from what follows. In addition to Strindberg’s personal history, there is a larger 
background to the particular form his religious turn took. This includes the influence 
of a number of thinkers and writers, notably Schopenliauer and Kierkegaard; and the 
history of Clii'istianity and hermeneutics since the Reformation.
Strindberg’s life
■
11
 ^It will become clear, I think, in the course of this thesis that I think such an undertaking is inherently 
problematic. Strindberg’s religion, although steeped in Lutheran Protestantism, was a collection of 
bits, assembled on an ad hoc basis to meet his immediate needs. Whether it ever really constituted a 
coherent system seems to me dubious.
 ^ See, for example, Martin Lamm, Strindberg och Makterna; Gunnar Brandell, Strindbergs Infernokris; 
Goran Stockenstrom, Ismael i Oknen
 ^Martin Lamm, Strindberg och Makterna (Stockiiolm; Svenska Kyi’kans Diakonistyrelses Bokforlag, 
1936), p. 13 
’ Ibid., p. 139
:S
My purpose here is not to reconstruct Strindberg’s post-lnferno belief system.'^ A 
number of very able scholars have engaged with this at length.^ Rather it is to 
adumbrate some of the personal sources of the agonistic religiosity found in the later 
plays. However it is perhaps worth noting that Strindberg’s conversion to Cliristianity 
had its parallels, as scholar Martin Lamm has pointed out, tliroughout European 
intellectual cfrcles at the turn of the twentieth century.^ Strindberg’s case is unusual, 
however, because he did not ultimately find a home in either a particular confession 
or any of the theosophical movements that then flourished. Strindberg’s scepticism, 
evident enough in what follows, was combined with a distrust of systems of ideas, and 
this made it difficult for him ever to reach a settled view of the world, whether this 
view was of his own making or not. In his plays, at any rate, Strindberg camiot help 
being at least partially at war with his religion. Theatre may be, then, a particularly 
appropriate medium for expressing this sort of conflict. This conflict does not issue in 
a harmonious synthesis. In Marin Lamm’s case, although he concedes that
Î!;
, t
Strindberg’s religious ideas never reached a final form, he nevertheless attempts to 
create a more or less coherent whole out of them. This coherence conflicts, as Lamm 
himself admits, with the way Strindberg addresses the question of divine justice in a 
number of plays. ^  Indeed, Lamm’s account of Strindberg’s religious development 
leaves a vivid impression of a man strenuously seeking to find evidence of order in 
the cosmos, yet never convincing himself either of its presence or absence, still less
Î
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coming to rest in a settled view.^ This internal conflict finds expression in all the 
plays examined here. How, then, did this conflict arise? Addressing this question, 
even briefly, means engaging with the nature of the sources for Strindberg’s life.
Strindberg provided a vast arr ay of information for biographers. His letters alone run 
to twenty-two volumes, in addition to which he kept an “Occult Diary” (Ockulta 
Dagboken) for several years. He also wrote a number of what purport to be 
autobiographies. They have certainly been treated as such. Strindberg, however, 
always introduces an konic distance between himself and his works. This is true also 
of his plays, which can seem deceptively autobiographical. The Son o f a Servant, 
written in 1886, is the major source for his early life and illustrates this problem 
particularly clearly. Strindberg introduces it with a mock interview in which the 
Interviewer (a mouthpiece for conservative views) attempts to find out from the 
Author whether his new book is an autobiography, a novel or a memoir. The Author 
refuses to answer, saying only that it is “the story of the evolution of a human being 
from 1849 [the year of Strindberg’s birth] to ’67.”  ^ He denies that it is a confession or 
a defence of himself, but calls it the “literature of the future.” ®^ It aims to analyse 
why the protagonist developed as he did in terms of heredity and environmental 
factors. The book itself is written in the third person, reinforcing the rhetorical 
distance between the author and the protagonist. It contains a psychologically acute 
study of its main character, and reads at times like a novel, at times like a polemic.
The nanator intrudes to attack moral codes, especially those relating to sexuality, to 
make comments on contemporary political developments, or to argue against the
See, in particular, Lainm, Strindberg och Makterna, pp. 135-50 
 ^August Strindberg, The Son o f a Seiyant: the Story o f the Evolution o f  a Human Being, 1849-67, 
trans. Evert Sprinctiom (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 19 
Ibid., p. 24
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child-rearing practices and educational system of his day. Clearly the whole thing is 
highly autobiographical, but is it autobiography? The Author in the introduction is 
right to resist calling it that.
'"'S:
#'
I
With this in mind. The Son o f a Seiyant nevertheless tells us a lot about Strindberg’s 
early religious life. He was born in 1849 into an intermittently prosperous middle- 
class household, ruled over by Oscar Strindberg, his stem, emotionally distant father. 
Some have connected this, not implausibly, with Strindberg’s later fixation on God as 
an angry, punitive but strong father figure that Strindberg alternately rebelled against 
and identified with.^  ^ Certainly he felt an early dissatisfaction with the weak Clu'ist, 
wishing to confront God dfrectly rather than tlii'ough an intermediary.^^ His mother, 
who had been a seiwant in Oscar Strindberg’s household before they married, died 
when Strindberg was thirteen. From her, Strindberg aequfred his enduring sense of 
identification with the working classes, although this was complicated by a conflicting 
sense of identification with the aristocracy. Under his mother’s influence, Strindberg 
inclined towards Pietism, which had gained wide popularity among the lower classes 
in mid-nineteenth century Sweden. As a result, Strindberg became ferociously 
religious. According to The Son o f a Servant, he engaged in a competition with his 
stepmother, who also had Pietistic leanings, to become the most insufferably pure in 
the household. Strindberg developed a martyi*-complex that remained with him for 
the rest of his life. The Son o f a Servant recounts his pleasure in being overlooked
Sti'indberg himself seems to suggest this connection in his essay “Mysticism -  For Now.” The 
scholar Gunnar Brandell certainly interprets this essay as evidence that Strindberg derived his idea of 
God from his father, even positing a Strindbergian “Mother -  religion” and “Father -  religion.”
August Strindberg, Selected Essays, trans. Michael Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 56 -  63; Gunnar Brandell, Strindberg in Inferno, trans. B. Jacobs (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 3-4, 1 5 3 -1 5 4  
In the essay “Mysticism -  For Now” Strindberg says that as a child “my thoughts about God 
embraced the notion of an infinitely strong man, from whom I had borrowed strength by way o f prayer 
[...] I never prayed to tlie weak, tortured figure of Christ, not even then, when his image hung upon the 
altar. Presumably I considered him as helpless as myself [ . Strindberg, Selected Essays, p. 60.
. . . .
’Strindberg, The Son o f  a Seiyant, p. 146
August Strindberg, Inferno / From an Occult Diaiy, trans. Maiy Sandbach (London: Penguin, 1979),
p. 262
Martin Lannn, August Strindberg (Stockholm: Sonniers, 1967), p. 17
“Confessionless Christianity” and “confessionless religion” are phrases Stiindberg himself used to 
characterise his religious orientation, without ever defining what the term meant. In the prose work 
Legender (Legends), for example, he says “I cut my personality in half and show the world the 
naturalistic occultist, but inside maintain and nurse the sprouting germ of a confessionless religion.” In 
Ensam (Alone), he says that the works of Balzac “had ... slipped into me a kind o f religion which I 
would call confessionless Christianity.” August Strindberg, Samlade Skrifter, vol. 28, John Landqvist 
(ed.) (Stockiiolm: Bonniers, 1914), p. 214; Ibid., vol. 38, p. 147
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and taking the blame for others’ wrongdoing; his young flesh was “nailed to the 
cross.”^^  He found a sense of exultation in his degradation. At the same time, he 
feared the seduction of worldly life, a fear that re-surfaced in his post-Inferno plays.
He therefore longed for marriage, this being the only outlet for his sexual drive that 
was legitimised by church and state. He lived in a state of terror, convinced that 
because he had practised masturbation his body would rot away and he would die at 
the age of twenty-five. His life among the Pietists left a lasting impression. He later 
described them as “...those pale, wicked, teiTor-stricken creatures, who cannot smile 
and who look like maniacs.” After a few years, having already strained relations 
with his family by berating them for then lack of religious seriousness and holding 
himself aloof, he came under the influence of Theodore Parker, an American 
Unitarian minister with a strong following in Sweden. Strindberg, in accordance with 
Unitarian principles, rejected the Trinity and the divinity of Clnist, becoming a 
fireethinker. He seems to have embraced this with a fervour equal to that of his former 
Pietism. According to Strindberg scholar Martin Lamm he “agitated in class, 
instigated a strike against morning prayers, quaiTelled with the theology teacher and 
the headmaster.”'  ^ Both these phases, Pietistic and Unitarian, offer clues to 
Strindberg’s post-lnferno ‘confessionless Christianity.’'  ^ The Pietists began as a 
radical Protestant movement in the late 17"’ centui-y, and sought to emulate the earliest 
Christian communities. They believed in the complete spiritual renewal of the
15
F. Ernest Stoeffler, “Pietism,” in The Encylopedia o f Religion, vol. 11, Mircea Eliade (éd.), p. 324 
Ibid., pp. 324 - 326
August Strindberg, Brev, vol. 10, Torsten Eklund (éd.), (Stockholm; Bonniers, 1968), p. 205 
Olof Lagerki-antz, August Strindberg, trans. Anselm Hollo (London; Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 365
individual, bringing him or her to a vivid sense of God’s presence. This imier renewal 
was made evident in personal piety, that is, a mamier of living “expressive of love for
17 . .God and man.” Pietistie Christianity thus had an existential orientation. Abstract
theology was less important than personal piety. In addition, the Pietists held that
their fellowship abrogated all bounds of religion, class and nationality. They 
addressed each other as “brother” and “sister.” They had a sense of separation from 
society as a whole, which did not live by Pietistic values, and they had a mission to 
refomi and improve the world. Thus, despite their sense of separation from society, 
they had a strong commitment to social engagement on behalf of the poor and the 
sick. Finally, Pietism inlierited Luther’s emphasis on a more or less literal 
inteipretation of the Bible. The Bible formed the centre of their faith, and their 
church services emphasised sermons at the expense of ritual.'^ Now Strindberg, in 
the end, emphatically rejected Pietism. In a letter to Torsten Hedlund, for instance, he 
inveighs against them, complaining of their selfish egotism and the falseness of their 
proclaimed love of humanity.'^ Nevertheless, some aspects of Pietism seem to have
remained with Strindberg. These are, firstly, that religion remained for him an
■existential question, not one of an abstract truth. This was as true of his atheist period 
as of his periods as an avowed Cliristian. Secondly, the Pietists’ social engagement 
on behalf of the poor also remained with Strmdberg, despite his occasional fantasies 
of becoming a Nietzschean superman. Indeed, late in life Strindberg equated 
Christianity with socialism.^" This found expression in his later plays in a sense of 
outraged compassion, often directed against a Creator of dubious justness. Thirdly,
16
his works, and especially his late plays, inteiTogate the Bible even as they proHfically 
reproduce Biblical motifs.
From Theodore Parker’s Unitarianism, on the other hand, Strindberg gained a 
renewed vigour and enjoyment of life. Aceording to The Son o f a Seiyant, a 
beefsteak and two bottles of beer with an aristocratic friend finally caused his devout 
Christianity to tumble, and he turned to Parker’s optimistic theism. Parker, and the 
Unitarians generally, rejected the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, and original sin.
Strindberg’s former asceticism crumbled, at least for a time. Subsequently, it seemed 
to Strindberg that he had two selves: “[h]is new self revolted against his old one, and 
for the rest of his life they fought with each other like an unhappy married couple who 
cannot get a divorce.” '^ This internal conflict helped shape the religious outlook of 
his later plays.
•a.
Strindberg may have abandoned Pietism early on, but he remained a theist until his 
trial for blasphemy. In 1884 he caused a scandal with his short story collection Giftas 
(“Married”) in which he refers to holy communion as “the impudent deception 
practised with Hogstedt’s Piccadon at 65 ore the half gallon, and Lettstrom’s wafers at 
1 crown a pound, which the parson passed off as the body and blood of Jesus of 
Nazareth, the agitator who had been executed over 1800 years earlier.”^^  While this 
passage satfrises Church ritual, it implicitly expresses admfration of Jesus. The trial 
was a public sensation, but although Strindberg was acquitted life in Sweden became 
unbearable to him and he left for the first of a number of periods of exile in Europe.
He became an avowed atheist and naturalist, producing a number of violent and very
^'Strindberg, The Son o f a Servant, p. 154
I
August Strindberg, Getting Married, pan s I  andII, trans. Mary Sandbach (London: Gollancz, 1972), 
p. 71
■a:
___
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powerful dramas in which he depicts life as a deadly struggle for survival. He himself 
conceived of these as part of a drama “which is not concerned whether something is 
beautiful or ugly, as long as it is great.”^^  The most famous of these were The Father 
and Miss Julie. Strindberg’s atheism was notably practical, God’s existence was for 
him a personal and ethical question rather than one of an abstract truth. Indeed, 
Strindberg’s atheism was an existential choice. We get the flavour of his atheism in 
this statement from his Inferno: “The fact is, that in the course of years, as 1 came to 
notice that the unseen Powers left the world to its fate and showed no interest in it, I 
had become an atheist.” "^' As one scholar puts it, Strindberg’s atheism “was the result 
of a practical decision to take his fate into his own hands, instead of depending on the 
intervention of divine P r o v id en c e . Th us  in the Foreword to Miss Julie Strindberg 
berates believers not for intellectual but for moral weakness: they camiot bear thefr 
own guilt, but must put the burden onto Jesus.^" This comment reveals the extent to 
which Strindberg retained, even as an atheist, the emotional outlook of his Pietistic 
years. It is also time that he retained a sharp sense of God’s injustice even after his 
conversion back to Cliristianity, a point we will return to in the course of the thesis.
Strindberg’s re-conversion to Chiistianity took place after a crisis, or in fact a 
repeated series of crises between 1894 and 1896. Strindberg himself gave a 
fictionalised account of this period in his book Inferno, because of which it has come 
to be known as his “Inferno crisis.” Since Martin Lamm’s monumental work on 
Strindberg, it has been a convention of Strindberg scholarship to divide his life and
Strmdberg, Selected Essays, p. 78 
Strindberg, Inferno, p. 102
Gunnar Brandell, Strindberg in Inferno, trans. B. Jacobs (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press), p. 54
August Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, trans. Michael Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 63
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work around this point?^ Each of the crises followed the same pattern: general 
anxiety and feeling sick; fantasies of suicide and persecution; flight to new 
surroundings, followed by the subsiding of the c r i s i s .Thi s  conveys nothing of the 
vivid sense of paranoid tenor in some passages o f Inferno, or the hallucinatory force 
of others. As with The Son o f a Servant, this is not quite autobiography. The nanator 
is very close to Strindberg, and the events he nanates follow closely those that 
Strindberg experienced in Paris and, later, in Austria. Yet this is still not straight 
autobiography, but somewhere between autobiography, allegory and novel. It deals 
with the nanator’s abnegation and chastisement by ‘the Powers’, who eventually whip 
him somewhat unwillingly back into the Clu istian fold. At times these Powers seem 
to be actual spiritual beings external to the nanator, at times they appear to be 
psychological projections embodying aspects of the narrator’s own psyche, A thought 
which first occurs in The Son o f a Servant recurs here, that this world is a penal 
colony where we suffer for unremembered crimes in a previous existence. But here 
the narrator (as did Strindberg himself) experiences life as an actual hell. It was 
towards the end of his Inferno-crisis that Strmdberg first encountered the writings of 
the eighteenth century Swedish mystic, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688 -  1772). 
Strindberg was immensely impressed by Swedenborg’s writings. Of his first reading 
of Swedenborg’s descriptions of hell, Strindberg says “I recognized in it the landscape 
around Klam [the Austrian village he was staying in] ... drawn as if fi'om nature.” "^ 
Swedenborg shared with Strindberg a marked tendency to read significance into
This division, implying as it does a decisive break between the pre- and post- Inferno Strindberg, is 
far from universally aceepted. Any lengthy engagement with Stiindberg reveals many continuities 
between these phases of his work, and the seeds of many later developments can be discerned in his 
earlier writings. Nevertheless, Sti’indberg’s drama did change, and change radically, after his Inferno 
crisis.
Gunnar Brandell gives an exlraustive description of the precise times, places and characteristics of 
each crisis in Strindberg in Inferno.
Strindberg, Inferno, p. 211
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apparently commonplace incidents and coincidences.^" Swedenborg, again like 
Strindberg, felt his life to be directed by spiritual beings, and it is Swedenborg’s 
writings that brought Strindberg to view these Powers as disciplinary spirits guided by 
a beneficent Providence.^' This, in part, helped Strindberg make sense of his 
experiences and particularly of his suffering, as did the belief in reincarnation that he 
adopted at about this time. A similar motivation prompted him to adopt a belief in
karma, a doctrine popularized in the west by HP Blavatsky.^^ It is significant, 
however, that although Strmdberg responded so strongly to Swedenborg’s visionary 
work, the latter’s theology repelled him.^  ^ It is also characteristic that Strindberg 
could not give himself wholly to a Swedenborgian view of the cosmos. He could not 
help questioning the presence of a providential design or its ultimate beneficence.
Indeed, both theodicy and the idea of a moral order in the cosmos come into question, 
at times subjected to outright attack, in the plays discussed in this thesis. Similarly, in 
his Inferno, Strindberg at times takes this worldly hell as just chastisement, at others 
as the work of a morally dubious divinity:
It is the Earth itself that is Hell, the prison constructed for us by an intelligence 
superior to our own, in which 1 could not take a step without injuring the 
happiness of others, and in which my fellow creatures could not enjoy their 
own happiness without causing me pain.^"'
This passage contains an accusation against the architect of the earthly prison.
■Strindberg’s naturalistic plays had presented the world as a ruthless struggle, in which 'if1
____________________________ ...Lamm, Strindberg och Makterna, p. 130-1 
Ibid., p. 104
Although Strindberg claimed a heady to have derived a similar idea from the works of Swedish 
naturalist Carl von Linne, See ibid., p. 134. Strindberg detested Blavatsky and claimed to find nothing 
original in her writings, yet she did exercise a certain influence on him. This becomes evident in the 
Chamber Plays, in particular in tlie subtitle of The Ghost Sonata: Kama Loka.
Ibid., p. 111-12 
Sti'indberg, Inferno, p. 211
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.. .the undeniable manifestations of the Evil One, in his traditional form, are 
simply scarecrows, conjured up by a Providence, unique and good, who
À
survival meant destroying others. That view is still evident here, but now it causes 
pain and resentment against the re-discovered Creator. The narrator struggles to
believe, yet every time he comes close to something like a conventional Cliristian 
outlook, his words sound forced and trite, even sentimental. We can observe this in If
the contrast of two passages, both from the final chapters o f Inferno:
'
governs by means of an immense staff of servants made up of the departed.^^
2From the next chapter:
Is religion a punishment, and is Clu'ist the spirit of vengeance? [...] Is it 
possible -  God forgive me -  that even Clirist has been transformed into a 
demon? He has brought death to reason, to the flesh, to beauty, to joy, to the 
purest feelings of affection of which mankind is capable.^"
The book, although pmporting to be the stoiy of a man’s conversion, ends in 
confusion. In the Epilogue the narrator tells us that he had intended to end his book 
with the words “‘what a jest, what a miserable jest, this life is after all.’”^^  The 
narrator is acutely aware of his own inesolution, declaring in a passage that is part 
prayer to the Powers, part castigation “In my youth 1 was a true believer and you 
made of me a free thinker. Of the fi'ee-thinker you made an atheist, of the atheist a 
monk [...] You have cut the ground fr'om under all my enthusiasms, and suppose that 
I now dedicate myself to religion, 1 know for a certainty that before ten years have 
passed you will prove to me that religion is f a l s e . I n  this peculiar passage, the 
nanator does not declare that religion is false. He declares that eventually it will
Ibid., p. 259 
Ibid., p. 262 
”  Ibid., p. 272
38 Ibid., p. 262
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prove to be so, although he believes it now and seriously wishes to pursue it. The 
narrator, and, we can infer, Strindberg, are neither believers nor disbelievers. This, 
rather than simple theistic belief, characterises the religious position behind the plays 
explored here; simultaneous belief and doubt, an agonising no-man’s~land. Inferno 
does not recount the conversion of a sinner, but the biith of a half-believer.
The historical background: the half-believer and the Bible as narrative
To be a Cluistian has always, perhaps, been problematic. The Gospel of Mark 
contains the declaration “I believe; help thou mine unbelief.”^^  However, the 
problematic status of being Cliristian became particularly acute in the nineteenth 
century, and for many remains so today. Indeed Christianity is often most 
problematic for the believer. The apparent withdrawal of God Irom the world 
tlireatened to make life a meaningless and nihilistic struggle. In Matthew Arnold’s 
words,
The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the fiill ...
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, ...
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Wliere ignorant armies clash by night.
■i'
39 Mark 9; 24
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Nietzsche characterised the situation in more extreme terms; God had not withdrawn, 
God was dead -  and we had killed him/° The result was disorientation and a 
pervading sense of loss. The theological responses to this have included the birth of 
American fundamentalism in the early twentieth century, as well as, more recently, 
the UK movement known as Radical Orthodoxy. Another response has been that of 
the half-believer, which we will explore in a moment. These responses all took place 
within Christianity. There was in the late nineteenth century another kind of reaction, 
one that is still with us; the turn towards Asian religions. The eclectic and syncretic 
spii'it this engendered was exemplified early on by Madam Blavatsky (1831-1891), 
who first came to prominence in the 1870s. She claimed to represent a lodge of 
masters whose members included the Buddha and Jesus. Implicit in this is the claim 
that all religions are in essence one, whatever the differences of doctrine and ritual. 
Swedenborg had a centuiy earlier adopted a position not far ftom this. Another 
symptom of this turn towards the east was the World Parliament of Religions, an 
event that took place in Chicago in 1893 and exposed the western world for the first 
time to figures like DT Suzuki and Swami Vivekananda. All these responses, 
disparate as they are, correspond to aspects of Strindberg’s reaction to his own 
religious crisis.
Of the above responses to the crisis of Cliristianity, one of the most pertinent to 
Strindberg is the figure of the half believer. The situation of the half-believer is the 
starting point for a number of more or less postmodern responses to theology that 
intemeave with Strindberg’s complex reaction to Chiistianity. The half believer does 
not comiote halfhearted belief or indifference. H alf belief is discomfiting precisely
Friedi'ich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ti'ans. Josephine Naucklioff (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 119 - 120
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because it occurs in the devout. The half believer “finds himself more often than not 
inhabiting a strange, bewildering and uncomfortable no-man’s land between belief 
and unbelief.”'^  ^ The half believer is a modern figure, and the responses to the half 
believer’s situation numerous. Richard Holloway, the former Bishop of Edinburgh, 
writes somewhat uncomfortably fi'om a position of half belief. He opens one book 
with an attack on doctrinally formulated religion, opposing to it an instinctive 
“religious impulse” that remains outside the proprietary claims of any particular 
tradition or denomination.'^^ The theologian Don Cupitt, on the other hand, embraces 
a Cliristian atheism that replaces the “realistic and anthropomorphic” view of God 
with an internalised religion. Furthermore he defends his position as orthodox.'^^ The 
a/theology of Mark C. Taylor begins in a place without fixed landmarks, asking the 
question “But where are we?”'^ '* He goes on, “Individuals appear to be unsure of 
where they have come from and where they are going ... Furthermore, the ‘texts’ that 
have guided and grounded previous generations often appear illegible in the modern 
and postmodern worlds.” He traces the postmodern predicament to one of the great 
“prophets” of postmodernism, Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of 
God anticipates the predicament addi'essed by all these writers when he asks
Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we 
doing when we unchained this earth fi'om its sun? Wliere is it moving to now? 
Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? ... Is there still an up and a 
down? Aren’t we straying as though thi'ough an infinite nothing?^^^
Peter Baelz, The Forgotten Dream: Experience, Hope and God (London: Mowbrays, 1975), p. 2 
Richard Holloway, Doubts and Loves: What is Left o f Christianity, (Edinburgh: Cannongate, 2002), 
pp. 3-5
 ^Don Cupitt, Taking Leave o f  God (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. 93 
Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theolog}? (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1984), p.
3
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 120
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This is the ten itory of half-belief. The plays we will be exploring also inliabit this 
space.
I have already hinted that the predicament faced by a believer at the turn of the 
twentieth centuiy, particularly one as acutely aware of the intellectual cuiTents of his 
age as Strindberg, was related to the progressive collapse of the perceived coherence 
of the Biblical canon. This was a particularly acute problem for the Lutheran 
iidieritance of the north with its emphasis on the Bible as the sole source of authority. 
Mark C Taylor, in formulating his a/theology, points out the problems facing the 
believer rather succinctly. In his Erring, Taylor points out that theology has for 
centuries been underwritten by a network comprising four basic terms: God, self, 
history and the book.'^ ® The self reflects the unity and coherence of God, while 
history has a fixed begimiing and an end, in the sense of a purpose or telos. The Book 
weaves the story of the interaction of the self with God. The four terms of this 
network were bound together to produce a complete, coherent narrative. Strindberg, 
writing almost a century before Taylor, was already quite consciously undermining 
the self and the book. The paradox is that this dissolution is simultaneously a moment 
of intensely religious vision. Indeed, it is frequently a moment of apocalyptic vision.
The dissolution of narrative coherence has a histoiy in the attempts after Luther and 
Calvin to find a hermeneutic that could provide a stable and authoritative reading of 
the Bible. As Hans Frei points out in his classic The Eclipse o f Biblical Narrative, 
before the eighteenth centuiy, the books of the Old and New Testaments were
Mark C. Taylor, Erring, p. 7 and passim.
if,,:-.___
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assumed both to be literally true, and to fomi a seamless whole.'^  ^ Wliile for Luther 
“the grammatical or historical sense is the tme s e n s e , h e  had to supplement this 
with a figurai or typological reading. This was made necessary by two linked 
concerns: the unity of the canon; and the centrality of Chi'ist to both Old and New 
Tes taments .To make this work, the events and people of the Old Testament were 
taken to have both a literal and a typological reference: as well as referring to 
historical events, they pre-figure the New Testament. Thus the Promised Land has a 
double reference: it both fulfils the promise made by God to the Israelites, and 
prefigures the Kingdom of Heaven promised to humanity in general. This 
interpretative operation linked the disparate books of the canon together, and turned it 
into a single narrative: the two testaments became “one canon, the unitary subject of 
which was the story of man’s fall and the salvation wrought by Jesus Christ.” ®^ Thus 
the Bible tells a single story that begins with the creation of the world in Genesis and 
ends, in Revelation, with the end of days, and all of human history is contained within 
this histoiy of salvation.
Confidence in this grand narrative began to break down as a logical and reflective gap 
opened up between the Bible and the world. The unity of the literal and figurai 
readings of the Bible came to seem untenable as the assumptions underpinning this 
unity came under attack. Under pressure, “the literal and figurai reading draw apart, 
the latter gradually looking like a forced, arbitrary imposition of unity on a group of 
very diverse texts. No longer an extension of literal reading, figurai interpretation 
instead becomes a bad historical argument or an arbitrary allegorizing of texts in the
Hans Frei, The Eclipse o f  Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) pp. 1-2, 4-5 
Ibid., p. 19 
Ibid., pp. 19-20 
Ibid., p. 31
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service of preconceived dogma. The unity of the Bible thus became questionable, 
and human history could not easily be read into the Biblical narrative. Indeed, in the 
eighteenth century it became important to test the Bible against a reconstmction of 
history, and this also lead to demands to subject the Bible to historical assumptions: 
“then, historical judgment had been no more than a function of the literal .,. sense of 
a nan'ative passage; now, on the contrary, the sense of such a passage came to depend 
on the estimate of its historical claims, character, and origin. In other words the 
interpretative position had reversed, and typology as a means of unifying the canon 
came under strain. Thus canonical unity became an issue for the faithful.
For Cliristianity after Paul, the primary narrative is the Passion. The betrayal, 
condemnation, cmcifixion and resun ection of Jesus still grips the western 
imagination. It has also become the core of Cliristian claims to universality.
Humanity fell with Adam, and Clirist, alone innocent, paid the price for the original 
transgression with his torment and death. The resurrection reveals this narrative as 
comedy, in Dante’s sense, rather than tragedy. The resurrection gives the crucifixion 
significance. Without it, the Gospels would tell a stoiy of meaningless suffering and 
death. As it is, this is a narrative of salvation. Humanity has fallen, the world is at 
fault, but the resurrection promises to restore humanity. This redemptive naiTative 
involves a reading of history (history is caught up in the divine drama of fall and 
redemption), as well as an understanding of humanity in general (humanity is fallen, 
and human imperfection becomes almost characteristic), and an understanding of 
human identity (as distinct coherent personality). In other words, a redemptive 
nan'ative rests on nan'ative conventions, of coherent individual actors within a linear
Ibid., p. 37 
Ibid., p. 41
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histoiy where cause and effect usually work in an unremarkable way (apart from 
divine interventions or miracles). This set of assumptions has a parallel in Aristotle’s 
analysis of tragedy. A brief review of the Ai'istotelian model of theatre helps to 
highlight both the originality and the theological import of the kind of theatre 
Strindberg embarked on in his di*eam plays.
For Aristotle, the essence of tragedy lies in mimesis, “an imitation of a worthy or 
illustrious, and perfect ac t i on . Th ea t r e ,  and indeed art in general, is an imitation of 
the world. Wliilst Aristotle discerns six major aspects of tragedy, he lays the greatest 
importance on plot, defined as “the combination of incidents. For tragedy is an 
imitation, not of men, but of actions... All the actions and incidents of the plot 
must, further, form a coherent whole. As a whole, it should possess a beginning, a 
middle and an end.^  ^ Thus the plot consists of essentially one action with a number of 
parts: “the fable should be the imitation of one action ... the parts of the transaction 
should be so aiTanged, that any one of them being transposed, or taken away, the 
whole would become different or changed.”^^  A causal chain therefore links the first 
and last actions of the plot, encompassing everything between.
There are two points to make here, the first connected with theology, the second with 
Strindberg. Firstly, then, Christian theology has tended to read history in terms not 
dissimilar to an Aristotelian drama. It has a beginning and a middle, and involves a 
projected end to history. This resemblance is probably no coincidence, given 
Aristotle’s influence on scholastic theology. The latter shares Aiistotle’s concern for
Ai'istotle, The Rhetoric, Poetic and Nichomachean Ethics o f Aristotle, trans. Thomas Taylor (Frome: 
The Prometheus Trust, 2002), p. 196
Ibid., p. 197 
Ibid., p. 199 
Ibid., p. 200
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coherent totalities, aiming to make theology into an internally consistent edifice of 
ideas, a “cathedral of the mind.”^^  Aristotelian drama may therefore be said to carry 
within it assumptions consonant with theology conceived of as the attempt to create a 
coherent, consistent and all-encompassing system of doctrines. Secondly, in his 
naturalistic phase Strindberg was writing largely in accordance with Aristotelian 
assumptions. Although Strindberg denied character as a coherent entity, the 
naturalistic plays have a beginning and an end linked by a causal chain that makes 
them into coherent wholes. Although they express a view of the world that is 
ostensibly atheistic, they are in this sense more theologically conservative than the 
post-Inferno dramas. In contrast, Strindberg’s dream plays break decisively with 
Aristotelian drama. As Strindberg puts it in the foreword to A Dream Play, “time and 
space do not exist.”^^  It is significant, then, that Strindberg begins to make use of 
Platonic ideas in his dream plays. Not only does he employ Platonic imagery in both 
the dialogue and the mise-en-scene, but the deliberate breaking up of theatrical 
realism is also arguably a move towards Plato. Stmidberg’s move away from 
Aristotelian theatre is also, to some extent, a move towards a Platonic theatre. We 
will explore this further in Chapter 3, but briefly stated in a Platonic theatre Plato’s 
myth of the cave becomes the central theatrical metaphor. Rather than a theatre in 
which the audience become passive observers of an imitation of the world, a Platonic 
theatre aims to ‘turn’ the audience away from the world of becoming, and towards 
being.^^
The phrase is Etienne Gilson’s. Quoted Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, 
Fourth Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 29 
August Stiindberg, Till Damaskus / Ett Dromspel (Stockliolm: Legenda, 1986), p. 108 
See Anthony Gash, “Plato’s Theatre of the Mind,” in Anthony Frost (ed.). Theatre Theories: From 
Plato to Virtual Reality (Nowrich: The Drama Studio, 2000), pp. 1-22
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Another facet of the background to Strindberg’s Cliristianity, and a vitally important 
one, is the early impression made on him by the Danish theologian Soren Kierkegaard 
(1813 -  1855). Kierkegaard, like Strindberg, objected to all-encompassing 
metaphysical systems. Kierkegaard’s Cluistianity is in a sense anti-narrative, too, in 
that faith involves a leap, a definitive break with non-faith. Kierkegaard presents us 
with an existential choice. Strindberg felt the attraction and the force of 
Kierkegaard’s thinking, but despite this was never quite able to make the 
Kierkegaardian leap. Its demand both appealed to and appalled him Strindberg’s 
contact with Kierkegaard was to a significant extent mediated by Ibsen’s ph,y Brand. 
Master Olof Strindberg’s first great play, reveals his reaction to Kierkegaard and to 
the Kierkegaardian hero of Ibsen’s play. These responses resonate throughout 
Strindberg’s later work.
Kierkegaard, Brand, and Master Olof
Strindberg’s earliest exposure to Kierkegaardian thought seems to have come in the 
form of a play, Ibsen’s Brand. A little later, while still a student, Strindberg read 
Kierkegaard’s Either/Or.^^ Strindberg instinctively felt Kierkegaard’s importance, 
although he had difficulty understanding him.'’  ^ The exact relationship of Ibsen’s 
Brand and Kierkegaardian ideas is vexed, but there are striking resemblances, and in 
the late 1860s this seemed sufficiently obvious for the Danish critic Georg Braudes to 
describe Ibsen as Kierkegaard’s poet.^^ Strindberg was immensely impressed with
Bjarnasson’s unpublished PhD thesis on Categories o f  Kierkegaardian Thought in the Life and 
Writings o f August Strindberg carefully details Strindberg’s encounter with Kierkegaard.
BrevYol. 1, pp. 103, 122.
Habib C. Malik, Receiving Soren Kierkegaard: the Early Impact and Transmission o f his Thought 
(Washington; The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 148. Brandes changed his mind 
about this some years later, partly due to Ibsen’s own denials. Malik discusses in detail the difficulties
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Brand, and Strindberg’s frst major play. Master Olof, reads, it seems to me, as a 
response to it. (Indeed, the last play Strindberg wrote. The Great Highway, also bears 
some striking resemblances to Brand.) As the Kierkegaardian themes of Brand and 
Strindberg’s response to them have echoes tlii’onghout the plays we will be looking at, 
I want to examine here the pertinent themes in Brand and then at the way in which 
Master Olof responds to them.
Brand dramatises a number of Kierkegaardian themes: an either/or choice; the leap;
and sacrifice (teleological suspension of the ethical). The play also echoes the
Kierkegaardian concern for truth as existential and subjective: the truth seen from the
viewpoint of a particular existing individual. The categorical choice requfred by
either/or is fundamental to Brand, but in Kierkegaard’s writings there are two ways of
understanding it. The book Either/Or concerns the choice between the aesthetic and
the e th ica l .Very  briefly, the aesthetic is characterised by a disengaged enjoyment.
It is an intellectually sophisticated hedonism that entails, ultimately, a detachment
from others and from any serious commitment. Any commitment entered into in the
aesthetic mode is done as an experiment, with the ultimate aim of further cultivating
pleasure. The aesthetic is attractive, but shallow. The ethical, on the other hand,
involves not merely an acknowledgement of the claim the ethical makes on the
individual, but a kind of inward commitment. The ethical is, paradoxical as it may
seem, focused inwardly and it is highly individualistic. Either/Or presents no
systematic argument in favour of one over the other, but rather they are presented side
by side and the reader is effectively asked to choose. Of course, this is a little
disingenuous: Kierkegaard quite clearly holds the ethical to be superior to the
in determining the nature and extent of Kierkegaard’s influence on Ibsen, without coming to a firm 
conclusion.
Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment o f Life, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 2004).
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aesthetic. But in any case, the two are incompatible. One must ultimately choose 
between the ethical and the aesthetic, even if the aesthetic is in some ways subsumed 
in the ethical. The choice is absolute, but what distinguishes the two, ultimately, is 
the quality of the choice. As we saw, the aesthetic individual can choose to abide by 
ethical norms as an experiment, but does not finally commit him- or herself. The 
ethical in this sense seems to consist more in the act of commitment than in the thing 
committed to. The second kind of either/or bears a strong resemblance to the first, but 
here the choice is between the ethical and the religious. In Fear and Trembling's 
account of Abraham and Isaac, the religious involves a suspension of the ethical. By 
any ethical standard, to sacrifice one’s son is abominable. For Kierkegaard, though, 
Abraham achieves something greater than the ethical. In fact, such is the force of 
God’s demand that it suspends the ethical. This is of some importance to Brand, but 
what concerns us here is really the way Kierkegaard characterises Chi'istianity. For 
Kierkegaard, Clu'istianity is also a matter of existential choice. It is not a cognitive 
truth about the universe, like Newton’s law of gravity, which can be empirically 
demonstrated and commands a sort of cold assent. Those who attempt to make 
Cliristianity conform to reason have misunderstood Cliristianity. In fact, as 
characterised in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, we can have no objective 
assurance of the tmth of Cliristianity, '^^ To suppose we can, or to suppose it is a 
matter of rational argument and evidence, is to mistake Clu istianity for an objective, 
cognitive truth. Faith consists precisely in a total commitment to something of which 
we can have no objective assurance. Christianity here presents us with an absolute 
choice: we believe or we do not. But here again it consists, not so much in what is 
believed, but in how you believe it. It is, even more so than the ethical, characterised
64 S0ren Kierkegaard, “Concluding Unscientific Postscript”, in Mark C. Taylor, Deconstruction in
 , /'i-'u;_____________________________________________ r,__ i /'n ^ n r .Context, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 ), pp. 169-190
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by inwardness. Clu'istianity for Kierkegaard concerns the individual. Now there is 
another aspect to all this that will become important for looking at Strindberg, namely 
the sense in which the choice secures individual identity. In Either/Or, the judge 
characterises the ethical as something that allows you to achieve individuality. It 
imbues a character and a life with coherence.*"  ^ The aesthetically lived life, by 
contrast, is always prone to change according to circumstance and lacks the kind of 
stability available to the ethically oriented. As if to demonstrate this, the material 
making up the first, aesthetic, section of the book consist of fragments.
The Christianity Brand's eponymous hero appears Kierkegaardian in its 
inwardness. It does not consist of conformity to a (worldly) church. Indeed, the 
demands of Brand’s inward Clu'istianity bring him into sharp conflict with the 
Chui'ch, as well as secular society. In Brand’s view, secular society and the Church 
are, in any case, more or less indistinguishable. The Church, for Brand, has 
compromised with the world. The individual, then, must choose between the world 
and Clu'istianity. Indeed, Brand finds he must choose between the Church and 
Christianity. This choice is absolute, and in this sense it resembles Kierkegaard’s 
either/or. In Brand’s terms, it is “all or nothing.” Compromise is impossible.
Brand’s ‘all or nothing’ is cruder than Kierkegaard’s either/or, but in both cases they 
proclaim an existential predicament: that the individual must choose. Furthermore, in 
the matter of Clu'istianity, the choice is absolute. It is also, in both cases, essentially 
individual and existential. The consequence, for Brand, is a life lived in opposition. 
Brand is heroically individualistic, and his absolute conunitment puts him at war with 
everyone. His faith demands that he always swims against the current. Indeed, this
Kierkegaard, Either/Or, pp. 478-80, 472
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swimming against the current itself seems to constitute his Cliristianity. In this way 
too, he resembles Kierkegaard, for whom how one believes matters more than what 
one be l ieves .Here  too Brand connects with the hero of Strindberg’s Master Olof, 
whose brother Lars tells him “You were bom to flght.”^^  Brand’s absolute 
commitment generates all the dramatic conflict in the play, and everything happens as 
a result of this.
Another aspect of Kierkegaard’s characterisation of Christianity, and one that feature
II
Î
prominently in Brand, is risk. The Chi'istian has an absolute imier commitment to
something without any (objective) assurance that it is true, as we have seen. This is a
risky undertaking. As Kierkegaard says in Postscript : “...I must constantly be intent
upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, over
seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith This is almost
literally true of Brand in Act 2. He crosses the fjord in a perilous storm to tend a
dying man who will otherwise die unsliriven. Brand feels the religious demand in
such a way that he must risk all. This sort of symbolism, of faith being bound up with
ultimate risk, is also present in the first act. Brand is half-way up a mountain,
accompanied by a peasant and a boy. A thick mist sun'ounds them, they have lost the
path, and it is almost dark. The Peasant complains that they must turn back, they are
in peril and Brand is walking on a thin crust of snow above a crevasse: “we are
standing over a gulf, no one knows how deep: it’ll swallow us up, and you too!”^^
Brand proclaims that he is doing God’s bidding, and his commitment is absolute: he
must risk all. This resembles Beckett’s vision of the human predicament, as well as 
-------------------------------------------
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34
that of the Strindberg plays we will be looking at. Brand and his companions are lost 
in a fog on a pathless mountainside, suspended over a crevasse, but Brand goes on, 
according to the demands of his faith, walking a perilous path over an abyss. 
Chi'istianity is then a gamble. As the Baillie says in Act 3:
The Baillie: [...] you stand where the road divides. Don’t stake your all on 
one card.
Brand: That I shall do.^°
Brand ruthlessly applies the absolute demand of his ‘all or nothing. ’ He refuses to see 
his dying mother until she commits herself entirely to God, to do which she must 
sacrifice the last scrap of the wealth she has horded over a lifetime. From Brand’s 
point of view she has made an idol of wealth and to turn away from this idolatry she 
must give up every last part of it: “the least fragment of the golden calf is fully as 
much an idol as the w h o l e , h e  proclaims. She finally dies without seeing her son, 
as Brand will not compromise, despite the anguish it costs him. The point of this is 
not that Brand is callous -  he is evidently very distressed -  but that his calling 
demands total commitment. Salvation is for Brand a matter of willingly sacrificing 
all: “dying in anguish upon the tree of the cross is not martyrdom; but this, first: 
Willing the death of the cross [...] this, in the first place, is taking hold of salvation. 
This extends ultimately to sacrificing his son and then his wife. He can only save his 
son by moving away from the unhealthy jQord he inhabits, but doing so means 
abandoning his calling. His wife, too, dies, probably fr'om grief. The reference to 
Abraham sacrificing Isaac is obvious, except that here God does not intervene and 
stay Brand’s hand. The ethical problem posed in the case of Abraham and Isaac is the
™ Ibid., p. 123 
Ibid., p. 106 
Ibid., p. 102
open.
The name Brand, in both Noiwegian and English, connotes fire and passion. Master 
Olof, the eponymous protagonist of Strindberg’s first major play, also bums with a 
passionate faith:
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same one posed by Brand -  namely that to sacrifice a child is monstrous. For 
Kierkegaard, this is justified by the suspension of the ethical. Such is the force of 
God’s command that the ethical is momentarily suspended. Now, according to Malik, 
Brand never attains the religious, in Kierkegaard’s sense, but remains in the ethical. 
He does not follow God’s commands but the dictates of his own will. The problem is, 
it seems to me, that it is impossible to know. Brand follows with utter conviction 
what he conceives to be an absolute demand and sacrifices everything to it. He has no 
more assurance of his rightness at the end of the play than he has at the begimiing. 
Indeed, the play’s ending is ambiguous. Brand is buried in an avalanche that also 
engulfs the entire valley. This could be read as a flat contradiction of everything he 
believes -  that there is only a bmte material world that finally smothers all in an 
undifferentiated expanse of whiteness. We could also read an implicit critique of 
Kierkegaard in the play as a whole. Brand is impressive, but ambiguous. At times he 
resembles the monstrous bishop in Ingmar Bergman’s Fanny and Alexander. He 
says, for example, “I know God’s love, and that is not weak and mild [...] it offers 
caresses which leave wounds.”^^  He later continues in the same style: “[y]ou manikin 
souls! you will end by turning Flumanity into humanitarians! Was God humane to 
Jesus Clirist?” '^^  His faith by sheer act of will makes him impressive, if not also a 
fanatic. Whether his refusal to compromise is in the end a virtue, the play leaves
___
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Olof: Once I had the flame of faith and it burned gloriously. But the monks 
quenched it with their holy water [...]
Lars: That was a fire of straw which would soon have burned out. But now 
the Lord will kindle in you a greater fue, which will consume the seed of the 
Philistines.^^
The play is loosely based on a historical character, the Swedish counterpart to Luther 
whom King Gustav Vasa made use of to break Sweden away from Roman 
Catholicism. The play depicts Sweden as suffering a Babylonian captivity under the 
rule of a coiTupt Church and repressive state. Olof finds himself, reluctantly at first, 
whipped up to rebellion against the Church, first by his brother Lars, and later by Gert 
Bookbinder, a radical ex-priest. So, like Brand, Olof finds himself fighting the 
religious establishment. Brand embarks on a project to pull down the old village 
church and build a new one, in order to awaken the village and start the renewal of the 
country. Similarly, Lars urges Olof to “pull down the old, rotten house [...] The Lord 
will build a new one.” ®^ This makes Olof politically useful to the King, who is 
attempting to limit the power of the Church, but ultimately it brings Olof into conflict 
with the state.
A'
.
s
In the cases of both Brand and Olof, choosing Christianity means strife. In both 
cases, thefr Christian calling leads them to fight for theii* countrymen’s awakening 
fr om spiritual slumber. But where Brand is unbending to the end, Olof shows signs of 
human frailty. Even in the first act, he is at fu*st very reluctant to fight the 
establishment. In a vision he sees an angel presenting him with a cup, but does not 
wish to take it. He wishes at best to follow in the rear of the fighting and heal the
Strindberg, Master Olof, p. 17 
Ibid.
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wounded. Perhaps more significantly, the play contains a curious parallel to Brand’s 
argument with his mother. Wliere Brand’s mother, despite conventional piety, is 
ultimately very worldly, Olof s mother remains a devout Catholic and deplores Olof s 
campaign against the Church. Brand, we have seen, ultimately refuses to attend his 
mother’s death-bed because she will not give up her attachment to worldly wealth. 
Olof, on the other hand, attends his mother’s death-bed, although she dies cursing him 
for ejecting the priest who was to perfbim the last rites. In his grief, Olof does what 
Brand never would -  he compromises his principles, lights the candles left by the 
priest and puts palm branches in each of her hands. Here, the absolute either/or 
demand of faith meets the contrary demands of compassion and mercy. Olof finds he 
has to compromise with the world, although he condemns his own weakness. The 
demands of an absolute dedication to truth (as Olof conceives it) conflict with being 
human.
This choice between principle and compromise confronts Olof in the starkest possible 
form at the play’s conclusion. He has become involved in a plot against the king.
The king, however, offers a pardon if Olof recants and accepts an official position in 
the reformed Swedish Church. Olof finally must choose between martyrdom and 
compromise. The choice could not be starker. Olof compromises. In the last line of 
the play, Gert, offstage, condemns Olof with the single word ‘apostate!’ The play 
ends with Olof weeping in torment.
Now there are various ways in which Master Olof suggests an engagement with 
Kierkegaard. There is the suggestion in Act I of a progi'cssion from the aesthetic to 
the ethical; as the first scene opens, Olof is dfrecting the rehearsal of a play he has
Ibid., p. 49
Strindberg, “From an Occult Diary,” in Inferno /From  an Occult Diaiy, trans. Mary Sandbach
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written. He appears, therefore, to be living aesthetically. Adding to this impression, 
he is at first reluctant to rebel, preferring to remain on the sidelines and observe, 
although he quickly overcomes this. His entry into the ethical and/or religious 
commits him to conflict with Church and then state authority in the name of his truth. 
There is also a suggestion that truth is subjective, dependent on the manner of belief 
rather than the substance. Olof tells his mother “Wliat you believe has become a lie 
[...]. Wlien you were young, you were right, when I am old 1 may be wrong.”^^  In 
the 1870s and 80s, Strindberg was very self-consciously modern, and of course this 
way of thinking celebrates the young revolutionaries over the old reactionaries, 
although Strindberg was always hampered by being able to see the other side of the 
argument, a crucial factor in the conclusion of Master Olof. But above all, the truth 
for Strindberg, as for Kierkegaard, is existential not abstract. The play dramatises the 
confrontation of religious demands with the demands of living in the world. By 
Brand’s standard, Olof fails. Yet Olof, because he finally gives way, is more human. 
He is both greater and lesser than Brand. The conflict between the demands of faith
'and the demands of the world re-appear in various forms in all the later plays we will 
.be looking at, and Olof s response to the conflict also becomes characteristic.
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche
In an entry in his Ockulta Dagboken (Occult Diary), Strindberg writes “[t]he whole 
world is but a semblance (=Humbug or relative empt i ness ) . Th i s  is not just the 
outburst of a disgruntled old man, but reflects a disposition afready present in 
Strindberg’s satirical early novel The Red Room, only here Strindberg’s social satire
(London: Penguin, 1979), p. 319
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has undergone a kind of metaphysical inflation. In The Red Room characters wear 
masks and play roles to hide their real motives. In the statement above, the whole 
world has come to seem a mere appearance, but of what?
The above statement from the Occult Diary echoes Schopenhauer’s gloomy outlook. 
In a letter to Torsten Hedlund, Strindberg declares that he was brought up by three 
Buddhists, the first being Schopenliauer.^^ Buddhism imparted to Schopenliauer, 
among other things, a sense that suffering is intrinsic to life. Prince Siddharta, 
according to legend, broke out of his father’s palace to witness for the first time 
sickness, old age and death, and this experience spurred his search for liberation. 
Schopenliauer combines this negative assessment of life with a deeply pessimistic 
metaphysics. For him the world is fundamentally blind will, appearing to us under the 
guise of various phenomena. Indeed we ourselves are ultimately manifestations of 
this same will.
Schopenliauer, for all his orientalism, inherits western metaphysics and its categories, 
particularly as formulated by Kant. He iifrierits the opposition of being and becoming, 
the language of reality and appearance. But rather than favouring an unseen reality 
that undergirds appearance, he abhors it. As ultimately creatures of will, we are 
trapped in ceaseless striving. Again, Schopenliauer is hardly unique in finding the 
world to be deficient. Any religion of salvation must find the world faulty, by 
definition, or there would be no need to save anyone from it. Schopenliauer too 
advocates salvation, in his case by stilling the will, a kind of extinction.
79 Brev, vol. 11, p.
40
The significance of Schopenliauer for Strindberg is, then, above all his subjectivism. 
Schopenliauer famously declares at the beginning o f The World as Will and Idea, 
“[t]he world is my idea.” Strindberg, we have seen, finds that the world is perception.
Thus also his experiments with points of view, without in the end deciding between
them. As Strindberg put it in one of his letters, “[w]hy does the bee build a hexagonal 
cell? Because he is subjective, the bastard, and sees everything hexagonally with his 
hexagonal eyes. Why does a person see the planets and the Kanholm bay as round? 
Because the subjective bugger has a round eye.” ®^ Truth becomes subjective and 
relative, and choosing between points of view becomes impossible. On what grounds 
could he do so? For Schopenhauer, as for Strindberg, this makes the mutable world 
dream-like in its changeability. Strindberg’s fiindamental concern, Gumiar Brandell 
points out, “was not with rational ways of explaining existence, but with competing 
visions of the w o r l d . T h e y  differ on the issues of will and its extinction.
Strindberg often speaks of the world as a faulty or distorted copy of a true and stable 
original, but this original is unavailable to us and unreachably distant. For 
Schopenhauer, on the contraiy, will is intimate to creatures and to phenomena. In
contrast to Schopenliauer, Strindberg does not advocate the extinction of the will.
■That subjectivity becomes fractured and unstable is a problem for Strindberg. His
I
seeking for salvation is also a quest for stability of subjectivity. As the death of God 
produces confusion and removes epistemic guarantees for Nietzsche, the fracturing of 
the apparent world, its distance fr om being, produces confusion for Strindberg. But 
Strindberg, unlike Nietzsche, sees the world as fallen. Indeed the fallen status of the 
world consists in its lack of stability, in the failure of epistemic guarantees that leaves
humanity dizzy.
____________________________
Brev, vol. 6, p. 36
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To sum up: a number of Strindberg’s later plays, although deeply marked by his 
religious turn, consistently undermine the salvific promises apparently offered. They 
do this by the dislocation of narrative and the fi’actiuing of characters’ identity. God 
has become unreachably distant and the world has become a desert. This is 
accompanied by a vision of the world as a fallen copy, deceitful and ever-changing, of 
a stable and truthfril original. God and being have departed and left the world reeling. 
This has a history in both Strindberg’s personal religious history and the growing 
crisis in Cliristianity, particularly Protestantism. In this context the Kierkegaardian 
demand to decide between faith and atheism is both urgent and unanswerable. The 
only Christianity available is one largely emptied of doctrinal content, because any 
coherent edifice of doctrine becomes untenable here. Rather, the plays again and 
again rehearse truncated versions of the Passion. Over and over, they commemorate 
the death of God,
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2. To Damascus
Strindberg’s Tnferno crisis’ finally drew to a close in 1896. A year later, as we have 
seen, he wrote a hallucinatory novel, Inferno, that purports to be an autobiographical 
account of this crisis. In 1898, he reworked a lot of the same material in part one of 
To Damascus. This marked the beginning of a period of frenzied creativity that 
lasted, more or less without pause, until Strindberg wrote his last play in 1909.
Sti'indberg wrote two further instalments of the play, part two in 1898 and part tlu ee 
in 1901. These were, however, afterthoughts. Strindberg originally conceived To 
Damascus as a single, self-contained play. This is clear enough fr om the peculiar 
structure of part one (discussed below). And although parts two and tlvee continue to 
some extent the fantastic elements of part one, they are also more naturalistic. The 
stage directions for part three even stipulates the era (late nineteenth century) and the 
place (Austria, by the Danube). The setting becomes a particular time and place, and 
much of the overt strangeness has gone.
This chapter focuses on part one. My aim here is to bring to light the ways in which 
the play, despite appearances, resists a unitary, allegorical reading. The play’s title 
itself suggests such a reading in its reference to the conversion of St. Paul, which I 
explore below. I argue, however, that the play cannot sustain this sort of reading. To 
put it in postmodern tenns, the Clnistian grand narrative (or Cliristianity as a giand 
naiTative) has become fractured if not fragmented. To Damascus is on one level an 
attempt to patch it together. Thus the play begins with a strikingly modern sense of 
estrangement, and attempts to overcome this estrangement by means of a somewhat
' - f ' !
need he reached for whatever lay to hand.^^ All the same, the holes remain and at 
times the protagonist feels them.
But first we need to take another look at an issue that impinges on the play’s 
coherence, namely its relationship to the life of its author. One way of making a 
coherent nan ative out of this story of conversion would be to turn it into dramatised 
autobiography. By becoming an account of the conversion experience of the actual
August Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 68 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1988), p. 213
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contrived allegory. The play represents the pilgrimage and salvation of one who feels
himself damned. This in itself raises questions about the coherence of the salvific 
theme the play overtly endorses. The protagonist feels himself to be damned; he has 
been judged for forgotten crimes committed in a previous existence; and since he is 
already damned, he presumably cannot be saved. Yet by the end of the play, we are 
supposed to believe that he has accepted salvation, however tentatively. This may 
suggest a sort of patched coat: the protagonist, estranged, dnectionless and lost, 
contrives a solution by patching together a coat from the tattered remains of western 
Clu'istianity. As Strindberg was to remark of his own conversion, years later, in his
:
The play embodies many contradictions. These include: cfrcular versus linear time; 
damnation versus salvation; old cosmology versus new cosmology. The play 
juxtaposes Clirist and Satan, exile and pilgrimage. In this chapter, I explore these 
themes under the headings of i. Structure; ii. Cosmology; iii. Christ/Satan iv. Exile 
and Damnation or Pilgrimage and Salvation. Finally, in section v,, I look at the play
as a theatrical piece, addressing the question, what kind of theatre is this? The answer 
to that question is intimately linked with the other themes listed above.
■'1;
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historical personage August Strindberg, it seems to take on a sort of factual 
coherence: this is what happened (albeit diessed up a bit for the stage.) The 
temptations to take this line are twofold: a long tradition within Strmdberg 
scholarship, and some statements made by Strindberg himself. A reeurring question 
for Strindberg scholarship is the relationship of Strindberg’s writing to his life.^  ^ To 
Damascus particularly invites this question. This arises from the play’s overtly 
autobiographical content, as well as its relationship to Inferno. The play’s protagonist 
suffers from religious neuroses of much the same kind as the play’s author, evident in 
the mixture of guilt and defiance. The Lady appears to be a depiction of Frida Uhl, 
Strindberg’s second wife. The book whose content the protagonist attempts to keep 
secret is sometimes inteipreted as Strindberg’s A Madman's Defence, a depiction of 
his first mar r i age .The  visit to the Lady’s mother resembles the time Strindberg 
spent with Frida Uhl’s parents in Doraach in Austria. The play even mentions a cliff- 
side resembling a Turk’s head that caught Strindberg’s attention during his stay with 
his mother-in-law.^^ Now as I have mentioned, the play has an intimate relationship 
with Strindberg’s Inferno, which also deals with a deep sense of guilt, religious 
conversion, and a hallucinatory journey toward a dubious salvation. Yet despite the 
clearly literary character of so much of the book (the ghosts’ supper in chapter 1, for
Strmdberg is not the only Scandinavian writer to be interpreted by scholarship in this fashion. Malik 
notes, in Receiving Soren Kierkegaard, that much of the early Danish scholarship on Kierkegaard dealt 
with the difficulties in interpreting him by “a kind of biographical-psychological approach to the ... 
idiosyncratic Dane and his strange works” (p. 141). Martin Lamm, pre-eminent among early 
Strindberg scholars, treats Strindberg’s writings in a similar vein, and much subsequent scholarship has 
followed suit, including Gunnar Brandell’s magisterial Strindberg in Inferno. Some more recent work 
has found this apparently self-evident relationship between Strindberg’s work and his life more 
problematic. See, for example, G. Rossholm et al (eds.) Strmdberg and Fiction (Stockliohn: Almqvist 
and Wiksell International, 2001), especially the chapters by Lisa Teruel (“Defining Strindberg’s Prose 
Fiction”) and Piotr Bukowski (“August Strindberg’s Inferno and Üie Absence of the Work”).
See, for instance, Michael Meyer’s introduction to To Damascus in August Strindberg, Plays: Three, 
trans. Michael Meyer (London: Methuen, 2000), p. 181.
Olof Lagerkrantz, August Strmdberg, p. 278
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instance, that was to re-appear in modified form in Ghost Sonata), the book closes 
with an assurance that it is a straight-forward factual account:
The reader who is inclined to consider that this book is a work of imagination 
is invited to consult the diary I wrote up day by day from 1895, of which the 
above is merely a version, composed of extracts expanded and rearranged.
Can we believe in the Inferno narrator’s sincerity? Strindberg encourages us to read 
his writings as autobiography,^^ and yet he always withholds himself at the moment 
he seems to be revealing himself. This suggests an analogy with Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous authorship, with which Strindberg was familiar. In the cases of both 
Strindberg and Kierkegaard the relationship of the author and the work is complex 
and paradoxical. Pseudonymous authorship introduces a rhetorical distance between 
the work and its author, making it difficult to discern the author’s views. In 
Kierkegaard’s case, his maimer of writing has an inherent dramatic potential: writing 
under pseudonyms allows Kierkegaard to explore different points of view ‘from 
within, ’ without overtly endorsing one over another. It allows a multiplicity of voices 
to enter his work, albeit a multiplicity governed, ultimately, by a telos leading from 
the aesthetic to the ethical and finally to the religious. For Strindberg, by contrast, his 
experiments with points of view undermined overarching teleological schemes. As 
one scholar puts it, “while Kierkegaard’s dialectical process ends in the security of the 
Clii'istian faith, Strindberg’s repeated tests of varied commitments end in the 
withdrawal to a nihilistic standpoint, affirming only the belief that no commitment is 
v a l i d . E v e n  at the moment he commits himself to faith, that faith is provisional.
86 Stiindberg, Inferno, p. 273
bi an early letter, from 1875, he famously declares “a writer is only a reporter of what he has lived.” 
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This is painfully clear at the end o f Inferno: a narrative of conversion that ends in 
profound and aching uncertainty.
To sum up: despite the appearance of coherent closure, To Damascus is full of 
dissonance and indeed incoherence. It is, however, incoherent in an interesting way: 
its confusion arises in part from a sharp perception of the predicament of its 
protagonist. The play is important, hi the context of this thesis, as the startmg point 
for the particular kind of symbolic dr ama we are concerned with, one in which 
Strindberg engages deeply and paradoxically with religious themes. It is also, more 
broadly, the beginning of modernist, especially absurdist, drama.
i. Structure
To Damascus part one begms the trend towards a drama with a loose and non-linear 
narrative structure. It represents a radical change in dramatic technique from 
Strindberg’s earlier work, and m particular from his naturalistic dramas such as The 
Father, Miss Julie and Creditors. I examine this in more detail in section v., below, 
but in summary Strindberg’s naturalistic diamas were founded on an attempt at 
complete verisimilitude, in which the begimimg and end of the play are linked by a 
tightly forged chain of cause and effect. To Damascus is, by contrast, a loose 
rambling succession of scenes, albeit arranged according to a symbolic pattern. The 
former is, in essence, still part of an Aristotelian theatre: as discussed in chapter 1, 
above, Aristotle required a drama to consist of essentially one ac t ion .Th i s  manner 
of construetion lends Strmdberg’s naturalistic plays, and perhaps Miss Julie in 
particular, a tremendous naiTative drive. They move forward at speed. By
See p. 25
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comparison To Damascus is less obviously dramatic. Miss Julie is driven by the 
seduction of Julie, her ferocious battle with Jean and ultimately her destruction; The 
Father by the psychological fight to the death between the Captain and his wife,
Laura. To Damascus contains no such external conflict. As Strmdberg scholar Egil 
Tornqvist points out, instead of the narrative drive of the naturalistic plays To 
Damascus provides something vaguer and looser.^^ In the former scene succeeds 
scene by logical necessity, and the drama centres on a hidden crime. The latter 
concerns a much less specific sense of uneasiness. Tornqvist calls it “the evil of 
mankind, original sin.”^^  It concerns an existential dis-ease. To Damascus draws us 
into the protagonist’s state of mind, and the protagonist’s mind is the main arena for 
whatever conflict appears in the play. Because of this it takes on an allegorical 
quality, if we define allegory as personifying “forces, vir tues and motives that are in 
dialogue with each other within the self.”^^  Allegory, however, requires a stable 
fi'arne of reference, whether it be the pilgrimage of the soul or forces within the 
human psyche. Part of the play’s achievement is to imdermine the stability of its 
frame(s) of reference.
ii.-
What then are its frames of reference? Principally, the conversion of St. Paul and the 
Passion narrative. To take St. Paul first: in Acts 9, Saul sets out from Jerusalem to 
Damascus with a mission to arrest any Christians he finds at the synagogue there. On 
the way, a heavenly light smrounds him: “And he fell to the Earth, and heard a voice 
saying unto him Saul, Saul, why persecutes! thou me? And he said. Who art thou,
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Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest.”^^  Saul, blinded by the 
light, is led to Damascus and there preaches in Christ’s name after his sight is 
restored. To Damascus, then, purports to recount the Damascene conversion of its 
protagonist, called simply the Unknown. This suggests a trajectory and a destination: 
conversion, and a release ft om spiritual blindness. The Unknown has lived, as the 
opening scene makes apparent, a life of debauchery. He has abandoned his children, 
drinks to excess, and in scene 1 seduces another man’s wife. He challenges God’s 
sovereignty, firstly by tiying to make the Lady into his new Eve, and later by 
attempting in a vision to remake the universe into something that better fits human 
happiness. At the mid-point of the play, he awakens in a monastic asylum, where the
Abbot curses him. From this moment, the Unknown begins his journey towards
-Calvary and a spiritual rebirth, in a sequence that the play itself suggests we should
read as a modest version of the Passion. This raises a problem. The Unknown’s 
Damascene moment comes not as a blinding light, but more as a blinding darkness. 
Inunediately preceding the asylum scene, the Unknown has defied God in the most 
overt possible terms: he has uprooted a crucifix from a roadside slirine and brandished
it, shouting defiance at the sky. The pivotal moment in the Unknown’s nainative is, 
then, not a divine light but a total darkness: the explicit denial and rejection of God. 
Indeed, To Damascus seems to turn Acts upside down; instead of Saul persecuting 
God’s people, God persecutes the Unknown.
Before going further with this, we need to look at the way the structure of the play 
both contributes to its allegorical dimension and asserts a neat order -  an order that 
the play, despite its pretensions, also undermines. To do this we need to turn to Egil
93 Acts 9: 4-5
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Tornqvist’s detailed analysis of the circular structure of To Damascus. A look at the 
ordermg of scenes shows how carefully Strindberg constructed the circular plot, scene 
succeeding scene according to the following pattern:
17,1 Street corner 
16 Doctor’s home 2 Doctor’s home
3 Hotel room 
4 Sea
5 Road 
6 Ravine 
7 Kitchen 
8 Rose chamber
.94
15 Hotel room
14 Sea 
13 Road
12 Ravine
11 Kitchen
10 Rose chamber 
9 Asylum"
The play pivots around the asylum scene, and each half mirrors the other. The first 
half represents a descent, culminating in outright defiance of God, while the second 
half portrays an ascent towards atonement. Scenes therefore succeed each other less 
from dramatic necessity than from the imperative to fit each scene into this overall 
design. Because of this the scenes have a static quality: they seem like a series of 
paintings, like a medieval triptych or stations of the cross. Indeed, within the play the 
Mother refers to the last scenes as stations, telling the Unknown to “plant a cross at 
every station, but stop at the seventh; you don’t have fourteen, like He did.”^^  The 
outline of the play, then, is allegorical. It portrays the spiritual journey of a man into 
the black depths of sin and his subsequent expiatoiy suffering that ends in conversion 
and the hope of salvation. Looking fi'om above, as it were, the meaning of the play
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seems clear. It appears to operate within a well-established and indeed very 
conservative theological framework of sin, guilt and redemption. Already, however, 
the play’s circularity tlireatens to complicate such an allegorical reading. St. 
Augustme, for instance, objected to circular time as pagan and counter to the linear 
time required for a histoiy of salvation. For him, Clu'istianity is “the straight path of 
t r u t h . T h i s  sort of Cludstian teleology requfres “the irreversible and nonrepeatable 
course of time dfrected toward salvation,” while cyclical time “would dictate 
entrapment within a fallen world, and events in time would never intimate anything 
decisive beyond the endless succession of similar conditions.A lready, then, the 
structure of the play suggests that reading it as a simple Clu istian allegory may prove 
problematic, even as it pushes us to do so. However, it is when we look at the play in 
detail that the meaning comes unstitched.
This framework alluded to above implies both an antliropology and a cosmology -  a 
view of the human predicament and a view of the cosmos. From the structure 
outlined above, the play would appear to belong to much the same mental world as 
the Pilgrim’s Progiess, or indeed to the Middle Ages. When we look at the 
protagonist of To Damascus, what we find is both akin to these and profoundly 
different. We see this in the opening lines of the play, when the protagonist (the 
Unknown) meets the Lady:
The Unknown: There you are. I think I knew you would come.
The Lady: You must have called me to you; yes, I felt it. -  But why are you 
standing here on the corner of the street?
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The Unlcnown: 1 don’t know; got to stand somewhere while I wait.
The Lady: What are you waiting for?
The Unlmown: If only I could say. -  For forty years I’ve been waiting for 
something, I think they call it happmess, or perhaps it’s just the end of 
unhappiness.^®
The Unknown lives in exile and waits, though he does not laiow what he waits for. 
While he is an everyman, in that he stands for the condition of all human beings, his 
situation is one of suspension. He exists without purpose, condemned to waiting 
without end: “If  I only knew why I exist, why I ’m standing here, where I should go, 
what I should do.”^^
The resemblance here to later absurdist theatre, and especially to Beckett’s Waiting 
fo r  Godot, is informative. In the latter. Estragon asks where they are to meet Godot: 
Estragon: ... You’re sure it was here?
Vladimir: What?
Estragon: That we were to wait.
Vladimir: He said by the tree. {They look at the tree.) Do you see any others? 
[]
Estragon: Looks more like a bush.
Vladimir: A  slirub.
Estragon: A bush.
Vladimir: A-. What are you msinuating? That we’ve come to the wrong 
place?
-------------------------------------------
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Godofs characters thus exist in a state of suspension, like the Unknown. Like the 
Unknown they live in the shadow of the death of God. Nietzsche’s madman asks of 
this momentous event “’who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? 
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? ... Where are we 
moving to now? .. .Are we not continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, 
forwards, in all directions? Is there still an up and a down? Aren’t we straying as 
though tlirough an infinite nothing?”’^ ®^ The implications of these images resound in 
both Godot and To Damascus. They imply a loss of any ontological or 
epistemological centre, the loss of any horizon within which to situate ourselves, a 
spiritual disorientation in which we seem to fall in all directions. For Vladimir and 
Estragon, as for the Unknown, they entail a loss of certainty: they no longer have any 
guarantee that they perceive the world as it is. Thus Beckett’s tramps camiot even be 
sure what time it is: “But what Saturday? And is it Saturday? Is it not rather Sunday? 
(Pause.) Or Monday? (Pause.) Or Friday?” Similarly, the Unknown’s 
perceptions of the world become a conundrum without a solution. Intermittently, he 
hears Mendelsohn’s funeral march, but as he tells the Doctor he cannot tell if he really 
hears it or imagines it^ °^ ; he sees mourners dressed in brown rather than the traditional 
black, but caimot detennine the truth of his perception^ both he and the Lady see 
the face of the Doctor in the flowery patterns of the wallpaper in their hotel room, but 
camiot say whether the face is ‘really’ there.
The critic Martin Esslin defined absurdism as follows:
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‘Absurd’ originally means ‘out of harmony’, in a musical context. Hence its 
dictionary definition; ‘out of harmony with reason or propriety; incongruous, 
unreasonable, illogical.
He explicates this by quoting Ionesco, who says the absurd “is that which is devoid of 
purpose.... Cut off from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots, man is 
lost; all his actions become senseless, absurd, useless.” ’^  ^ Thus Absurdism is anti- 
teleological, and because of this it tends to place characters in a state of suspension, 
exactly as To Damascus does. The Unknown represents a predicament, rather than a 
character as traditionally conceived. This predicament, so well summed up by 
Ionesco, above, is one of suspension and isolation. This suspension and isolation
I
i :  
;
clashes with the overt teleology built into the play’s structure as outlined above.
The Unknown is, then, a very modern character, the alienated stranger. Among the 
characteristics of the alienated stranger is the withdrawal into an isolated self, 
separated absolutely from everything outside it. The Unknown appeals to the Lady,
saying “I ’m in a strange city, haven’t a friend, and the few acquaintances I have seem
#
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more like strangers, almost enemies.” ®^® This kind of figure, the homeless stranger,
exists inseparably from a certain kind of enviionment -  the desert. Indeed, the desert
defines him. In the introduction to his The Disappearance o f God, J. Hillis Miller
explicates the desert via a bmary opposition: the city and the desert. The city is the
creation of culture, but underneath and all around this artificial constmct is the desert:
.“[rjeality is conceived of as gross, heavy, and meaningless, the desert of the world
'I
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before and human transformations of nature are “mere subjective illusions.”
So in To Damascus, the Unknown is the alienated outsider, the exile; lost, tormented 
by visions, wandering in the desert.
Miller further argues that the alienated subject turns in upon itself, becoming point­
like, with the ii'onic result that the sense of self becomes precarious. Without a settled 
place in any social or cosmic order, the unity of the self comes under tlu eat. This is, 
again, true of To Damascus and partieularly of the Unknown. The play is littered 
with alter egos, from the Beggar to Caesar to the spectral figures in the monastic 
refectory. In the first scene alone he encounters two: the Latin-quoting beggar who 
shares with the Unknown a scar on the forehead, and more alarmingly the dead man 
waiting to be buried by the brown-clad undertakers in the cafe. Here again is the 
tension between the overtly allegorical aspect of the play and its own undermining of 
overarching explanatory frameworks. The allegorical role of the dead man is 
particularly clear. The resemblance to the Unknown is pointed. The Guests at the 
café discuss the dead man:
Guest I: Yes, he was a useless man who couldn’t take life seriously.
Unknown: And he probably drank too much as well?
Guest II : He did.
Guest III: And he left others to support his wife and children.
This echoes what the Unknown has afready said about himself to the Lady. The 
corpse is both a wammg and a representation of the Unknown’s own spiritual death. 
The Beggar serves a similar role. The Lady belabours the point when she tells the
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Unknown, sententiously, “if you continue to drink, you’ll become like him.”’^^ This 
obvious moralismg and allegorising is undercut, however, by two factors: the 
subjectivism that casts doubt on every perception, lending the scene its hallucinatory 
air; and the suppressed but vibrant protest against conventional morality within the 
scene. To take the subjectivism first, the play constantly makes us uncertain whether 
anything is what it seems. The play opens with funereal music first approaching then 
receding. This recurs in later scenes, but neither the Unknown nor the audience ever 
know if the Unknown hears an actual funeral march or merely imagines it. As the 
Unknown sits with the pallbearers at the café, he asks why they are wearing brown 
instead of the more usual black. One of them sarcastically replies “To us in our 
foolishness it’s black, but if Your Grace commands, then it is brown for him.” *^^  Is 
the pallbearer having a joke at the Unknown’s expense, or is the Unknown 
hallucinating? The Beggar engenders a similar uncertainty. He bears an unsettling 
resemblance to the Unknown, as does the dead man, but the main result is not an 
allegorical or moral point but a sense of unease. No wonder the Unknown asks “is 
this a carnival or is everything as it should be?”’ ®^ As Tornqvist points out, the play 
“perhaps for the first time in the history of diuma, makes the audience doubt theii' own 
senses.”  ^ The scene provokes a sense of displacement, a mpturing o f ‘natural’ 
order.
The second point, the protest against an oppressive moral system, is related to the 
fii'st. The Unknown feels himself beyond the pale, and everyone else seems to agree 
with him. This is because he is a drunkard; he abandoned his wife and children; he
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ii. Cosmology
He has quite deliberately broken social and religious bonds, and therefore falls outside 
the conventional moral norm. And yet he refuses to fall into line in part as an ethical 
protest at the injustice of social and religious bonds. He has suffered perseeution, he 
says, because
I couldn’t see the people suffer -  and said so, and wrote: free yourselves and I 
will help you. So I said to the poor: do not let the rich bleed you white! And 
to women: do not let men oppress you! Finally, and this was probably worst 
of all, I told the children: do not obey your parents when they are unjust.^
This defiance of social bonds echoes the Gospel of Matthew 10:34-36, where Clmst 
proclaims that he has come to bring a sword, “for I am come to set a man at variance 
against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law 
against her mother in law.” The echo is apt: Strindberg habitually assoeiated Clirist 
with rebellion against the established social and political order in the name of liberty. 
And, as we will see, m Strindberg Christ and Lucifer are linked. So it is no surprise
that the Unknown tells the Lady that he lifted his fist against heaven. ^
II have argued that To Damascus conflicts with itself, because the play’s structure 
asserts a coherent allegorical meaning that the play’s text undermines. The conflict 
between coherence and dissolution, meaning and niliilism mirrors the conflict in 
nineteenth century literature between the old cosmology and the new. This
cosmological shift emerges with full force in a number of modernist writers, not least
-------------------------------------------
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in Beckett and Pinter, but was also present in nineteenth century writers m Sweden 
and elsewhere. Thus the writers of the “naturalistic breakthrough” m 1880s Sweden 
wrote against society and religious tradition, generally from a left-wing standpoint.
For this movement, Church authority was illegitimate and religion had lost its 
credibility. However, they still believed in social progress -  something that served as 
a suiTogate for religious belief. The loss of credibility of the “old cosmology” was 
also felt by English writers. One passage in George Eliot’s Middlernarch deseribes 
the way a myriad of seratches in a reflective surface will appear to form concentric 
circles around a eentre of illumination. Thus the universe seems ordered around the 
needs and wishes of each individual. In this central passage, the appearance of a 
beneficent design in the universe is merely a product of point of view. The cosmos 
appears to have been created for our personal benefit, but this is because we see 
events as if aiTanged in concentric circles around us. There is in fact no design.
Cupitt characterises this shift as a move ftom an old, finite cosmos that resembles “a 
very rich literary text, full of hidden symbolism”  ^ to a modern infinite cosmos that is 
“morally and religiously neutral and without m a g i c . I n  the old cosmos, “values, 
purposes, omens, portents, occult forces and meanings abounded in everything” while 
the new cosmos is a “‘meaningless’, boundless mechanical u n i v e r s e . I n  the old 
cosmology, the social order mirrored the order of the cosmos, and every individual 
could find her or his place. In the new cosmology, the individual is essentially 
homeless. J. Hillis Miller characterizes this in musical terms: “[i]n that old harmony 
man, soeiety, nature, and language miiTored one another, lilce so many voices in a
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madrigal or fligue.”^^  ^ In the shift to a new cosmology, we have experienced “the 
breaking of the circle, the untuning of the sky, the change from the closed world to the 
mfinite universe which slowly destroyed the polyphonic harmony of microcosm and 
macrocosm.”^^  ^ It is striking, then, that music becomes so important to Strindberg in 
his later plays. To Damascus opens with the sound of a funeral march approaching 
and then moving into the distance. This march recurs at various points tliroughout 
the play, although, as we have seen, we can never be sure if the Unknown is merely 
hallucinating. At any rate, the musical harmony that characterized the old cosmology 
has become here a funeral dirge, one that torments the Unknown tluoughout the play.
And fittingly enough, those moments (and there are a lot of them) when the Unknown 
does read the world like a text “full of hidden symbolism” are more unsettling than 
reassuring. In scene 3 (the Hotel room), the Lady seems to see the face of her 
abandoned husband in the patterns of the curtain:
The Lady: Look at these curtains: do you see the portrait created by the 
flowers?
The Unlmown: Yes, it’s him!
The Unknown then goes on to see other patterns: “But I can see somebody else in the 
patterns on the tablecloth. ..this cannot be natural! No, it’s witchcraft!” ’^  ^ At this 
point the Unknown hears the funeral march again. Of course both characters are 
suffering an acute sense of guilt here, the Unknown as a seducer and the Lady for 
leaving her husband. They arrive at this room after every other hotel in town has 
turned them away because they are unmarried. Adding to then sense of persecution,
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they both recognize the room, for they have both separately stayed there before. They 
seem to be suffering mental torment as a special punishment, though whether this is 
merely for seduction and adultery, or if it has deeper roots the protagonists camiot be 
sure. As the Unknown says in the following scene, “I have been judged, but it must 
have happened before I was bom, because I had already begun my sentence as a 
c h i l d . T h e  Unknown later bares his chest and in a scene reminiscent of 
Shakespeare’s King Lear, cries “Come! Strike me with your thunder, if you dare! 
Terrify me with your stomi, if you can!” '^  ^ The Unknown’s (and Strindberg’s) sense 
of persecution at the hands of unseen powers echoes Lear’s lament, “as flies to 
wanton children are we playthings of the gods.” As Strindberg writes in Inferno, 
“[a]re not the gods jesting with us mortals, and is that why we too, sharing the jest, are 
able to laugh in the most tonnented moments of our lives?”^^® In other words, the 
Unknown’s suffering seems to him arbitrarily inflicted. The fact that he sees patterns 
and meanings written into everything around him does nothing to comfort him. The 
old and new cosmologies adumbrated by Cupitt clash here. In a sense, the play’s 
main question is whether or not the Unknown is suffering a just and improving 
punishment at the hands of Providentially-guided powers, or is simply a victim of 
their arbitrary whims.
Something similar happens in the following scene (By the Sea), that begins when the 
Unknown exclaims “Quiet, I hear a poem coming.. After hearing a rhythm like 
horses hooves and the sound of baimers snapping in the wmd, that the Lady msists is 
merely the wind in the trees, the Unknown goes on “But now I see -  do you know
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where? -  in your weaving -  a big kitchen [..] [with] three small recessed windows 
with bars on them [.. The Lady becomes more and more alarmed as the
Unknown, apparently in a trance, describes exactly her home and family. Here the 
Unknown almost literally reads the world like a rich literary text, but the effect is 
disconcerting and incongruous. Far from providing reassurance of an ordered 
cosmos, it seems almost grotesque.
iii. Christ/Satan
The Unknown resembles Falander, a minor character in Strindberg’s early novel The 
Red Room. As Eric Johannesson’s brilliant study of Strindberg’s novels points out, 
Falander is a paradox, at once Clirist-like and Satanic.^®' Another character, 
Rehnlijelm, comments on the way Falander takes on others’ suffering and calms thefr 
sorrows, acting as a confessor and a guide. But at the same time, Falander condemns 
morality, proclaiming it to be “just malice assuming [...] a presentable form.” ®^^ The 
shocked Rehnlijelm later describes Falander as “fundamentally good, self-sacrificing, 
noble, generous - in fact I can't think of anything bad in his character - but he is 
immoral, and without morals a man is no good, is he?” ®^® As if to emphasize his 
ambiguous standing, Falander himself seems to enjoy his bad reputation: on 
discovering that others have nicknamed him the Devil he replies, ‘“Ah! The Devil? 
That’s a good name.’”’®"^ Now this is important because this kind of character crops 
up in a number of Strindberg’s works (and Strindberg often saw himself in this sort of 
light). The Unknown is one such. The Doctor looking at a portrait of the Unknown
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sees with horror that in a certain light the latter resembles the Devil/®^ Yet as we 
have seen, the Unknown has rebelled against God and religious authority because he 
“couldn’t see the people suffer.”  ^ If he is a devil, he is an oddly moral one. 
However, his morality contradicts the prevailing moral code, which, according to the 
Unknown, enslaves everyone. He objects to morality as a system. 1 have already 
noted the echo of Matthew 10: 34-36. As the Innkeeper says of the Unknown: “He’s 
one of those, who goes around and frees wretches from their duty.” ®^^
The Unknown resembles another, ahnost contemporary, version of Cludst: that of 
Dostoyevsky’s “The Grand Inquisitor”. In Dostoyevsky’s tale, inserted into the 
middle of The Brothers Karamazov, Chr ist returns to Seville in the fifteenth century 
and attracts the attention of the Inquisition. The Grand Inquisitor accuses Christ of 
offering humanity an unendurable freedom. The Church has spent the intervening 
centuries since the crucifixion “correcting” Clirist’s work, as people want above all 
someone to bow down to. ‘“You thirsted for a love that was free, not for the servile 
ecstasies of the slave before the might that has inspired him with dread once and for 
a l l ... we corrected your great deed.. .And people were glad that they had once been 
brought together into a flock and that at last from their hearts had been removed such 
a terrible gift, which has brought them so much t o r m e n t . S t r i n d b e r g  clearly has a 
view of religion similar to Dostoyevsky’s Chi'ist, for he says in Inferno: “Must you 
then humble yourself before God? But it is an insult to the All-Highest to drag Him 
down to the level of a planter who rules over slaves.”'®^ Clearly, the Grand Inquisitor
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of Dostoyevsky’s story believes this is exactly what people need. In his mind, Clirist 
brought only suffering in the burdensome freedom he offered, and the Church had 
relieved that burden precisely by taking on the role of a “planter who rules over 
slaves.” Indeed, the Inquisitor tells Clirist that the Church was founded on what He 
rejected: miracle, mystery and authority. In order that humanity might return to 
childish innocence and be happy, a select few in the Church had shouldered the 
burden and “taken upon themselves the curse of the knowledge of good and evil.” "^^  ^
The martyrs, by this account, have eaten the finit of the Edenic tree in order to protect 
the rest of humanity from it. The serpent that encouraged them to eat this fruit would, 
then, appear to be Clirist. This is almost Gnosticism: Cludst comes to free humanity 
from the tyramiical demiurge, equated with the God of the Old Testament. The 
coincidence of Clirist and Satan has roots as old as Christianity. Strindberg’s way of 
thhiking, like Dostoyevsky’s, has this in common with Gnosticism: inasmuch as the 
Unknown is Clirist-like, he is also Satanic, and like the Chiist of the Grand Inquisitor 
(and indeed of the Gospels) he upsets worldly hierarchies.
The Unknown, then, offers a dangerous freedom, acknowledging that he has been 
hated and persecuted for it. He is emphatic that this was a rebellion not just against 
the social order, but also against heaven. Later, we find that this extends to a 
rebellion also against the order of nature. In scene 4 {By the Sea) the Unknown has a 
kind of epiphany:
This is what it means to live; yes, now I’m living, precisely now! and I feel my
self swelling, stretching out, becoming thimier. I am becoming unbounded. I
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am everywhere, in the sea that is my blood, in the mountains that form my 
skeleton, in the trees, in the flowers; and my head reaches up to heaven, I look 
out across the universe that is me, and I feel the creator’s whole power in me, 
because it is me. I would like to take the whole lump in my hand and knead it 
into somethmg more perfect, more durable, more beautiful...would like to see 
all creation and every created being happy: bom without pain, living without 
sorrow and dying in calm joy!
Here the Unknown pretends to the place of the Creator. His self expands almost to 
infinity, and he senses the world as part of his body. Sensing his own infinite creative 
power, he wishes to remake the world into something better. Thus the Unknown 
wishes to usurp God, and this makes him Satanic. In this vision, the Unknown 
resembles one of his alter egos, the madman Caesar, who “broods about nature’s lack 
of proper order” and re-arranges plants according a more rational scheme. The 
point is not lost on the Lady, who points out the resemblance immediately. Indeed it 
seems that Caesar may be there as a warning to the Unknown of the madness he risks. 
Yet the Unknown is at his greatest in these moments of rebellion. In the asylum 
scene, the Abbess informs the convalescing Unknown that they found him “on the 
mountain above the ravine, with a cross that you had broken off a Calvary and which 
you were using to threaten someone up in the clouds that you imagined you could 
see.” "^^  ^ Despite the unintentionally comic note, the Unknown’s defiance is at that 
moment heroic. And his revolt against morality, against God and the social order, is 
ethically motivated: he camiot stand the suffering he sees. This rebellion imbues the 
protagonist in his unregenerate state with a kind of heroism. He is not simply a sinner 
who must learn humility and repent: there is justice in his revolt. This of course
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problematises the play’s whole redemptive scheme. Right at the play’s begimimg we 
find a coincidentia oppositomm in the Unknown, at least in his own account of
himself. He tells the Lady how others have always hated him; “They have blamed me 
for everything. No-one in my town was as hated as me, no-one so despised.” "^^  ^ So 
here he is, a scapegoat taking the blame for others. The scapegoat was one of 
Strindberg’s favourite tropes, as we shall see in other works. Yet the Unknown is not 
blessed but cursed. He goes on to describe how priests cursed him from the pulpit 
and ends up by saying he raised his fist agamst heaven.
iv. Exile and Damnation or Pilgrimage and Salvation?
The wanderings of the Lady and the Unknown in the first half of To Damascus 
resemble a nightmarish exile. The characters themselves see their misadventures as a 
punishment, as we have seen. This is further elaborated in the allusions to Genesis.
In the first scene, the Unknown enquires anxiously whether the Lady has read his
recent work, and finding that she has not, he forbids her to do so. Later, prompted by 
her mother, the Lady breaks her word, reads the Unknown’s last work, and recoils in 
horror. The analogy to Genesis is obvious, all the more so because when they meet, 
the Unknown ‘christens’ the Lady as Eve. So in scene 8 (just before the nightmarish, 
pivotal asylum scene), the Lady tells the Unknown; “it’s as if I had eaten from the tree 
of knowledge: my eyes are opened, and I know now what evil is and what good is!”*'^  ^
The play seems to be collapsing into mythological confrision here. The Unknown is 
both the serpent who tempts with his book, and the God who forbids Eve to eat of the 
tree of knowledge. He is also, we have seen, a coincidentia oppositomm of Christ and
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Satan. But that has a paradoxical coherence to it. Indeed it is a paradox, if a 
suppressed one, that has arguably always been present in Cluistianity. '^^® Blake made 
use of it in The Marriage o f Heaven and Hell, and Dostoyevsky at least alludes to the 
possibility in the Grand Inquisitor, as we have seen. It was also there in Gnosticism. 
Early Gnostic versions of Genesis made of the Old Testament God a tyi amiical 
demiurge, from whose tlirall Chi'ist came to liberate humanity. In this version, Christ 
is the seipent in the Garden, and this of course alters Christian imagery entirely. In 
this Gnostic reading, the serpent represents divine wisdom, much as serpents still do 
in Buddhism and Hinduism. Is the Unknown, then, a patriarchal tyrant or a Clu'ist- 
like liberator? A tempter and seducer or a saviour?
The nightmarish asylum scene begins the attempt, carried through in the rest of the 
play, to squeeze all of this into a more or less orthodox box. Here we find figures, 
seated round a refectory table, all of whom look similar to characters elsewhere in the 
play, although it is not them. The Confessor describes them to the Unknown: a 
madman called Caesar, who lost his wits after reading a particular writer (with the 
strong implication that this writer was the Unknown); a beggar who will not accept he 
is a beggar because he speaks Latin; a pafr of despised parents who worried 
themselves to death over their vicious son; an abandoned wife with two uncared for 
c h i l d r e n . T h e  few crimes on this list that we do not recognise for the Unknown’s 
deeds we can surmise are his. We learn that in his delirium the Unknown had accused 
himself of almost every crime imaginable, and imagined that he saw his victims. The
See Goodall, Jane, Artaud and the Gnostic Drama (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), especially the 
introduction.
For a contemporary version of this, see the recent Korean film Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter and 
Spring. Towards the end of the fihn, after his master has died, the disciple finds a snake in his master’s 
bed.
Strindberg, Till Damaskus / Ett Dromspel, pp. 72-3
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Unknown reacts with guilt and fear, refusing to greet this macabre company. The
, 3Confessor then goes to the lectern and reads the curse from Deuteronomy 28. Among 
the curses for disobedience to God’s commandments are “The Lord shall send upon 
thee cursing , vexation, and rebuke, in all that thou settest thine hand unto for to do, 
until thou be destroyed, and until thou perish quickly; because of the wickedness of
thy doings, whereby thou hast forsaken me.” ^^  ^ The Unknown has suffered God’s 
curse. Now the play begins to suppress the coindentia oppositorum in the Unknown.
God’s curse has fallen on him for his disobedience, for his breaking of social bonds 
and defiance of taboos; the justness of his revolt is suppressed. Having defied God, 
the Unknown begins his expiation and atonement, an atonement that involves 
submission to the authoritarian father God, as well as submission to the respectable 
social norms and rules that the cui'se in Deuteronomy re-enforces. This book of the 
Bible, after all, consists of a set of mles and commandments to regulate not just 
religious life but also everyday affairs, and the cuise is to fall on the one who does not
abide by these. The Unknown resolves to return to the Rose Room in his mother-in- 
law’s house, and from here the order of scenes repeat themselves in reverse in a kind 
of undoing of the first half. The Unknown condemns himself in front of the Mother, 
then says he has begun to believe. The Mother observes that the Unknown’s life has 
been guided by Providential powers, and the Unknown agrees. His suffering had a 
redemptive purpose. For example, the Unknown reports a torture undergone at the 
asylum: he awoke to find himself being stretched on a kind of rack. The Mother 
points out that he had probably injured his back and they did this to heal him. In other 
words, all the torments he has undergone were inflicted by a chastening power 
wishing only to do him good. If this starts to sound like trite religious kitsch, it is.
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The Unknown has not entirely lost his fight, however, telling the Mother as he leaves 
that “you are the most spiteful person I have ever met, but that’s because you are 
religious In the following scene, the Unknown struggles to make himself kneel 
before a crucifix, and must finally call on God’s help. From here on, the scenes of the 
first half are swiftly revisited, during which the Unknown is reunited with the Lady, 
and in the final scene the Unknown concludes that all that has happened has, despite 
appearances, been for the best. It ends with the Unknown disappearmg into a church 
after the Lady.
Now this final scene, taking place on the street comer where the play began, deals 
with the Unknown’s final conversion and in two very specific ways attempts to 
answer the sense of suspension, dis-ease, and lack of orientation encountered in scene 
1. Thus, in this very brief finale (a mere two pages as against the first scene’s 
eighteen), the Unknown remembers that he had failed to collect a letter ft om the post- 
office. At the end of the fust scene, he had refused to collect it, assuring the Lady that 
it could contain only legal proceedmgs or other malevolence.^^® Here, at the end of 
the play, the Lady tells the Unknown to “believe it is a good letter”:
The Unlmown: Good?
The Lady: Believe it! Imagine it!
The letter at this point represents the Unknown’s conception of life itself. The 
question is, does it contam somethmg fundamentally good or something malevolent 
and evil? The Unknown’s decision to collect his letter becomes, then, a leap of faith. 
He has decided to believe that it is good and his faith pays off, literally: the letter 
contains money. The Unknown has misjudged life. He tells the Lady (and the
Strindberg, Till Damaskus /  Ett Dromspel, p. 82 
Ibid., p. 24 
Ibid., p. 104
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audience) “it looks nasty, this play, but it probably isn’t! It was the Invisible I 
slandered, when I misunderstood.. Thus events exonerate the world and its 
creator. Like Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, the Unknown finds the world is fundamentally 
good, although even now he cannot be entirely sure. He says that it probably is not 
malevolent, revealing that he still has doubts. The final scene answers the first in one 
further way. In the middle of scene 1, the Unknown rehrses the Lady’s entreaty to 
enter the church, saying “It causes me pain and makes me feel [...] that I am an 
unblessed and that 1 can never agam go there just as I can never become a child 
a g a i n . T h e r e  is here an echo of two passages from the Gospels. In Matthew,
Jesus proclaims “except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not 
enter into the kmgdom of heaven.” (18:3) In Jolin, He tells Nicodenius “except a man 
be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.” (3:3)*®^  Thus the Unknown feels
himself excluded from salvation. He lives as one of the damned. He caimot become a
Jchild or be bom again, and suffers therefore his state of lost wandering and waiting. Now in the final scene, the Unknown finds that at last he can enter the Church, yet 
from his remarks he himself seems a little unconvinced by his own conversion. As 
the Lady beckons to him to enter church, he remarks
The Unlmown: Well, I can always go tluough; but I won’t stay there.
The Lady: You don’t know that! - come on! -  Inside there you’ll hear new 
songs! I
The Unlmown (going after her towards the church door): Perhaps!
ill----------------------------
• I
Ibid., p. 19
The Swedish of the 1917 Bible is particularly close to Strindberg’s phrasing in the passage from 
John. The Unknown says “jag aldrig mer kan komma dit in lika litet som jag kan bli bam pa nytt.”
John 3:3 reads ”om en manniska icke bliver fbdd pa nytt, sa kan hon icke H se Guds rike.”
Strindberg, Till Damaskus, p. 105
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Thus the final word uttered by the Unknown is a word of doubt: “perhaps.” Looking 
at this final scene, it is little wonder that the Unknown seems himself unconvinced by 
it. It seems ironic that the object that signifies the ultimate beneficence of existence 
should be some cash in an envelope. Can this really hold the symbolic weight 
attached to it? Does a modest sum of money actually counter the palpable sense of 
alienation and loss in the earlier part of the play? The final scene is a forced attempt 
to close off and explain away the existential anguish of the first nine scenes. The 
Unknown is himself to blame: his lack of faith in God has been the source of all his 
misery.
v. Sacred Drama?
As alluded to above, To Damascus embodies a significant change in Strindberg’s 
dramaturgy. To appreciate this fully requires, first, a more detailed examination of his 
naturalistic drama before mvestigating the change undergone in the post-Inferno 
dream plays. We can take the dramatic assumptions inlierent in Miss Julie as 
representative of Strindberg’s naturalistic phase. The entire play takes place in one 
room, a large kitchen belonging to the household of Julie’s father. The action occurs 
over the course of one evening, and in fact takes about the time it would in real life. It 
thus adheres to a near-absolute verisimilitude. Strindberg’s famous preface to the 
play further emphasises how thoroughly he had attempted to create a seamless 
illusion. Thus he says that in a naturalistic play the dialogue should wander; the 
scenery should be realistic; the lighting should not come from below, as it commonly 
did at the time, as it distorts the actors’ faces and obscures their expressions; the
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blocking should allow actors to move naturally; etc3®^  Strindberg’s critique of 
contemporary theatre attacks above all its artificiality: it fails to produce a realistic 
likeness of the world. Strindberg thus delineates here a thoroughly Aristotelian 
theatre, in the sense that it aims for a more thorough application of mimetic 
assumptions. While Strindberg’s naturalism contains within it the seeds of some of 
the developments of his anti-realistic post-Inferno plays, his overarching concern here 
is for verisimilitude.
The mimetic requiiements delineated in the preface to Miss Julie are accompanied by 
a newly conceived aesthetic. Strindberg saw his naturalistic plays as the beginning of 
a “scientific” theatre. The educated mind, he argues, has become by virtue of a 
more developed intellect incapable of a simple-minded identification with unreal 
characters acted ons t age . ^To this he attributes the malaise in contemporary theatre. 
It plays entii'ely on the audience’s emotions without appealing to the mind.^ *^ ® The 
superior audiences of the futur e will derive theh pleasure from observing and 
analysing the characters and action of a play. They will have laid aside “those 
inferior, unreliable instruments of thought called feelings” and look with indifference 
on “the brutal, cynical, heartless drama that life presents.”’^ ® As these statements 
imply, Strindberg does not think of this ideal theatre as a spur to political action, 
askmg rhetorically “why should [the world] be remedied? Rather, this drama 
accepts the world as it is, and offers the educated pleasures of learning and analysis.
"^August Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, ti'ans. Michael Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), pp. 63; 65-6; 66-7; 67.
He conceived of his autobiographical novel Tjanstelcvinnans Son (“The Son of a Servant”) m similar 
terms as the “literature of the future.” See p. 12.
Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, pp. 56-7.
Ibid., p. 56 
Ibid., p. 57 
Ibid., p. 61
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mentioned above, Strindberg desires that the audience should sit in complete
someone in whom the process of differentiation may be observed. ,167
The ideal audience is then an audience of scientifically dispassionate, analytical 
minds. On this rests all the demands Strindberg makes on theatre. As well as those
da r k n e s s t h e  better to maintain its analytical distance from events onstage. His
ISidealised theatre resembles a sort of laboratory. Strindberg offers us a sample of 
the pleasures to be derived from such a theatre when he uses Darwinian language to
describe Miss Julie, in which the character Jean “is the type who founds a species,
'1
'" g
The staging of Strindberg’s naturalistic plays therefore rests on clear, well-defined 
principles. The staging of his dream plays is more problematic. In the case o f^  
Dream Play itself, this results in part fr om the technical demands it makes, as we shall 
see. But To Damascus also, although teclmically less demanding, poses its own 
problems. This arises principally fr om the difficulty in answering the question, what 
kind of theatre is it? Strindberg was struggling to find a new form to fit what he 
wanted to do, and had no ready-made movement to provide any guidance, let alone
clearly formulated answers. He never wrote any statement of principles for his di eam 
plays equivalent to the preface to Miss Julie. He was in any case much less ready 
to subscribe wholly to any movement at this point in his life.^^  ^ I believe however 
that a comparison between To Damascus and the late medieval morality play
-------------------------------------------
Ibid., p. 67
This is not to say that what Strindberg actually achieves in Miss Julie is a theatre of scientific 
detachment. The play derives its power not from the analytical pleasures it affords, but from its 
extreme, ahnost luminous, emotional violence. It is only dispassionate in the sense that it presents the 
conflict between Julie and Jean without taking sides for or against either of them.
Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, p. 61
Unlike the preface to Miss Julie, the foreword to A Dream Play does not offer a detailed statement 
of theatrical principles. Rather it offers a brief, vivid, and poetic impression of what he intended his 
dream plays to be -  and at that leaves much ambiguity and wide scope for interpretation, as I discuss in 
the next chapter.
See Strindberg, Inferno, p. 262. See also below, pp. 213-4
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Everyman, whilst not providing a definitive answer to what kind of theatre the former 
demands, provides a fruitful way of exploring this question. In the following 
discussion, it will emerge that it is not just their affinities, but also then differences, 
that are informative.
Everyman begins fi*om the assumption of universal guilt, that all are tainted by 
original sin and stand in need of salvation. Furthermore, it accepts without question 
the justness of God and of the created order. Thus God enters at the beginning of the 
play and denounces humanity:
God: I perceive ... how that all creatures be to me unkind ...
They fear not of my righteousness the shaip rod;
My law that I showed, when I for them died 
They forget clean...
Everyman is, then, guilty of transgressions against God’s law. His guilt (and 
therefore that of the audience) is announced by God, who furthermore explains 
exactly what Everyman is guilty of. The Unknown also embodies a sense of guilt, yet 
in his case the crime is unclear;
The Unknown: [...] judgment has been pronounced, but it must have been
pronounced before I was born, because already in my childhood I had 
begun to serve my sentence.
Both thus entail the guilt of humanity; in the first case an external agency, the 
personal God, condemns humanity for its disobedience; in the second, guilt ceases to 
be the result of judgment by a superior being, becoming instead internalised -  it has 
virtually become a condition of existence.
J.B. Trapp (ed.), Medieval English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 389 
Strindberg, TillDamaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 42
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The Unknown reflects therefore a vision of what it means to be a human being: it 
entails an inborn sense of guilt for unknown crimes. Everyman also concerns itself 
with what it means to be human. In the latter case, it does this by personifying 
aspects of Everyman -  in other words, it uses allegory. Thus Everyman’s drinking 
companions are personified in the figure of Fellowship, his family as Kindred and 
Cousin, his wealth as Goods, and so on. Confronted by Death, who informs 
Everyman that he must go on a long pilgrimage at the end of which he must render his 
accounts to the Almighty, Everyman calls on his friends and worldly possessions for 
help. One by one they enter, and to his dismay Everyman finds they cannot help him. 
Thus Fellowship abandons him, and Goods boasts of having lured him almost to 
damnation. The play thereby dramatises forcefully that the uses of wealth and 
companionship are all in this world. Facing death they camiot help him or us.
Indeed, they hinder us. At his lowest ebb, Everyman then discovers his Good Deeds 
squeaking feebly at his feet, having been bound by Everyman’s sins. Knowledge 
(standing for acknowledgement of sins) enters and persuades Everyman to make 
penance by scourging himself, after which his liberated Good Deeds rise from the 
ground. Strength, Discretion, Five Wits and Beauty then appear, swearing to 
accompany Everyman. However, as he approaches the grave they all depart, leaving 
Everyman to enter the grave accompanied only by his Good Deeds. The voice of an 
angel fr'om offstage receives Everyman into heaven, and the Doctor enters to 
underline the moral of the play.
Everyman derives its dramatic power from the fact that the predicament confronting 
Everyman also ultimately confr onts every member of the audience. The audience is
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Everyman, and the play confronts its viewers with then own mortality. Everyman’s 
story is their story. The Unknown in To Damascus similarly confronts its viewers 
with a situation which is also then own. But here the situation has altered: instead of 
pilgrimage, suspension; instead of progress, disorientation and uncertainty. To 
Damascus cannot sustain the linear progression fi'om self-knowledge to contrition and 
ultimately salvation.
There is a further point of comparison here, in part with morality plays like Everyman 
and in part with late medieval mystery cycles. Everyman serves an obvious religious 
purpose: it aims to edify the audience by convincing them to embrace Christian piety 
and to lead the Cliristian version of the good life. It does this, in part, by making the 
audience uncomfortable. To work dramatically, it requfres that the audience identify 
with Everyman and thus themselves confr ont their own mortality. The English 
mystery cycles, originating like the morality play in the late Middle Ages, depicted 
episodes from the Bible. They were eommunal affairs -  each of a town’s guilds 
would perfomi one scene, usually with some connection with the guild, at various 
staging points tliroughout the town. Like the morality plays, they served a didactic 
purpose, “[reinforcing] the message of sermons and other forms of religious 
instruction.”’^^  In them God becomes a participant in the action, interacting with 
man. The story presented in the mystery cycles embraces the creation, fall and 
redemption of humanity. Thus the audience situates itself within this universal 
narrative. It therefore bound the audience and the players in a common Cliristian 
identity. The audience in Strindberg’s day, as in our own, would not necessarily 
regard itself as Cliristian, and even if it did, would not be likely to find the salvific
Trapp, Medieval English Literature, p. 364
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promise offered in the mystery and morality plays credible in that form.’^  ^ To 
Damascus does not, and camiot, serve the didactic function of these earlier plays. Nor 
could it bind the audience in a common identity in the same way. And yet it does 
discomfort the audience, as does Everyman, but without the latter’s context of a 
saving teleology. Or rather, while it tries to resolve its own internal contradictions in 
a salvific teleology, this latter aspect of the play is unconvincing, as discussed above. 
To Damascus does not work, either, as a psychological investigation of conversion. 
While Strindberg’s naturalistic plays were in some senses part of a psychological 
theatre, Strindberg has here turned away from psychology.’ '^’ This is a metaphysical 
theatre.
In it is also one of the earliest traces of the attempt canded out in a number of 20C 
theatrical practitioners to think of the theatre in terms of the sacred (or alternatively of 
the sacred in terms of theatre). A play-text does not become theatre until it is 
performed, and to that extent we have to be carefiil here. To Damascus is not, as the 
printed word, theatre. Yet it belongs to a line of thinking about sacred theatre. This is 
not because it belongs within a confessional tradition: as we have seen, reading it in 
this way is problematic. Everyman and the medieval mystery cycles are sacred 
theatre in the sense that they are subsumed within medieval Cliristianity and serve to 
reinforce Cliristian piety. In what sense, then, can To Damascus claim to belong to a 
sacred theatre? The former was a theatre at the centre of the cultm*e, reproducing and 
reinforcing the central themes of Christianity. To borrow an image fr'om Robert
The drama critic Eric Bentley refers with contempt to a performance of another Strindberg play, 
Easter, he witnessed in Germany; “mention religion and your audience of solid citizens will put up 
with nonsense to an infinite extent. It is hard for a playwright to induce awe by any honest means, but 
by mentioning Jesus Christ he can do it in half a second,” Eric Bentley, In Search o f  Theater (New 
York: Vintage Books), p. 130
See below, on the treatment of character in The Burnt House, pp. 151-2
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Bmstein, the former is theatre performed, as it were, within a temple, whilst the latter
Robert Brustein, The Theatre o f Revolt (Loudon: Methuen, 1970), pp. 3-4 
This is a theme I explore in the following chapter. See pp. 125-8 
Peter Brook, The Empty Space (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 47 
Ibid., p. 49
is theatre performed amongst the temple’s r u i n s . O n e  consequence is that in 
Everyman God himself comes on stage and becomes a part of the action. In To 
Damascus God has ceased to be a perceptible presence. But if To Damascus is, 
despite itself, theatre performed in the ntins, yet it still has a claim to be called sacred.
This claim derives in part, in my view, from the paradoxical conflation of sacred and 
sacrilegious comparable with some writings on the theological fringe, like those of 
Thomas Altizer.’^ ’’ Altizer in turn draws on this strain within some Chr istian writers, 
especially William Blake. It also derives fr om a powerful strain within much thinking 
on the theatre, itself often employing paradox. Certainly the language of the sacred
■ ■has become common cuiTency amongst many theatrical practitioners in the century 
since Strindberg’s death. One pertinent example comes from Peter Brook’s famous 
The Empty Space, when he turns to the “Holy Theatre.” Brook becomes, perhaps 
necessarily, discursive and vague when he talks of this. The closest he comes to a 
neat definition of holy theatre is to say
[The Holy Theatre] could be called The Theatre of the Invisible-Made-Visible: 
the notion that the stage is a place where the invisible can appear has a deep 
hold on our thoughts.”’^ ^
This is theatre opening onto the invisible. Of course, this leaves us with a huge 
question. Brook alludes to it when he asks of the wartime theatre in both England and 
Germany “was it a hunger for the invisible, a hunger for a reality deeper than the 
fullest form of everyday life -  or was it a hunger for the missing things in life, a 
hunger, in fact, for buffers against reality?” Brook’s “Invisible” becomes, in
iI
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Strindberg, a void. Whether this void is sacred or nihilistic is a question that haunts 
his plays, as we will see.
My argument here at least opens the possibility that a production of To Damascus 
could function as sacred theatre in the sense that performers and audience are bound 
together in a communal experience in which the sense of identity becomes a site of 
conflicting roles, as well as the site of an existential predicament. This conflict may 
itself open onto a kind of transcendence -  but a transcendence without content. In this 
Strindberg was ahead of his time. Like the exemplars of what Brook calls Holy 
Theatre, Strindberg seeks the sacred, and like them he ultimately had to conduct this 
search outside and between traditions. Brook says of the nomadic American theatre 
troupe Living Theatre “[sjearching for holiness without tradition it is compelled to 
turn to many sources, many t r a d i t i o n s . H e n c e  Strindberg’s eclecticism, which 
becomes ever more evident in the other plays this thesis discusses, may have been an 
absolutely necessary part of reaching towards the sacred. This eclecticism itself 
undercuts the teleology underlying the kind of allegory To Damascus attempts to 
enforce on itself and on its audience. The possibility of a sacred theatre, and what it 
might mean, is a theme informing the rest of this thesis, and one which I return to 
explicitly in the final chapter.
Conclusion
Ibid., p.70 Ia
.
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The drama critic Eric Bentley, reviewing a production of To Damascus, accused 
Strindberg of purveying pretentious religious k i t s c h . I f  we read To Damascus as a 
moral allegory, then he is right. Such a reading might suggest that the Unknown’s 
various alter egos -  the thief, the madman, the corpse -  represent warnings that shock 
the Unknown out of his complacency and guide him on the path to repentance, with 
the ultimate result that he embraces the Church. Given this sort of reading the play 
does become trite and dull. And yet Eric Bentley’s judgment is not fair. From a close 
reading emerges a much more ambiguous play. On the one hand, it seems to embrace 
a very conservative and moralistic version of Cliristianity; on the other, it performs at 
certain moments a Blakean inversion of Clu'istianity. Because of this inversion, 
received theological categories begin to break down. Good and evil become difficult 
to distinguish, the centred self is constantly under tlrreat from a proliferation of alter 
egos, and ultimately Clirist and Satan become difficult, perhaps impossible, to tell 
apart. Indeed, they may be one and the same.
Wliat begins to emerge in To Damascus is a response to Cliristianity as what the 
theologian Paul Tillich called a “broken myth.” Wlien a myth -  such as the 
resurrection - becomes deniythologised, the possibility of a “broken myth” opens.
This is, in Tillich’s words, “a myth which is understood as a myth, but not removed or 
replaced.”’ ’^ The symbolic power of a broken myth is retained, although its symbolic 
character is made conscious. The language of symbol fimctions, according to Tillich, 
by pointing beyond itself. A symbol is not, however, arbitrary, as it participates in the 
reality to which it points. Furthermore, it “opens up levels of reality which otherwise
Eric Bentley, In Search o f Theater, p. 128-9. He does allow that a careful reading of the play might 
“dispel the clouds and bring someüring to light.”
Paul Tillich, Dynamics o f Faith (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 50
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are closed to us.”’^^  A broken myth retains these functions, while no longer being 
taken literally. It would seem to provide an opening onto transcendence. This is, as 
Tillich makes clear, distinct from the alternative religious response to the de- 
mythologizing of religion, namely the retreat into literalism and fundamentalism. 
Tillich therefore shares an underlying motivation with Don Cupitt -  to respond to 
modernity with a de-mythologized theology. Both begin from religion as a human 
experience, and in this sense both are existential: they confront the predicament of a 
de-mythologized world. In To Damascus, Strindberg also begins fr om this 
predicament. The Unknown confronts a de-mythologized world. The structure of the 
play, promoting as it does an allegorical reading, tries to reinscribe this de- 
mythologized world into a conservative Cliristian salvific myth. It fails, however.
The symbolic language of Cliristianity, at least in this form, no longer opens up 
“levels of reality.” It no longer opens onto transcendence. To Damascus therefore 
ends with a conversion that does not even convince the Unknown himself. Another 
property of symbols, as Tillich points out, is that they grow and, ultimately, die.”’^
The play clings to a form of Cliristianity that even in 1898 was dying. Perhaps this is 
why Eric Bentley found it kitsch.
The play is, then, as Bentley says, a jumble.’ '^’ Yet this jumble contains moments of 
clarity. Above all it depicts the predicament of the half-believers, those who live in 
the space vacated by Christianity as an ecclesial institution. Thus the Unknown’s 
state of suspension at the beginning of the play, that prefigures the suspended 
existence of, for example, Vladimir and Estragon. Thus also the Unknown’s oddly 
ambivalent conversion: in the last scene he says he will enter the Church, but he will
Ibid., p. 42 
Ibid., p. 43
Eric Bentley, In Search o f Theater, p. 128
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not stay. The play occupies an uncomfortable position between atheism and faith. A 
question therefore lurks uneasily behind To Damascus. Without a linear, teleological 
theology and its embodiment in an ecclesial hierarchy, is Christianity still possible?
In Nietzschean terms, is Cliristianity possible after the death of God?
For Strindberg, Christianity is ineluctably centred on the crucifixion. For Tillich, the 
crucifixion is the paramount religious symbol because it contains within itself its own 
undoing: “Every type of faith has the tendency to elevate its concrete symbols to 
absolute validity. The criterion of the truth of faith, therefore, is that it implies an 
element of self-negation.”’^^  An enigma, a secret lies beyond the symbol, but only to 
the extent that the symbol undoes itself. But what if, behind the symbol, lies the 
darkness of the abyss? For this is implicitly a possibility for a self-negating symbol.
If so, how do we understand “the hollowness of the sign which forever empties 
i t s e l f D o e s  a divine abyss lie behind the symbol of the crucifixion, or a nihilistic 
void? In either case, the prospects for Cliristianity as an institution embodied in a 
Church and an authoritarian hierarchy look uncertain. And in this context, the 
Unknown faces a Kierkegaardian choice, but he is unable to choose.
Tillich, The Dynamics o f Faith, p. 97
Ian Ahnond, “Derrida and the Secret of the Non-Secret: On Respiritualising the Profane,” in 
Literature and Theolog} ,^ vol. 17, No. 4, December 2003, p. 465
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3. A Dream Play
The previous chapter argues that despite appearances To Damascus problematizes 
Cliristianity as a nan'ative of salvation. The allegorical pattern of the play is 
undermined by its existential texture: the erosion of a coherent sense of character and 
narrative, the muted challenge to nineteenth century ethical and religious norms, the 
sense of a cosmos devoid of stable meaning. InW Dream Play, the allegorical and 
indeed mythic elements of the play exist in a similar tension with its existential 
texture. A Dream Play, however, confronts openly the questions that To Damascus 
rather suppresses. Even as it enacts a myth of incarnation and (ambiguous) liberation, 
it questions the possibility of the cosmic harmony on which such a myth ultimately 
relies. It does so in part by its concern for justice. This becomes especially apparent 
in the attack on theodicy, discussed below. While the play is less related to 
Chi'istianity, and in fact embodies a religious syncretism, it still enacts a naixative of 
salvation. This narrative, however, ends in ambiguity. The strangely moving 
conclusion to A Dream Play does not offer any clear affirmation. Nor is it simply 
nihilistic. It ends, thematically, on a question -  on the question posed by an empty 
space and a funeral pyre.
To put this in different temis, the play embodies a tension between myth and dream. 
On the one hand the play enacts a kind of Platonic myth; on the other, its dream 
constmction tlneatens this myth with its anarchic instability. In a sense, it is caught 
between saying and unsaying. Plato’s myth of the cave, alluded to explicitly in A 
Dream Play, makes the objects of this world imitations of Ideas or Forms. Book 7 of 
The Republic likens the world to a cave in which the inliabitants sit chained to a rock
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watching shadowy images projected on the wall in front of them. Having never 
experienced anything else, they take a tree-shaped shadow to be a real tree, a table­
shaped shadow to be a real table, and so on. If someone frees himself and escapes the 
cave he emerges into the realm of Ideas, and sees for the first time the Ideal tree, of 
which all earthly trees are an imitation, illuminated by the sun of the Good. Now 
while this makes of the world an insubstantial shadow-play, it also imbues the objects 
of this world with at least a provisional stability and identity. The trees we see may 
be mere shadows, but in then essential being they refer back to the unchanging 
Platonic form of a tree, and this Platonic form lends them identity and coherence, 
even if the shadow is ultimately impermanent and insubstantial. A Dream Play refers 
to the world as a cave, and also as a copy in which something has gone wrong. The 
reference is specifically Platonic. Yet its dream construction undermines any sense of 
Platonic realism by the mutability of the mise-en-scene and the characters. An object 
may be a tree in one scene, a hat-stand in the next. Character and perception, too, are 
mutable. This contrast between myth and dream might be clarified by a comparison 
with Gerard Manley Hopkins’ conception of cliromatic and diatonic harmony.
Hopkins sought to bind the apparently chaotic multiplicity of the world into a musical 
harmony, but noted that there were two kinds of harmony in music: “Diatonism is any 
change in things, any difference between part and part, which is abrupt. Chi'omatism 
is change or difference which is sliding or transitional.” ’^  ^ For Hopkins, cluomatism 
implies a gradual and spontaneous evolution, in which species are not eternal types 
but are “momentary and accidental coagulations of universal matter, developed 
without a break fr om the species below, and ready to flow at any time to a higher
Miller, The Disappearance o f  God, p. 278
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species in the perpetual stream of development.”’^^  Hopkins therefore favours 
diatonic harmony, because this means “organization can only be imposed downward 
from a realm of pre-deteiinined types” -  a principle Hopkins describes as Platonism 
or realism. In a cliromatic world “[a]ll is ‘bleared, smeared’, and ‘self in self is 
‘steeped and pashed’ in the perpetual flux. As a result, rhyming is impossible, and in 
a world where rhyme is impossible no principle of ordering r e m a i n s . I n  such a 
world, not only do the objects of perception dissolve in ever-changing flux, but the 
subject is also in jeopardy. A Dream Play portrays, in Hopkins’ terms, a chromatic 
world in which “[t]he characters split, double, evaporate, condense, flow out, and are 
collected.”’^ ” A Platonic vision of cosmic order, by contrast, provides the objects of 
the world with a kind of stability of identity, even if they are ultimately insubstantial 
compared to the original Ideas from which they dr aw their essence.
In the foreword to A Dream Play, Strindberg says that his narrative ‘sways’. In 
writing about the play, I find my own naiTative swaying, however straight I try to 
keep it. In what follows, I begin w ith^ Dream Play as myth; I then discuss the 
staging, and in particular the way in which the play can be read as a move towards a 
Platonic, as opposed to Aristotelian, theatre; finally I turn to A Dream Play as dream.
1. MYTH
Strindberg’s Cave
Ibid.
Ibid.
190 Strindberg, TUI Damaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 108
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Outside Sweden, Strindberg is famous as a playwright. It is less well known that he
was also an artist. In 1901, at around the time he was writing A Dream Play,
Strindberg did a painting cslWqû Inferno-Tavlan (‘The Inferno Painting’).’ ’^ Around
the border we see what appears to be a dark fringe of leaves, roughly daubed,
resembling a cave. The middle of the painting opens out onto a stoimy grey sky, from 
.which streaks of rain pour down onto a landscape or perhaps a seascape: we see a 
distant range of green humps that could either be hills or waves. This cave motif 
seems to reflect an obsession of Strindberg’s. It first appears in a painting from 1892 
called Underlandet (‘Wonderland’) . I n  this, a patch of bright pinkish-white light 
appears in the middle of a field of variegated dull greens and browns, while in the 
foreground are a number of small pink flowers above a dark patch that may be a pool. 
By his own account, Strindberg sat down to paint a view of the sea fr om a forest, but 
found, when he had finished, a cave opening onto a patch of light inliabited by 
“disembodied and undefined beings.”’ He had inadvertently found an image that
I
i
.
both embodied an old obsession with the sea,”’^  and echoes in his post-Inferno plays,
A Dream Play in particular. All these ‘cave’ paintings situate the viewer inside either 
a cave or a dense forest (he leaves it ambiguous), opening out onto a land- or 
seascape. They evoke multilayered associations. Barnets Forsta Vagga^^ (‘The 
Child’s First Cradle), painted for his recently-bom daughter Anne-Marie, again has a 
border of green daubs resembling leaves. In the middle, it opens onto a cahn seascape 
painted in warm orange and red tones, a red sun just rising above the horizon. It
August Strindberg, Inferno-Tavlan, 1901, oil on canvas, 100cm x 70 cm, private collection 
August Strindberg, Underlandet, 1894, oil on cardboard, 72.5 x 52cm, Nationalmuseum, Stockholm
August Strindberg, New Directions in Art! Or the Role o f Chance in Artistic Creation, trans. 
unknown, in Per Hedstrom (ed.), Strindberg: Painter and Photographer (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001), pp. 180-1
An obsession reflected throughout his paintings, as well as in a number of plays and literary works, 
not least A Dream Play and, as we shall see, tiie novel IHavshandet. I
August Strindberg, Barnets Forsta Vagga, 1901, oil on paper, 45 x 38cm, private collection
I
85
encloses the viewer within a womb, opening out onto the sea of time and space. Thus 
the picture implies a process of becoming, of being born into the world and becoming 
incarnate. Here, too, the world looks welcoming and lull of warmth. In other 
paintings, it is less so, although symbolically they are consistent with each other.
Thus Inferno-Tavlan opens onto a scene of storms. Its title has a double reference: it 
invokes both Dante’s Inferno and Strindberg’s account of his crises in Paris. The latter 
reference suggests that this painting is in some sense a self-portrait, evoking the 
emotional storms he suffered. The cave or forest from within which the storm is seen 
implies, again, existence in the material world. As a forest, it calls to mmd the 
beginning of Dante’s Inferno, where the narrator finds himself lost in the midst of an 
impenetrable forest. The forest for Dante represents the material world, in which he 
has become a lost wanderer.
In the course of Strindberg’s “Inferno-crisis” and its afteimath the imagination as an 
image-making faculty took on great importance. Partly under the influence of 
Swedenborg, Strindberg came to regard images as having a revelatory power that 
words lack.’^  ^ It is not surprising, therefore, that H Dream Play seeks to use images 
to address the audience dfrectly, without words. Thus the play reproduces these 
mythical cave images in its mise-en-scene. After one scene-change, a shabby wall 
runs across the stage, and
[i]n the middle of the wall is a gate which opens onto a path that leads out to a 
gi'een, light place where an enonnous blue aconite is seen.’^^
Like his ‘cave’ paintings, this places the audience (and the actors) within a confined 
space, the confinement here emphasized by the wall, with an opening into an ill-
Harry G. Carlson, Out o f Inferno: Strindberg’s Reawakening as an Artist (Seattle: University o f  
Washington Press, 1996), pp. 264-7
Strindberg, Till Damaskus/Ett Dromspel, p. 119
86
As well as the Platonic, there is here, also, a Neoplatonic background. Because of his 
interest in literature and allegory, the best way to approach this is probably through 
Porphyry, but first, as a precondition, we need to look, however briefly, at the 
philosophy of Poiphyry’s teacher, P l o t i n u s . I n  contrast to a gi'eat deal of Christian 
theological language that evokes a personal God who creates the cosmos (and, utterly 
transcendent, stands outside creation yet has a relationship with it), Plotinus holds that 
the world is the emanation of what he calls the One. The One, Plotinus tells us, 
remains unmoving and unchanging, yet from it the cosmos arises in the same way as
I retm-n to this below, pp. 105-7. Also p. 106, n. 251
199
Îdefined area of light. In the paintings, what we see in the clearing is ambiguous in 
terms of form. Here it is ambiguous symbolically. If we are in a cave, as the 
audience, are we looking deeper into the cave at another image, or are we looking 
out? The clearing contains an enonnous blue aconite. This too is ambiguous. 
Aconite is a poison as well as a medicine against fever. In small doses it produces 
numbness and sleep. It stands for both poison and cure, sleep and the remedy for 
fevered dreams.
It is worth emphasising here the Platonic background to these cave-like images. In 
the paintings discussed above, the cave opens out onto the world of matter, the world 
of everyday existence. The cave itself is both a womb and a prison. In Plato’s myth, 
men and women sit bound to a rock, looking at shadows that they take for reality. In 
Strindberg’s paintings, this shadow play has become a seascape of shifting, 
evanescent forms. This seascape is sometimes calm, sometimes stormy, but the sea 
here becomes the world of ever-changing forms. It becomes, indeed, maya.’^ ^
I
I
I
This is, necessarily, a very cursory treatment of Plotinus.
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light emanates from the unehanging snn.^’’° The One is also said to “overflow.” ’^” By 
stages, the overflowing of the One ‘descends’ until, the emanation of the One 
attenuated almost to nothing, it becomes matter. Thus a deep unity underlies the 
apparent multiplicity of the world. Thus, also, birth into the world is a descent and a 
forgetting of our true divine natuie. Porphyiy, in his famous allegory On the Cave o f 
the Nymphs, makes of the description of a cave in Homer’s Odyssey a concrete image 
of this descent into the world. He begins by pointing out the ancient lineage of cave 
imagery. The cave, Porphyry tells us, has always represented the world. The hard, 
resilient rock that fomis the cave resembles matter. In itself it is dark, obscure and 
formless, as matter itself is. However, by being shaped into forms it becomes visible 
and sensually appealing. The Platonic background to the images discussed above 
(both the paintings and the set) implies bondage to a world of illusory sense 
perceptions. The Neoplatonic suggests in turn a descent into the world and a 
forgetting. As we shall see, A Dream Play begins with a literal descent into the 
world. Taken together, this places both the characters of the play, and the audience 
watching it, within the cave, lost in the forest of materialism.
A Dream Play begins with a literal descent into the world. As with all salvific myths, 
the world is necessarily seen as imperfect. India’s Daughter finds herself on a cloud 
being drawn down towards the Earth. Gazing down and seeing the world’s beauty, 
Indra explains that it was once more beautiful “in the morning of time; then 
something happened, a disturbance in its orbit, or perhaps something else, a rebellion 
followed by a crime, which had to be suppressed ... Hearing India’s unkind
200
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Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London; Penguin, 1991), pp. 353-4 
Ibid., p. 361. Plotinus is careful to mark this ‘overflowing’ as a metaphor, not a literal action. 
Strindberg, Till Damaskus /  Ett Dromspel, p. 110
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words about humanity, she proclaims that he judges them too harshly. As she sinks 
further, he tells her that the Earth is
[N]ot the best [world], of course, but not the worst either, 
it is called Dust, it rolls round like all the others, 
and so the inliabitants sometimes get delirious, 
on the borderline between folly and madness^’’^
Taking on human life, the Daughter at first sees life naively. She frees the Officer 
from his confinement in the growing castle, only for him to endure the frustration of 
never meeting his true love, Victoria. She marries the Lawyer and they have a child, 
only to discover how difficult maiTiage and parenthood are. She witnesses the lot of 
both rich and poor, and finds that human life is extraordinarily difficult for both.
Plunged into the chaotic confusion of experience, she gradually forgets her own 
natui'e until, in Fingaf s Cave, she re-awakens and finally she is consumed by fire.
This myth incorporates the motifs of Poiphyiy’s work: the descent into generation and 
the final release into the realm of the Gods. It also incoiporates the Christian motif of 
incarnation, and perhaps also of kenosis -  the self-emptying of God taking on human 
mortality. The daughter descends, forgets her godhood and takes on a frilly human 
life, including mainiage and children, and dies, not on the cross, but in a cosmic 
conflagration.
i
Underlying this is still a way of thinking that is largely Cliristian, however. Despite 
,its exotic trappings, the prologue reproduces original sin as the cause of suffering.
Strindberg is typically vague, but it involves a first crime, a rebellion that had to be 
suppressed. A certain moral ambivalence intmdes here: the prologue leaves it unclear
i
---------------------------------------
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who to blame for humanity’s bad behaviour. The rotation of the earth makes people 
dizzy, half mad, and so not really culpable. The implicit authoritarianism of this 
conception of original sin (humanity fails by disobeying God’s command) would 
never have sat very easily with Strindberg. Indeed, early on in his career he wrote a 
fragment of a play embracing frill-blown Gnosticism, in which the God of the Bible is 
an evil usurper and the serpent comes to liberate humanity fr om His tymnny.^” In 
this Gnostic fragment, Christ also arrives to fr ee humanity, and God punishes him 
with cmcifixion. A Dream Play refers to Clirist, also, as one who disrupts the social 
order. This disruption is intimately linked with the question of justice. The Lawyer, 
so polluted by the vices and sufferings of the people he has defended that his hands 
turn black, is crowned by the Daughter with a crown of thorns. The legal 
establishment refuses him a doctorate, because he has taken the side of the poor and 
the c o n d e m n e d . A s  with Strindberg’s novel. The Scapegoat, the Lawyer, as 
advocate for poor frail humanity, represents Christ. Implicitly, therefore, humanity 
needs an advocate. This implies that the social and indeed cosmic order (the two 
being intimately linked) is not just. “Justice, which so often is unjust,” as the Lawyer 
says.^’’*^ God as an authoritarian father figure seems distinctly lacking injustice. In 
another reference to Clirist, the Lawyer tells the Daughter that a liberator once came,
and that he was crucified by all the right-thinking p e o p l e . T h e  play calls into
■question the justice that ultimately underpins Plato’s myth, and indeed underpins 
Christianity as a narrative of sin and redemption.
August Strindberg, Samlade Shifter, vol. 2, John Landquist (ed.), (Stockliolm; Bonniers, 1912), pp. 
3 0 7 -3 1 9 . The was the ‘Efterspel,’ a sort o f coda to tire verse version of Master Olof. Years after tlie
events of MasterOlof Olof and his sons sit down to watch a play put on by a travelling troupe outside 
Stockholm. This play within a play is comprised of the Gnostic drama outlined above.
Strindberg, Till Damaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 135 t
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Strindberg used the sea as an image of worldly life on a number of occasions in both 
paintings and novels, but here his use of it has subtly changed. Strindberg’s novel I  
Havsbandet (“By the Open Sea”) makes particular use of sea imagery that correlates
As we have seen, the play resembles Strindberg’s “cave paintings” both thematically
and in the mise-en-scene. It is no surprise, then, that one scene explicitly takes place 
inside a cave, and it is in this scene that the Daughter awakens to her divine nature 
and sees the world for what it is. Near the end of the play, the Daughter transports the 
Poet to Fingal’s Cave. This is an actual cave existing on the Hebridean island of 
Staffa off the Scottish coast which also served as the inspiration for the composer 
Mussorgsky’s Hebrides Overture', it is the destination of the giant’s causeway that 
begins in Northern Ireland and consists of hexagonal columns resembling paving 
blocks. The Daughter tells the Poet that this cave exists at “the world-sea’s farthest 
limit.” ’^’^  She identifies the sea with the world, and in Fingal’s cave is able to stand at 
its edge, almost outside it, as is the Poet. From here the world appears as a sea 
troubled by terrible stonns.
■'7;,
Î
with another series of sea paintings from the 1890s. These paintings all have the same 
general form: a beach m the foreground, merging into the sea in the middle distance, 
in turn only just made distinguishable from the sky by an almost invisible horizon.
On the beach, in the foreground to one side, stands a solitary flower. These paintings
.move close to abstraction, the beach, sea and sky becoming bands of colour. Thus, in 
Den Ensamma Tisteln (“The Solitary Thistle)^^^, a small green thistle grows in the 
bottom right of the painting, standing on a pale yellow shore that blends into a pale 
blue sea. The sky, the same colour as the sea, is only distinguishable by a faint shift Î
____________________________
-“Mbid., p. 172
August Strindberg, Den Ensamma Tisteln, 1892, Oil on Panel, 19 x 30cm, Private Collection
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of colour at the horizon. Lilce many of Strindberg’s paintings, there seems to be an 
autobiographical element to this. The thistle, prickly and stubborn, seems an ironic 
reference to Strindberg’s own sense of self. This ego is the only source of orientation 
in a landscape that has become weightless and insubstantial. The delicate tonal shifts 
of the almost abstract bands of colour suggest a potential for a sort of aesthetic 
transcendence of the ego, in which the sense of self becomes vague and as it were 
floats. But the prickly thistle seems to oppose this, asserting a stubborn determination 
to hold onto a fnm sense of self in a world without fixed points of reference. Indeed 
the ego becomes here the only fixed point of reference. This was the seed of 
Strindberg’s dislike of Theosophy: he saw the destruction of the ego, the world’s 
fixed point, as madness.^”’ Strindberg’s 1 Havsbandet opens with the 
protagonist’s perilous journey in an open boat to an island at the edge of the 
archipelago where he is to take up the post of fisheries inspector. Although he has no 
nautical experience, he wrests control of the boat from its captain by sheer force of 
will and navigates across a sea that tiuoatens to swamp the boat and drown everyone 
in it. The sea corresponds to the world, and it is wild, unthinking and dangerous. It is 
not governed by any Providential purpose, and bears no mark of design. Inspector 
Borg, the protagonist, uses his superior intelligence and refined perception to ride the 
currents, avoid the dangerous crests of breaking waves, and steer the boat in to land. 
His ego and the force of his will become the only means of steering a course tlirough 
the sea.
In A Dream P/qy‘s Fingaf s cave scene, the Poet and the Daughter look out on a sea 
that is also perilous. They see a ghost-ship, the-Flying Dutchman, crossing the waves.
Thus, for instance, Inferno’s naiTator comments “the denial and mortification of the Ego ... to me 
seemed and still seems an insane idea.” Strindberg, Inferno, p. 168. See also Lamm, Strindberg och 
Makterna, p. 135-6
211 Stiindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 31, p. 32
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This transforms into an ordinary ship in a stormy sea, heading for a reef. The crew of 
the ship are in peril of their lives without knowing it. Like the crew of the little boat 
in the opening chapter o îI  Havsbandet they exist in a perilous world, yet human
efforts to steer a course seems insignificant here. And while Inspector Borg and the 
rest of his boat’s crew face death, the peril confronting the crew of the foundering 
ship in A Dream Play is perhaps more desperate; they find themselves bound to a life 
in which there are no fixed points, but in which the assertion of will by superior 
intellect does not in essence ameliorate their predicament. This is the sea of time and 
space, of an insubstantial, unstable and perilous existence in the material world. By 
implication, the life portrayed in the rest of the play is precisely this life on a stomi- 
tossed sea. In essence, the characters in the play are the crew of the ship perishing in 
the storm. The play also implies that its audience, too, are like the crew of the ship. I 
return to this below.
There is a further point of comparison between the Fingal’s cave scene and I  
Havsbandet. In Chapter 3 of the latter. Inspector Borg takes a boat out into the water 
around the island where he now resides to inspect the fishing-grounds. After some
I
hours, he finds his attention shifting to the spring pack-ice drifting by. At first he 
finds that the cracks in the ice resemble a map with “islands, bays, inlets, straits.”^" 
Where the ice has run agiound and piled up it
created vaults and formed caves, built up towers, mined churches, fortresses f.
[...] Here the blocks had piled up like cyclopean stone, organizing itself into
■I___
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teiTaces like an Assyrian-Greek temple; there the repeated hammering of the 
waves had carved out a Romanesque arch?’^
All this resembles the work of human hands, despite being the chance result of natural 
forces. Yet this passage also testifies to the mutability of matter. Sea-ice worked on 
by wind and waves comes to resemble everything from an intricate map to a Greek 
temple, but without the work of either a cartographer or an architect. In the Fingal’s 
cave scene, again, forms mutate into each other. Thus the Poet sees the ship 
transfomi itself:
Poet: ... I don’t think it is a ship ... it’s a two-storey house with trees outside
... and ... telephone poles ... a tower that reaches into the skies.^’^
This transformation resembles the way the sets change within the play.^’'’ Inspector
Borg is a Nietzschean superman, turned by Strindberg into a tragic hero. He
speculates on the continuity of matter and life, implying perhaps a Schopenhauerian
vision of blind will forming matter in a way that appears deceptively purposeful.
Underpinning this, however, is an absence of meaning. It is a world without the 
.possibility of escape. A Dream Play confr'onts the void, but rather than pointing to a 
nihilistic abyss, it refuses to interpret it.^’^
Plotinus allegorizes the Odyssey as an escape fi*om the binding power of material life 
in Odysseus’ flight from the sorceiy of Circe and Calypso.^’^  Strindberg perceived 
his own predicament in similar terms, of being bound to the world. In a letter to his
Theosophist friend Torsten Hedlund, he writes “.. .1 hate the world because it binds
■
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my spirit, and because I love it.” ’^^  In A Dream Play, the characters are similarly 
bound to the world by desire and by love. The play, then, enacts a Neoplatonic myth. 
Returning to Porphyiy, his allegory deals, above all, with the cave on Ithaca described 
in Homer’s Odyssey, containing jars of honey, stone looms and running water. The
eave has one entrance for mortals, another for the gods. Porphyry gives a detailed 
allegorical reading of all aspects of the cave as Homer describes it. Thus the water 
that flows thi’ough the cave symbolises the mutability of matter, its ever changing 
impermanence and perpetual flux. This water is also associated with generation, 
sexual delight and reproduction. Moist spirits are drawn to water. The stone looms 
are bones, onto which flesh is woven. The cups filled with honey are associated with 
sleep and the descent of the soul into the world, (Porphyry points out that Saturn was 
put to. sleep with honey). Drawn to worldly delights, the spirits take on physical form. 
The object of the wise is to escape the world of generation and flux represented by the 
cave, exiting through the portal of the immortals, “in order that, being at length 
divested of the torn garments [by which his true person was concealed], he may 
recover the ruined empire of his soul.” ’^^
I
I
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There is a tension, then, between the Platonic, with its fixed forms and eternal 
essences, and the ever-changing flux of a dream. Within this dream, no form is 
stable, all is mutable. For Strindberg, the world has gone wrong. Even in the 
prologue there are tliree different explanations of this: a distuihance in the earth’s 
orbit; a rebellion followed by a crime; or the rotation of the earth making its 
inhabitants dizzy. Cosmic discord tlireatens the cosmic harmony. Deeply implicated 
in this is the play’s challenge to theodicy. We will examine this in more detail later,
56
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after first looking at the stage technique o f A Dream Play. This needs proper
fexamination fust of all because any interpretation of the play must take this into 
account: it is intimately connected with the mythic themes of the play. Secondly, it 
represents the fullest development of the anti-natuialistic tendency in Strindberg’s 
later writing. Thirdly, any theological investigation of the play involves a question
-that has puzzled every eommentator and director who has dealt with A Dream Play.
Wlio exactly is the dreamer?
I
2. STAGING
Apart from the mythical Prologue, which was added a few years after the rest of the 
play was written, A Dream Play does not have any fi*aming devices. This is unlike 
medieval or classical dream allegories, where someone would fall asleep and have a 
symbolic, meaningful dream. The ft aming devices in the latter serve to provide a 
stable fi-ame of reference for interpreting the dreams, and without that the meaning 
becomes slippery. A Dream Play does, however, have internal frames. This is
particularly apparent earlier on, with a series of dreams within dreams. The internal 
fi-ames themselves are not, however, stable. Instead there is a movement of the mind 
and imagination, as from the very beginning Strindberg suspends ordinary causal
narrative logic: shifts take place according to flashes of imagination and free- 
association. Thus, in the first scene, the Daughter becomes certain that the castle 
contains a prisoner, and that her duty is to fr'ee him.^’  ^ The castle opens up and the 
Daughter finds the Officer inside, waiting for her.^ ^® The Officer complains that life 
has wronged him, whereupon he and the Daughter freeze and a dieam within the 
dream begins. A partition is removed, and a scene follows between the Mother and
i
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221the Father/^' It reads ahnost like a cinematic flashback -  the Daughter and Officer
%
are clearly witnessing a scene from the Officer’s past. Again, we have the free- 
associative progression, but the ‘frame’ around this scene turns out to be porous when 
the Officer unfi'eezes and approaches the Mother. Strindberg produces an effect of 
great strangeness when the Mother, who seems to exist only in the Officer’s memory, 
asks
Mother Who is that girl?
Officer (whispering) It’s Agnes 
The dialogue at this point collapses the ‘frame’ around the scene. A similar effect is 
produced a few lines later:
■i
'
Officer To think that that cupboard can still be there after twenty years ...
We’ve moved so many times, and my mother died ten years ago!
Mother Well, what about it? You have to question everything..
The narrative is not governed by natui alistically conceived causality, and space and 
time exist here within the minds of the characters. : l
Thus the opening up of frames within frames which then dissolve into each other
contributes to the dreamlike sense of unreality in the play. A Dream Play, however,
makes much more extreme demands on the staging than this. One scene change
requires the following:
The scene changes to a lawyer’s office, with the curtain up [ie. in full view of 
.the audience], thus: the gate remains and functions as the gate to the office 
railing which extends right across the stage. The DOORKEEPER’S room
Ibid., p. 115 
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remains as the LAWYER’S nook containing his desk ... the lime tree, stripped 
of leaves, is a hat and clothes stand.^ "^^
Strindberg struggled to get the play produced for five years before it had its premiere 
at Stockholm’s Intima Teatern in 1907.^^  ^ While this was not the fii'st time Strindberg 
had difficulty persuading theatres to produce a play, in this instance a large part of the 
problem was clearly the technical demands it makes.^ *^^  The original production at 
Intima Teatern attempted to meet the challenge of staging A Dream Play with a kind
.of projector called a scioptikon. The scioptikon did not work smoothly, leading to 
lengthy blackouts between scenes that broke up the flow of the play. Wliy does
Strindberg make such difficult demands of the staging? In part, it is clearly to 
reinforce the dreamlike quality of the play on stage. Indeed, one review of the S'
original production complained that instead of seeing the enchantment of a dream
made tangible, the audience got heavy stage machinery.Together  with long pauses 
between scenes it destroyed the illusion of a dream.
The scene-changes help, then, to create the dream-like atmosphere of the play, but 
there are also two fiirther points. They reflect Strindberg’s thinking on perception and 
artistic creation, formulated in part in his essay “New Directions in Art”; and they 
create a kind of embodied metaphor, extending the metaphor of life as a kind of 
dream into the physical trappings of the stage. In “New Directions in Aif”, Strindberg 
notes the pleasure he derives from seeing unfinished sketches made with leftover 
paint. They set the imagination in motion, and every time he sees these sketches he
IIIbid., p. 131In 1905, for instance, he attempted to get a French version of/! Dream Play (entitled Reverie) 
produced in Paris.
In his campaign to persuade theatres to put on the play, Strindberg wrote to a number of them 
suggesting simplifications and cuts. Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 46, p. 153 
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 46, p. 159
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sees something new/^^ Strindberg finds that imagination is integral to seeing, as is 
his state of mind. Thus in A Blue Book the Teacher tells the Pupil that he had once 
had a room that seemed to him the most beautiful in the world:
It had not always been beautiful, but gieat, meaningful events had occuiTed 
there; a child was born there, a man died there. [.,.] One day [...] I showed it 
to a guest. He happened to be a “black man”, hopeless and despairing, who 
only believed in fists and anger [...] The man stood in the middle of the room, 
looked around him, and muttered: I can’t see it! -  When he said that, the room 
got darker; the walls closed in, the floor slirank, and my temple full of light 
was transformed before my eyes, so that I saw it as a hospital room with cheap 
wallpaper, the lovely floral curtains looked grubby, the little white desk was 
covered in inlc-spots, and the gilding had gone black; the tile-stove’s brass 
doors were dull -  the whole room was changed, and I felt ashamed.^^^
The Teacher’s fond memories and the emotional attachments evoked by the room 
make it beautiful. However the presence of a cynical stranger turns it into a cheap, 
decaying room that resembles a hospital. This could be interpreted to mean that the 
Teacher’s fond memories turned an ordinary room into something heavenly, and 
when the stranger entered the Teacher simply saw it as it was. However the passage 
does not support this interpretation. The Teacher says at the end of this statement that 
the room was “fortrollad,” a word that means either enchanted or bewitched but does 
not have the positive or negative comiotations of those words. This could mean that 
the room had been enchanted by the Teacher’s memories, but because this statement 
comes last it rather implies that the stranger’s presence had caused the room to
August Strindberg, ’’New Directions in Art! Or the Role of Chance in Artistic Creation,” trans. 
unknown, in Per Hedstrom (ed.), Strindberg: Painter and Photographer (Newhaven: Yale University 
Press, 2001), p. 177-8
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 65, p. 26
So why does Strindberg go to the trouble of writing all this in a dream-like form in the
Strindberg, Till Damaskvs / Eu Dromspel, p. 108
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,become bewitched. The point here is that there is no objective room independent of 
who is observing it. The perceiver finds it heavenly or hellish accordmg to his state 
of mind. Thus perception is inescapably shaped by expectation, memory and 
imagination. Furthemiore, as Strindberg says in “New Directions in Art,” the 
imagination works on the unformed stuff of perception to create physical objects
according to its fancy. The scene-changes in A Dream Play imitate this process of 
perception, whereby a doorkeeper’s room becomes a nook for a desk and a lime tree 
becomes a coat stand. The metamoiphosis of the mise-en-scene creates a kind of 
visual poetry resembling a dream.
1first place? This treatment extends the dream metaphor into the physical space and 
scenery of the stage. But what is the dr eam a metaphor for? The answer is implicit in 
the passage fromW Blue Book quoted above. The world appears to us via the working 
of the imagination. The world’s consequent mutability is emphasised by some of the 
vocabulary used in the foreword, where Strindberg briefly describes what he means 
by a “dream play” (although this explanation, as we shall see, itself raises a lot of
■:questions). The Swedish has alchemical overtones: characters “evaporate, condense,
flow out.”^^  ^ This is no coincidence. During his 1890s sojourn in Paris, Strindberg
had set up chemical apparatus in his apartment, with which he pursued experiments in
both chemistry and alchemy. Alchemy sought not only, or even primarily, the 
.transfoiunation of matter, but the transmutation of the soul. Thus transformation of
'lead into gold became for alchemy a metaphor for the sublimation of base instincts, in 
other words a spii'itual transformation. Thus in every country where alchemy
___
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flourished, the alchemists saw themselves as inlieritors of an esoteric tradition, and 
instruction in alchemy as an initiation.^^ ^ Alchemy had, therefore, a concern with 
spiritual transformation not incongruent with Porphyry’s allegory on the soul’s 
descent into generation and ultimate liberation. But the part of alchemy and indeed 
contemporary chemistry that held a particular fascination for Strindberg was its 
monism. In Strindberg’s own words, monism begins “from the fundamental 
assumption that matter is one, and the chemical elements only different stages of 
condensation of the same and only substance.”^^  ^ So the universe consists of one 
substance undergoing continual mutation and evolution, appearing under many 
different forms. This idea, although it has ancient roots, appealed to a number of 
Strindberg’s contemporaries as scientifically up-to-date.^^^ Darwinian evolution did 
not upset the proponents of monistic chemistry, as Darwin’s ideas seemed to confirm 
thefr own. Indeed, monism widened the applicability of Darwin, depicting a world 
where not only animals and plants but matter also evolved and changed 
spontaneously.^^'* This implied for Strindberg a kind of life-force present even in 
inanimate matter.^^^ This begins to explain the transformations of the set that 
Strindberg demanded. The mise-en-scene conforms to a monistic viewpoint, in which 
matter mutates and changes form. This implies that a fundamental unity underlies the 
apparent multiplicity. This in turn bears on a question that has puzzled so many 
directors and commentators: who is the dreamer? Before discussing this question, we 
must turn to one other issue raised by the staging.
Mircea Eliade, “Alchemy” in The Encyclopedia o f Religion, vol. 1, pp. 183 - 185 
Strindberg, Samlade Skrifter, vol. 54, John Landqvist (ed.) (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1920), p. 330 
Brandell, Strindberg in Inferno, pp. 168-70
Ibid. Thus Strindberg declares at the end of his Jardin des Plantes “. . . I  am a transformist like 
Darwin and a monist like Spencer and Haeckel.” Strindberg, Samlade Shifter, vol. 27, (Stockholm: 
Bonniers, 1917), p. 298
Brandell, Strindberg in Inferno, p. 177
236 Bertolt Brecht, jSrec/ît on Theatre, tians. John Willett (London; Methuen, 1984), p. 187
' ■ ■ '  1
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Strindberg, Brecht and Platonic Theatre
Strindberg, we have seen, wrote for some years according to naturalistic principles. A 
Dream Play however continues the deliberate breaching of naturalistic principles 
begun in To Damascus. This breach of naturalism anticipates the anti-realist moves 
of a number of subsequent playwrights. In the last chapter I addressed the question of 
what kind of theatre Strindberg was attempting in To Damascus by a comparison with 
medieval mystery and morality plays. Here, I address the question again by a 
comparison with the theatrical practices of Bertolt Brecht. Strindberg’s career ended
shortly before Brecht’s began, and there is at least a superficial resemblance between
.Strindberg’s late theatre and Brecht’s disruption of the realistic surface of drama.
This comparison is motivated by the fact that both were rebelling against the 
principles of Aristotelian mimesis. Both also, in their different ways, look back to 
Plato.
.Brecht remained tliroughout his career closely involved in the production of plays.
His approach to producing, as well as writing, plays was governed by a theory with 
Marxist underpimiings. Brecht’s famous ‘alienation’ effect aimed to keep the 
audience’s critical faculties awake. li\A Short Organum for the Theatre, Brecht 
describes the effect of naturalistic theatre on its audience as akin to hypnosis; “[t]hey 
look at the stage as if in a trance: an expression which comes from the Middle Ages, 
the days of witches and priests. As Peter Womack points out, in this theatre the 
proscenium arch acts like pane of glass tlirough which the audience passively 
observes what is going on without feeling that it can in any way affect the social order
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represented on stage/^^ This kind of theatre is therefore inlierently reactionary, not 
necessarily in its subject matter but in its manner of performance. Naturalistic theatre 
is, in Brecht’s view, little more than childish daydreaming. It functions by creating a 
seamless illusion, and causing the audience to identify with characters and feel their 
emotions. The great enemy of Brecht’s theatre is empathy. To keep the audience 
awake, to keep them thinking, theatre must above all break down the illusion of 
watching, as if through a window, scenes from real people’s lives.^ *^* It should make 
the familiar seem strange: the social order represented on stage must appear to be part 
of an ongoing historical process, not the natural and eternal order of things. In other 
words, it should appear mutable and the audience should feel that it can change the 
world.
How does Brecht do this? As Womack puts it, “[w]hat is necessary is that the 
mechanics of the thing should be visible.”^^** This principle affects all aspects of 
production, from acting to sets to music. The actors must not become totally 
immersed in the role, but must make the audience aware that they are playing a part, 
as it were demonstrating a character. As Brecht puts it, “[a]iming not to put his 
audience into a trance, he [the actor] must not go into a trance himself.” '^*® Referring 
to a performance by the actor Charles Laughton, Brecht continues “the actor appears 
on the stage in a double role, as Laughton and as Galileo ... the showman Laughton 
does not disappear in the Galileo whom he is showing.” '^** This is exactly the
Peter Womack, “Brecht: Theatre for Marx” in Anthony Frost (ed.), Theatre Theories: From Plato to 
Virtual Reality (Norwich; The Drama Studio, 2000), pp. 147-8
There is an ironic consonance between Brecht’s ideas and Strindberg’s programme for naturalistic 
theatre. Both wish for an audience that keeps an analytical distance from events portrayed onstage.
See pp. 70-1 above.
Womack, “Brecht; Theatre for Marx”, p. 151 (his italics)
Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, p. 193 
Ibid., p. 194
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242 Ibid., p. 203
Strindberg, Till Damaskus / Eu Dwmspel, p. 121
opposite of the assumptions of naturalistic acting, where the aim is precisely to make 
the audience empathise with the characters and spend a few hours dreaming. The 
purpose of method acting is to disappear into the role as entirely as possible. I
I
The resemblance between Brecht’s conception of naturalistic theatre and Plato’s myth 
of the cave is clear. A bourgeois audience sits in the dark looking at unreal events 
acted out by people pretending to be someone else, and take it for reality. The 
audience deliberately suppresses its awareness of the um eality of what they see. In 
Plato’s myth, the wise man undoes his bonds and turns towards the entrance of the 
cave, seeing reality for the first time. Consequently, he also sees the shadow play, the 
thing he had taken for the world, for what it is. Brecht’s theatre similarly aims to 
awaken its audience, and to re-orient it towards what Brecht conceives as the truth.
This motivates the breaking up of the mimetic surface of the play.
A Dream Play similarly undermines the mimetic assumptions of Aidstotelian theatre 
by the mutation of scenery, the jumps in time and place. Strindberg’s use of music 
and song also, perhaps, anticipates Brecht. For Brecht, music should resist smooth 
incorporation; the actors, when they sing, should mark it off from the rest of the play, 
the effect perhaps heightened by a change in the lighting. "^*  ^ In A Dream Play, the 
Officer enters singing Victoria’s name:
Officer (sings): Victoria!
A Female Voice (fi*om above, sings): I am here!^ '*^
The scene as a whole expresses a state of unfulfilled longing in an almost Beckett-like
.
way -  the Officer returns again and again, singing for Victoria, whom he never sees.
::I_
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In this sense the scene itself is not mimetic, but within the scene the sung lines lend 
themselves to further breaking up the surface of the play.
Brecht’s treatment of character offers a further point of comparison with Strindberg.
:Just as the social order is to be seen in Brecht, not as an eternal fact, but as a
Brecht, Brecht on Brecht, p. 191
Antony Tatlow, “Saying Yes and Saying No: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as Educators” in Tatlow, 
Antony (ed.), The Brecht Yearbook, vol. 27 (Madison, Michigan: hitemational Brecht Society, 2002), 
pp. 23-4, 38
"  ^Sti’indberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, p. 60 
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 64, pp. 68, 69-70
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contingent result of history, so character too is historically conditioned. A character 
will behave according to class interest and to circumstances. '^*'* Subjectivity does not ■I'
stand above or outside history but is part of it and conditioned by it. It was here that 
Brecht intersected with Buddhism, in the denial of an essential, substantial self.^ '*^
Brecht’s main concern in characterisation was that the actor should not disappear into 
the part: Laughton should not disappear into Galileo but should still be visible 
‘underneath’ his role. But for Strindberg Laughton too is a kind of role. As we will
see in the next chapter, Strindberg treats character as persona - a mask - leaving open
the question of whether any stable essence underlies it. Because of this, it becomes 
difficult to speak of anyone as having a good character or a bad character. Character 
becomes reactive and dependent on context. As in Brecht, character is conditioned. 
Even in his naturalistic plays, Strindberg conceived of character as something patched 
together out of fragments. '^*  ^ For Brecht too, character is a ‘complex’, a mixture of 
sometimes contradictory parts and attitudes, and of course it is historically 
conditioned. Brecht claimed his inconsistent characterisation was not just intended to 
provoke alienation, it was also more true to life. Strindberg had akeady made similar 
claims. ^ '*^
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I have drawn a parallel here between the theoretical treatment of staging and
The dialogue o f A Dream Play evokes exactly this doubleness in the Daughter’s lines 
towards the end of the play:
characterisation behmd Brecht’s “Verfremdungseffekt” and the more ad hoc stage 
technique Strindberg uses in A Dream Play. Does A Dream Play in fact, then, create
the kind of alienation Brecht sought? '^*  ^ A Dream Play flaunts its own status as a
waking dream, even in its title. Yet its aim is different. Brechtian theatre aims to 
awaken its audience to relationships of power and their consequences, with the
it
ultimate hope of altering those relationships. To achieve this it tries to keep its 
audience’s critical faculties alert by playing on the doubleness of theatre; Charles 
Laughton is both the actor Charles Laughton and Galileo. However, Brecht accepts 
the reality of the world interpreted by Marx. This forms the ultimate backdrop to 
Brecht’s thinking. A Dream Play makes this backdrop of power relations, and the 
world in which they appear, into a dream. The auditors of Plato’s myth find in the 
cave’s inliabitants an image of themselves, and yet the myth is itself a part of the
■world’s shadow-play. This doubleness in the myth of the cave, as Anthony Gash has 
pointed out, serves very well as an image of theatre.^ "*  ^ In the theatre the stage is both
■a stage and it is somewhere else, just as each character is both an actor and somebody 
else. Aristotelian theatre suppresses this doubleness, while Platonic theatre plays on
A recent production at Sweden’s Royal Dramatic Theatre (directed by Mats Ek) also suggested, in 
one small aspect of the staging, that the play could work in a Brechtian manner. The Daughter and the 
Glazier, in their first scene, gaze out at the audience as they talk about all the flowers they can see, and 
the Glazier explains tliat they wish to grow away from the dirt. Here, the audience itself registered as 
tlie flowers. This brought strongly to awareness the theatricality of what was going on. This was one 
of the few good moments in this production.
Anthony Gash, “Plato’s Theatre of the Mind” in Frost, Theatre Theories, pp. 10-11
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In the morning of time before the sun shone, Brahma, the divine primordial 
force, allowed himself to be seduced by Maya, the world-mother, into 
propagating. This [...] was heaven’s original sin. And so the world, this life 
and its people are only a phantom, a semblance, a dream-picture..
The Poet (the Daughter’s interlocutor) as well as the audience find here an image of 
theii' own predicament.^^* They are all, according to this, phantoms -  yet this speech 
is itself also Maya. We have looked in some detail at the relationship between 
Strindberg’s ‘cave’ paintings and^ Dream Play, and noted that under Swedenborg’s 
influence Strindberg came to regard images as a more direct means of communication 
than words. In the passage above, Strindberg reverts to myth, as in fact Plato 
sometimes did, to communicate in a mamier inaccessible to discursive explanations.
The passage above functions in an analogous way to Plato’s myth of the cave. It 
depicts in mythic terms the ontological and existential situation of humanity. Yet, 
like Plato’s myth, it is itself an image within the world’s unreal play. Implicitly, then, 
an image, even though itself a shadow, has the potential to change the spectator’s 
orientation. Strindberg, unlike Brecht, was no longer writing according to a coherent 
theory of stagecraft, but the above analysis reveals that A Dream Play does in fact 
contain an underlying coherence. The staging, the use of images, the dialogue and the 
Daughter’s mythical descent into the world all work together. This theatre works, as 
it were, towards a metaphysical Verfiremdungseffekt.
Strindberg, Till Damaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 194
The scholarly consensus holds that because the first part of this speech was inserted late, and 
consists of a paraphrase from Arvid Ahnfelts Verldsliteraturens historia, it must be an inessential 
afterthought. (See Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 46 pp. 135-6) Strindberg scholar Harry Carlson 
disagrees, seeing the concept of maya, and therefore this speech also, as integral to the play. My 
argument suggests that Carlson is right. I see no reason not to believe that Strindberg inserted this 
speech precisely because it states in mythical form the fundamental idea behind A Dream Play.
107
There is first, however, one further question to addi'ess.
analogous to the one Mitchell invented. This is, essentially, an entiiely new character.
I have argued here that A Dream Play can be read as one possible form of Platonic 
theatre. Brecht represents another form that a Platonic theatre might take. Harry 
Carlson remarks that Strindberg was “a Platonist in his heart and an Aristotelian in his 
head.”^^  ^ This is an astute comment. As we will see in the following section, on 
“Dream,” Strindberg’s idealism did not overcome his scepticism. A Dream Play 
remains rooted in hard and often harsh experience. The ‘mythical’ aspect of the play 
exists in tension with this, as I discuss below.
3. DREAM
The Question of the Dreamer
Is the dreamer Agnes herself? One of the male characters? Ingmar Bergman’s 1970
production placed the Poet to one side, observing most of the action and thus making 
him the dreamer. The American Strindberg scholar HaiTy Carlson, on the other hand, 
proposes a rather elaborate sequence of shared dreams between Agnes and the tluee 
main male protagonists.^^^ This imposes some clarity, but raises the question whether 
such clarity is spurious. In Carlson’s case, it leads him to favour what is 
fundamentally a moralistic reading of the play.^ '^* Director Katie Mitchell’s recent 
production at the National Theatre came up with a radical solution. She invented a 
character, Alft'ed^^ ,^ and introduced a firaming device in which Alft'ed falls asleep in
his office and then becomes the unfortunate protagonist of all the dreams that follow.
Carlson, Out o f Inferno, p 54
Harry G. Carlson, Strindberg and the Poetiy o f  Myth (Berkeley; University of California Press, 
1982), pp. 1 4 4 -5
See, for example, his comments on the OfScer’s failure to pass the ‘tests’ the Daughter (in Carlson’s 
interpretation) confronts him with. Ibid., pp. 1 6 2 -3 .
Although the Daughter in one scene addresses the Lawyer as ‘Alfred,’ there is no character
_ _
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In Mitchell’s version Agnes is reduced to a minor character in Alfred’s di'eam. None 
of these answers are very satisfactory, in my view. Carlson’s inteipretation favours a 
schematic, allegorical interpretation of the play at the expense of the elements that 
undermine allegories and schemas. On the other hand, both Mitchell’s and 
Bergman’s solutions involve major dfrectorial interventions in the play, particularly 
Mitchell’s.^ ^^  My contention is that if we read the play while bearing in mind 
Strindberg’s monism, these interventions become unnecessary and indeed 
problematic. At this point I want to pick out some remarks that Katie Mitchell made, 
because I believe she expresses clearly a basic misconception.^^^ Strindberg’s 
foreword states: “one consciousness stands over all, the dreamer’ Glossing this, 
Mitchell says “A Dream Play is a series of episodes in one long dream that, as 
Strindberg’s preface states, all take place inside one person’s eonsciousness.” Now 
let’s take a look at what Strindberg actually says about the dreamer at slightly greater 
length:
...But one consciousness stands over all, the dreamer’s; for it there are no 
secrets, nothing insignificant, no scruples, no law. He neither condemns nor 
acquits, but only relates; and as the dream is for the most part painful, less 
often happy, a tone of sadness and compassion for all that lives runs tluough 
the swaying narrative.
It is of course true that a production must interpret the play. My argument here is that these 
productions have interpreted this aspect of the play badly. This applies more sti ongly to the Bergman 
production, as Mitchell was in effect using Dream Play> as a springboard to arrive at a play of her 
own.
Katie Mitchell, “No Limits”, in The Guardian, February 12'\ 2005. The article is online at 
httn://arts.guardian.co.uk/features/stoi-v/0., 1411035.00.html. It is probably unfair to pick on Mitchell 
here: she did produce a lively piece of theatre. A Dream Play is a problematic piece in terms of stage 
production, and not merely from the technical point of view as the ambiguity over this issue 
demonstrates.
Strindberg, Till Damaskus f  Ett Dromspel, p. 108. In Swedish, “ett medvetande star over alia, det ar 
drdmmarens.”
In Swedish: ''Men ett medvetande stâr over alia, det ar drdmmarens; fo r det finns inga hemlighetei; 
ingen inkonsek\>ens, inga skrupler, ingen lag. Han domer icke, frisager icke, endast relaterar; och
■I
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The dreamer seems in this description markedly impersonal. Strindberg never tells us
who the dreamer is, nor does the drama imply that it is any one character or any set of
characters. Furthermore, Strindberg does not say that one person’s consciousness
stands over all, only that one consciousness does. I do not believe this was due to
oversight. It seems to me there were a number of things in the back of Strindberg’s
mind when he conceived of a drama of this kind, among them his earlier adherence to
monism and Schopenliauer, especially in the latter’s conception of the will. I have
akeady alluded to Strindberg’s monism. Its basic tenet is that despite the appearance
of multiplicity, the universe is essentially one substance. For Strindberg, this also, we
have seen, implied mutability -  a single substance evolving and changing appearance.
For this reason he expended a lot of energy trying to undermine the elemental theory
of c h e mi s t r y , No w although Strindberg later rejected monism for theism, monism
clearly retained a strong grip on his imagination. Turning to Schopenliauer,^^* you
camiot read him very far without seeing his affinity with Strindberg’s outlook. They
not only share each other’s misogyny, but also a profound pessimism. Again, both
took an interest in Buddliism and the East. Strindberg actually says in one of his
letters “... I have grown up on thi'ee Buddhists: Schopenliauer, v. Hartmann and lastly
Nietzsche.”^^  ^ Schopenliauer opens The World as Will and Idea with the assertion
“The world is my idea.” That is to say that the world exists for us only as we perceive
sâsom drommen mest ar smartsam, mindre ofta glattig, gar en ton av vemod, och medlidande med allt 
levandegenom den vinglande berattelsenT Sti’indberg, TUI Damaskus /  Ett Dromspel, p. 108
Brandell disparages Strindberg’s pui'suit of monistic chemistry, and indeed his scientific beliefs in 
general. In Strindberg’s defence, I would note that although the exact form and details o f the monism 
Strindberg espoused will now seem absurd to many, monism in a broad sense is not dead. Physicists 
spent much of the twentieth century looking for a unified field theory, a theory of everything -  a quest 
for a monistic view o f the universe if  ever there was one. hi some cases this quest took on a religious 
dimension. It led Professor Brian Josephson of Cambridge University, a Nobel Laureate in Physics, 
into Mahayana Buddhism, and led to David Bohm’s well-known association with J. Krishnamurti. On 
the other hand Dr. Susan Blackmore, the psychologist, explicitly calls herself a monist and defends it as 
part of her materialist scientific orthodoxy.
This section is necessarily cursory -  a detailed account of Schopenliauer’s influence on Strindberg is 
beyond my scope here. I only wish to point out some of the striking similarities, which result not only 
fi’om Strindberg’s reading of Schopenhauer but also fl om a similarity of temperament.
^- -^Brev, vol. 11, p. 99
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it, and we have no access to the world apart from perception; it is idea or 
representation. Schopenhauer also accepted Kant’s position that space and time are 
categories of perception, not properties of the world in itself. In other words we do 
not derive the concepts of space and time empfrically from experience, but rather 
impose these categories on the flux of sensory perceptions. We are unable to 
experience the world apart from these categories; they are a priori concepts. If we 
take these two together, that the world is perception, and that the subject imposes 
space, time and causation on the flux of experience, then the world might begin to 
seem a little unreal. Schopenhauer clearly thought so, for he states that the world as 
idea “could only pass by us like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly vision.”^^  ^ The 
other aspect of Schopenliauer’s philosophy is the world as will. Now the will for 
Schopenliauer is not just the underpimiing of human consciousness, but the 
metaphysical underpinning of the world. Schopenliauer argues that the body is the 
only thing anyone knows as both idea and will. To paraplnase his argument, I know it 
as idea because it is part of my perceptual field. However I also know it as it is in 
itself, from the inside. And when I examine my body under the aspect of thing-in- 
itself, I find that the tliing-in-itself is will.^ '^* The unconscious, ever-desfring will as 
thing-in-itself underpins everything, and thus the world is objectified will. 
Schopenhauer states time and again that there is only one will, appearing under 
different forms. In one passage, for instance, he tells us:
This w ill... [the reader] will recognise as the inmost nature not only in those 
phenomena which are closely similar to his own, in men and animals, but 
further reflection will lead him also to recognise the force which stirs and
Arthur Schopenliauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. Jill Berman (London: Everyman, 2002), p.
31
The psychological implications of Schopenliauer’s work were not lost on Freud, and perhaps not on 
Strindberg either. For more details, see R.K. Gupta, “Freud and Schopenliauer,” in Michael Fox (ed.), 
Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, p. 42
Frederick Copleston notes the ironic consonance between Schopenhauer’s morality and 
contemporary Christian ethics. Nietzsche also came to this conclusion, and because o f this came to 
reject Schopenliauer. See Copleston, “Schopenhauer and Nietzsche” in Michael Fox (ed.), 
Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), pp. 215 -2 2 5 . 
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, p. xxv
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vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force by which the crystal is formed, that 
by which the magnet turns to the North Pole ... the force which appears in the 
elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, separation and
combination, and, lastly, even gravitation ... all these he will recognise as 
different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as 
identical.
Schopenliauer advocates, in other words, a form of monism. Significantly, 
Schopenliauer also has a soteriology. Human beings are individuated will, and are 
also endowed with consciousness. For Schopenliauer the only permanent escape from 
suffering, engendered in large part by the never-satisfied desires and promptings of 
the will, is a conscious denial of the will and stilling of desire. Given Strindberg’s 
religious turn later in life, and Schopenhauer’s concuiTence with Christian morality on 
the evil of the will, this must have appealed to Strindberg strongly.^ ^** To sum up, 
Schopenhauer’s conception of the world makes of it a sort of dream emanating from I
the will, in which individual human identities are part of the dream. Or, as David
.
I
Berman glosses this latter point: “The world, in short, will be like a very orderly and 
vivid dream, although not one in which 1 (David Berman) am the dreamer but only 
one of the characters in the di'eam. In terms o f A Dream Play, no individual 
character is the dreamer. The dreamer only witnesses, but takes no part in the play: it 
is absent. How do we read this absence? Is it a theological absence? I return to the 
question, below, when an empty space intrudes at a crucial point iu the play.
,j
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The Challenge to Theodicy
A Dream Play owes much of its dramatic force to the very hitman conflicts that take 
place within it. Woven into its dreanvstructure is a lot of hard life-experience.
Indeed, it is seldom far from the mundane realities of this-worldly existence. 
Sometimes the play compresses this experience to the point that it becomes parabolic. 
Thus the Bill Poster enters proudly bearing a fishing net and a green fish-box: 
Daughter: And it makes you happy?
Bill Poster: Yes, so happy ... It was my dream as a child ,.. and finally if  s 
come true, though I am fifty years old, of course...
Daughter: Fifty years for a fishing net and a box...
Bill Poster: A green box, a gi^een one..
Having finally realized his dream, however, the Bill Poster finds his net and box 
strangely disappointing;
Daughter: Wliat was wrong with your net?
Bill Poster: Wrong? Well, there wasn’t really anything wrong... but it wasn’t 
the way I’d imagined it, and so the happiness wasn’t so great..
The Bill Poster cannot exactly say how he had imagined his net, so the Daughter says 
“Let me tell you!... You had imagined it differently! It was going to be green, but not 
that g r e e n ! T h i s  scene compactly (and rather humorously) encapsulates a 
common experience: that something longed for, when attained, does not supply the 
expected sense of fulfilment. When we obtain a desired object, our desire fixes on 
something else. Desire itself never ends. This suggests a Schopenliauerian, and 
indeed Buddhist, sense that dissatisfaction is inherent to living. However, the play
Strindberg, Till Damaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 120 
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contains also an outright attack on theodicy, that is the attempt to reconcile the 
goodness of God with the existence of suffering.
The play becomes more literally parabolic in its attack on the parable of the prodigal 
son. Strindberg replaces the two sons with two daughters. Wliile the family has a 
party for the daughter who went astray the other daughter, Lina, downtrodden and 
embittered, has to feed the pigs. The Daughter gives the usual explanation of the 
parable: “They are rejoicing because the one who went astray abandoned the path of 
wickedness, and not just because she came home!”^^ * The Poet, however, points out 
how unjust this is: “Then they should put on a ball with supper every evening for this 
blameless workmg-gkl who never went astray ... They never do though. And when 
Lina isn’t working she must go to church where they reproach her for not being 
perfect. Is that just?”^^  ^ Far fi*om justifying the ways of God to man, the play cross­
questions divine justice. The attack on theodicy exists in tension with the overall 
mythic motif of the play. Gratuitous suffering does not sit easily with cosmic order. 
The Myth of Er at the end of Plato’s Republic, to name just one example, defends the 
essential justness of the world. In a di'eam, Er sees the souls of the dead being judged 
and sent down to infernal regions to undergo purgative suffering, or up to a heavenly 
realm where they reap the reward of a good life. When their portion of suffering or 
pleasure is exhausted, they each pick a life and are reborn. According to this vision, 
no one suffers unjustly. Our own choices determine our happiness or misery.
The play’s attack on theodicy brings to mind the statement of the theologian David 
Jenkins: “The dreadhil thing about so much theology is that in relation to the reality
Ibid., p. 151 
Ibid., pp. 151-2
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of the human situation, it is so superficial... Theologians need therefore to stand 
under the judgments of the insights of literature before they can speak with true 
theological force of, and to, the world this literature reflects and illuminates.”^^  ^ The
ft:::
Daughter does not come to judge humanity, but to take on human suffering and, as 
she tells Indra in the prologue, see if their complaints are justified. In a sense, the 
play judges the gods, or indeed God. Despite her platitudes at the beginning of the 
play, the Daughter confronts dirt and suffering and vice at every turn. She tells the
.. ....
Officer, for instance, that he too is a child of heaven. The Officer replies “Then why
do I have look after horses? Clean stalls and muck them out?”^^ '* This juxtaposition
of idealistic sentiments and earthly filth recurs in a number of places, and in a fairly
literal way in one of the Poef s scenes. He enters carrying a bucket of mud, and
switches fi'om ecstatic utterances to cynicism:
(ecstatic) From clay the god Ptah created human beings on a potter’s wheel, a
lathe, - (sceptical) or some damn thing or other!... (ecstatic) From clay the
sculptor creates his more or less immortal masterpiece, - (sceptical) -  which is 
.usually just rubbish! ^
This happens again in the Daughter’s statement to the Officer that “love conquers 
all ”276 Yfie corridor scene follows soon afterwards, where the Officer wears out his 
life waiting for his true love, Victoria. This trite statement of the Daughter’s is 
undercut further by her own marriage to the Lawyer a little later, in which they find 
they cannot help torturing each other. At the beginning of the play, the Glasscutter
David Jenkins, "Literature and the Theologian,” in John Coulson (ed.), Theology’ and the University: 
An Ecumenical Investigation (London; Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964), p. 219 
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tells the Daughter that flowers grow up out of the soil “[bjecause they camiot feel at 
home in the dirt.”^^  ^ The rest of the play consists largely of dii't and suffering.
The question of justice arises most acutely in the coal-heavers’ scene. The Daughter, 
finding herself in a Mediterranean scene, declares “This is paradise The Fkst 
Coal-Heaver answers “This is hell!”
2"^  ^Coal-Heaver. Forty-eight degrees in the shade!
Coal-Heaver: Shall we go for a swim?
2'"^  Coal-Heaver: Then the police will come! We aren’t allowed to swim 
here!
Coal-Heaver: Can’t we even take hiiit from the tree?
Coal-Heaver: No, the police will come.
Coal-Heaver: But I can’t work in this heat; I’m going.
2”"^ Coal-Heaver: The police will come and aiTest you! ... And anyway then 
you’ll have to go without food.^^^
The coal-heavers confront the Daughter directly with the injustice of their lot. As the 
first coal-heaver points out, those who work hardest eat least. He adds “[sjhouldn’t 
one -  without wanting to be blunt -  perhaps suppose that this is unjust? ... Wliat does 
the daughter of the Gods say?” The daughter of the Gods is speechless. None of the 
usual platitudes can adequately explain this injustice. The coal-heavers have 
committed no crime except for being bom poor, while the rich have no special virtue 
to explain their fortmie. On top of this, earth, air and water are all owned by 
someone. The Daughter asks if there might not be some secret justification for the
"""Ibid., p. 113 
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way things are, to which the Lawyer replies “Yes, the well-off always think so.”^^ °
He concludes “That everyone cannot be equal, that 1 can understand, but that they
-lift
should be so unequal?”^^ * Strindberg attacks not only social injustice in this scene.
I
ft
but the claims made by theodicy also. He confronts suffering and can find no 
explanation consonant with divine justice. The attempt to explain, or explain away, 
suffering fails. Indeed, the coal-heavers’ scene indicts religiously-motivated 
explanations of apparent injustice. It points out how well such explanations suit the 
well-off and the “right- thinking” people. If theology stands under the judgment of 
literature here, it does not come out too well. Strindberg abjures in this play the 
platitudes with which he resolved To Damascus. i
Brecht again echoes Strindberg, in his The Good Person o f Szechwan. The whole 
play is, in effect, a parable, and it attacks the moral underpimiings of monotheism 
(that is, morality conceived as obedience to a set of divine commandments). The
eponymous good person, Shen Teh, begins the play as a prostitute. This itself may 
signal unease with a moral code that all too easily condeimis prostitutes as fallen 
women. Tliree gods seek lodging in the capital of Szechwan in their quest to find at 
least one good person in the province. The only good person they can find is Shen 
Teh, the prostitute. In return for their night’s lodging, the gods reward Shen Teh with 
a large sum of money and the instruction to be good. Shen Teh has already explained 
how difficult it is to follow this apparently simple instruction:
Of course I should like to obey the commandments [...] Not to covet my 
neighbour’s house would be a joy to me [...] nor do I wish to exploit other
Ibid., p. 170 
Ibid., p. 171
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men or to rob the defenceless. But how can it be done? Even by breaking one
282
Bertolt Brecht, The Good Person o f Szechwan, trans. John Willett (London; Methuen, 2000), pp. 10-11
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or two of the commandments I can barely manage.
With the money she has received from the gods, Shen Teh buys a tobacconist and 
goes into business. In accordance with her own inclinations, as well as the 
commandment of the gods, she tries to help all who come to her. As a result of her 
kindness, she becomes teiiibly exploited until her business is in danger of folding.
Shen Teh’s cousin, a young man called Shui Ta, comes to take over the shop while 
Shen Teh disappears. A hard-headed businessman, he drives out the people who have 
been living off his cousin and turns the shop into a profitable business. Having 
restored the shop’s fortunes, he departs. He finds however that he must intermittently 
retuin when the shop is again in danger due to Shen Teh’s charity. Finally, he appears 
to have returned for good, while Shen Teh has vanished, and the suspicion grows in 
the town that Shui Ta has murdered Shen Teh. The final scene, in which Shui Ta is 
put on trial, reveals that Shen Teh and Shui Ta are the same person. Shen Teh could 
not follow the commandments and make a living. To survive, she must split herself 
in two.
sThe Good Person o f Szechwan echoes A Dream Play not only in this parabolic attack 
on a morality made impossible because it conflicts with the need to survive, but even 
in the tone of some of the comments about the difficulty of existing in this kind of 
world. The First God exclaims at one point
We for our part wish to travel further and continue our search, and discover 
still more people like our good person in Szechwan, so that we can put a stop
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to the rumour which says that the good have found our earth impossible to live
The latter part of this could have come straight out of A Dream Play. The main 
complaint tlu*oughout is that in the world it is impossible to exist except by exploiting 
others. For Brecht, this is the consequence of a corrupt politics and an economy 
based upon exploitation. Thus Shui Ta sings 
In order to win one’s mid-day meal 
One needs the tougliness that elsewhere builds empires.
Except twelve others be trampled down 
The unfortunate cannot be helped.
I
.1:
So why can’t the gods make a simple decision 
That goodness must conquer in spite of its weakness?- 
Then back up the good with an armoured division 
Command it to ‘fiie!’ and not tolerate meekness?^ '^*
The good are weak and therefore ineffectual unless prepared to back their principles 
with force. Note that in the passage above, Brecht disparages meekness. Clearly, in 
Brecht’s view, the meek will not inlierit the earth until they take to the barricades.
This morality only serves, in this view, to ensure that the poor and the powerless 
remain poor and powerless. This is where Good Woman and A Dream Play diverge. 
Wliile Strindberg shares Brecht’s perception that life is intolerably difficult, and while 
he too attacks a hypocritical morality, he does not see the root of these only in
economic or political conditions. Ameliorating the material ckcumstances of the poor 
still, nevertheless, leaves them and everyone else in the position of having to harm 
others in order to live. The cause seems to coincide with the creation of the earth
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that the fulfilment of his desire gives way to dissatisfaction. Desire and attachment to 
the world lie at the root of suffering and there is nobody who does not suffer.
I rely here on the account in Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and 
Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 47-60
A Dream Play provides further examples of this. In the Skamsund scene, the rich are stretched out
I:itself, in some form of original sin, or a falling away fi-om an original harmony.
While this has Christian overtones, it also comes close to the Buddhist analysis of 
suffering. The first of the Four Holy Truths taught by the Buddha is that birth, 
ageing, sickness and death are all dukkha. Dukkha signifies something broader than 
suffering; it refers to a general sense of dissatisfaction and unease in mundane
285living. Thus the Bill-Poster who has waited all his life for a green fishing net finds
'SI
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Strindberg referred to To Damascus as his first dream play. A Dream Play is better 
drama than To Damascus because the conflicts such as those discussed above are not 
governed by a preconceived allegorical pattern, nor are they resolved. The director 
Stanislavski demanded that his actors find the truth inside then performance. As a 
playwright, Strindberg comes much closer to the truth of experience here than in his 
earlier dream play. The depiction of marriage, to take one example, remains fiesh and 
compelling, as well as blackly humorous. Rather than opting for any particular 
answer to the problem of suffering, it leaves the audience with a question-mark. In 
this sense too, to draw one final comparison with Brecht, it resembles The Good 
Person o f Szechwan. The latter ends with an epilogue in which one of the players 
apologises to the audience for the lack of a neat conclusion, then poses some
questions:
----------------------------------
on racks and undergo treatments for their health that resemble torture. Wliile this scene has a strongly 
satirical element, it does nevertheless point out that beyond meeting material needs wealth does not 
relieve all suffering.
The apparent pessimism of the Buddhist stance is relieved by the fact tliat Buddhism, like 
Christianity, has a soteriology -  one that depends on a realistic assessment of mundane life. Wliether 
and in what form A Dream Play allows a soteriological promise is discussed towards the end of this 
chapter.
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But what would you suggest? What is your answer? [...]
Should men be better? Should the world be changed?
Or just the gods? Or ought there to be none?^^^
The Good Person o f Szechwan is thus open-ended. It asks the audience to reflect on 
the experience lying behind the play and make up their own minds. A Dream Play is 
not open-ended in quite this way, yet it places mundane suffering side-by-side with a 
myth of incarnation and liberation and refuses to resolve the tension on the audience’s 
behalf. What the theological implications of this tension might be, I explore next.
The abyss
So, we have a play where the dreamer is absent, and despite its dream-like appearance 
and the often parabolic nature of the narrative, resists easy allegorisation. The play 
contains a tension between the language of presence and the language of absence. 
Returning to the cave allegory, this time in a more purely Platonic form, the Daughter 
tells the Lawyer that in a mirror you see the world the right way around, “because as it 
is it’s the wrong way round.”
Lawyer: How did it come to be the wrong way round?
Daughter: Wlren the copy was taken...
Lawyer: Exactly! The copy ... I always had a feeling it was a faulty 
copy...^^^
Plato’s myth uses the language of presence and being. The images in the cave 
correspond to the Ideas that those who escape the cave perceive. For Plato the Idea or 
Fomi is real in a way that the image is not, but the image nevertheless shares
Brecht, The Good Person o f  Szechwan, p. 109 
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something of the qualities of the Idea?^^ Here the myth of the cave has become 
problematic, as we have seen -  this world is not only a copy, but it has something
wrong with it. Something has interposed or gone wrong between the original and the
copy, and the original, true world has become distant, almost an absence. This 
.tension occurs again in the unanswered appeals to God, an appeal that the Daughter, 
finally, says she will caiTy to the tlu'one. “The throne” is the language of presence, 
and the language of a personal God, yet the unanswered appeals indicate only an 
absence, all the more so as in the course of the play an answer never comes. This in 
part is what makes the ending so moving; perhaps the throne is empty.
7
IThis emptiness tlueatens to open an abyss. Indeed, the abyss is felt, and suppressed, 
throughout the play, hidden behind a clover-leaf door. This door remams throughout 
most of the scene-changes, gradually becommg the focus of the whole play, and it 
provokes notably hostile reactions. The Officer is the first to speculate on what it 
hides, noting, as a variety of characters do, that they have never seen it opened, even y;-
though they have passed it thousands of times. An excited crowd gathers as the 
Glazier prepares to open the door, when a policeman intervenes, forbidding anyone to 
open the door “in the name of the law.”^^® The secular authorities do not want the 
door opened, but as we learn the door also contains a tlireat to the prevailing religious 
order. Here it is not just the secular authority represented in the police that wishes to 
prevent the opening of the clover-leaf door, it is authority as such that is threatened by
____________________________
See, for example, Diotima’s reported speech on beauty in the Symposium. “Suddenly he [the seeker 
of wisdom] will behold ... that very Beauty, Socrates, for which all the earlier hardships had been 
borne: in the first place, everlasting, and never being born nor perishing, neither increasing nor 
diminishing .,. while all the beautiful firings elsewhere partake of this beauty in such mamier that when 
they are born and perish it becomes neither less nor more and nothing at all happens to it.” Plato, 
“Symposium,” in Plato, Great Dialogues o f  Plato, trans. W. H. D. Rouse (New York: Mentor, 1984), 
p. 105
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it. As the feminist theologian Grace M. Jantzen has noted, the abyss in modernity has 
taken on an altogether negative connotation. As a negation of all grounds, it tlireatens 
to undermine all certainty, and with it any ontological foundation for truth.^^  ^ It 
therefore provokes horror and dread. A Dream Play harnesses the destructive 
potential of the abyss, for authority implies an Author and the abyss hidden behind the 
door seems to thi*eaten the whole edifice of authority guaranteed ultimately by a law- 
giving personal God. In A Dream Play too this provokes horror. Thus the Lawyer 
reacts with ten'or and dismay when the Daughter fiddles with his clover-leaf 
cupboard. Indeed, the door provokes a sense of excitement and unease amongst 
everyone. The Dean of Theology declares that the door hides dangerous t r u t h s . H e  
and the other tliree Deans, of Philosophy, Medicine and Law, wrangle and fight each 
other over the tmth and who has it. In the end, though, they all stand for a social 
institution that claims to know the truth, and that feels its authority tlireatened. When 
the door opens, and they find that it contains nothing, they are scandalized as the 
Dean of Theology declares, “Nothing! That is the solution to the riddle of the 
world.. The Dean of Law declares that they have been deceived, and the crowd 
of “right-thinking people” close in tlneateningly on the Daughter.
Lord Chancellor: Would you please tell us what you mean by opening this 
door?
Daughter: No, my friends! If I told you, you wouldn’t believe me.
Dean o f Medicine: But it’s nothing.
Daughter: Exactly. -  But you don’t understand!^^"^
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Thus the Daughter reveals an emptiness that precisely threatens to “swallow[] up
foundations and grounds for c e r t a i n t y . I t  fills the Deans with nihilistic dread. And
yet the Daughter, in revealing the nothing hidden behind the door, acts as a
hierophant, the revealer of a sacred mystery. This is all the more curious given 
.Strindberg’s reputation for misogyny. It takes a daughter of the gods to reveal a holy 
abyss. Jantzen points out that the Greek root word for abyss is feminine.^^^ She also 
points out that its association with the feminine has persisted in the imagination of 
modernity, not least in Nietzsche and Heidegger. It persists here too, but here it is 
valorized because it brings freedom. Thus, A Dream Play agrees in part with the 
negative assessment of the abyss as destructive, but here, its groundlessness
threatening subversion, the abyss also seems to promise freedom. : l
Wliat does this signify for the role of the Daughter, a female Chi'ist? The play 
suggests in a number of places that we read her as such. She acts as an intercessor 
between humanity and God, and indeed her fate seems pre-figured in that of Jesus, the 
saviour destroyed by the “right-thinking people.” Indeed, there may be a reference to 
agnus dei, the sacrificial lamb of God, in her name, A g n e s . B u t  she undermines the 
foundations of a metaphysical theology. In this, like Falander in The Red Room or the 
Unknown in his unregenerate state in To Damascus, she resembles Dostoyevsky’s 
version of Cludst. She offers a fr eedom at odds with the Church. Thus the Dean of 
Theology, confronted by the emptiness she reveals, becomes an atheist and apostate. 
For him, a religion without a metaphysical foundation is impossible. The revelation 
of the abyss is the death of God. Is religion still possible after the death of God? 1
-------------------------------------------  I
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iOnly, Jantzen suggests, by re-imagining the abyss. To do this, she suggests, we should turn back to medieval mysticism, which characterized the abyss in feminine 
terms, as a womb. This dilemma -  how to do theology after the death of God -  has 
motivated all the theologies that start from “half-belief,” For Strindberg, the 
revelation of the divine void is the death of all systems. The import is apocalyptic -  
as the ending of the play makes clear -  but, in this case, not necessarily a matter for 
despair.
The Daughter’s hieratic revelation of the void is followed hy a frmereal ritual. The 
characters file past a funeral pyre and cast in the markers of their identity and of their
folly. The Doorkeeper throws her shawl, that has absorbed the suffering of so many,
into the flames. The Officer burns up his roses, the Glazier thi’ows in his diamond, i
'■and so forth. At the end the Dean of Theology comes in raging, and cries
I have been disavowed by God, persecuted by the people, abandoned by the
'government and mocked by my colleagues. How can I believe when no-one
telse believes ... How can 1 defend a God who doesn’t defend his own? It’s all rubbish.^^^
So saying, he casts a book (a martyrology, according to the Poet) on the fire. For him 
the emptiness behind the door has left a nihilistic absence, and the fire is a fiineral i
pyre for his religion and his God. Consigning his book to the flames, he also casts
away theology as a closed and all-inclusive metaphysical system. For the Dean of 
Theology, this means abandoning his God. So at the height of this ritual comes a 
statement of atheism. The words of the book are silent.
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Conclusion
Plato at crucial moments gives up arguing and resorts to myth. His myths convey a 
vision of an ordered, just cosmos.^^^ Strindberg also employs a cosmic myth, but here 
combined with a Gnostic sense of a fallen world, he calls the justice and harmony of 
the cosmos into question. I pointed out, above, A Dream Play's resemblance to 
Hopkins’ clu'omatic harmony. Hopkins preferred diatonic harmony because it 
allowed for order imposed from above, while clnomatic harmony did not. An order 
imposed on the world from outside also allows, perhaps demands, theism.
Clnomatism excludes the kind of God Hopkins wants. If the dreamlike aspect of the 
play makes theism problematic, what does it do to Clxrist? The Lawyer at one point 
tells the Daughter that a liberator once came, and he was crucified by all the “right- 
thinking people.” ®^® This remark, ahnost an aside, makes the crucifixion seem not so 
much the central cosmic event of Christian theology but a contingent outcome of 
malice. Furthermore, in the Fingal’s Cave scene, the Daughter and the Poet witness a 
saviour walking on water towards the foundering ship, and the crew leap into the sea 
to escape him. These imply that Chiist failed -  that the crucifixion did not redeem 
humanity. More radically, if the crucifixion is merely contingent, it undermines the 
whole edifice of redemptive theology. And without the resun ection, all we have is 
the crucifixion. The empty tomb, instead of signifying resurrection, signifies a void. 
While this may be a divine void, it undermines God as presence.
The Myth of Er in the final chapter of The Republic, again, makes this explicit. The myth explicitly 
defends the justness of the cosmos, but this sense o f cosmic justice and order underlies and underpins 
all Platonic myth-making. The word cosmos itself implies order, and therefore balance and justice. 
Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 350-359
Strindberg, Till Damaskus /  Ett Dromspel, pp. 167-8
126
The conclusion o f^  Dream Play thus negates theology and negates the theologian’s 
God. Does this make the play, in fact, atheist? This is a difficult question to answer, 
because in A Dream Play, as in the other plays I discuss, the categories of Christian 
and atheist become problematic. Neither label can be applied unequivocally. The 
play reflects what the theologian Thomas Altizer described nearly seventy years later 
as the chaotic situation in which “everything which we have been given as faith is 
tumbling in our midst.”^^  ^ Our situation, Altizer suggests, is apocalyptic, and the 
received categories of theological thinking are no longer adequate. The finale o f A 
Dream Play is, perhaps more than anything else Strindberg wrote, apocalyptic, and 
Altizer elucidates the problem of reading this.
The Daughter departs, promising to carry humanity’s complaint “to the throne,”^^  ^ So 
saying, she disappears into the growing castle which bursts into flame, illuminating a 
backdrop formed of a wall of faces in various attitudes of sorrow and despair.
Finally, the bud on top of the castle blossoms into a giant chrysanthemum. This is 
apocalyptic, certainly, but the symbolism is not in any easily recognizable sense 
Christian. The burning castle and the wall of suffering faces suggests, on the one 
hand, an ancient Buddhist parable that equates the world with a house “hurned by the 
flames of aging and dying, and by the flames of greed, hatred and delusion.”^^  ^ On 
the other hand it evokes the cosmic conflagration of Ragnarok in Norse mythology, in 
which the entii*e cosmos is burned up and the gods are destroyed. As Altizer implies, 
the really apocalyptic vision is difficult to read because in it categories collapse. This 
problem afflicts any reading o f^  Dream Play. It eschews stable fi'ames of reference
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-  rather it has frames within frames that elide and collapse into each other. Hence the 
understandable anxiety on the part of theatre directors to create a stable frame of
reference, usually by making an intervention to establish who is doing the dreaming. 
Yet, my argument suggests, to do so is to betray Strindberg’s vision. The ending, 
though strangely moving, finally resists a ‘closed’ theological reading.
304 Altizer, The Descent into Hell, p. 180
:
And yet Altizer, as well as elucidating the problems of reading the apocalyptic 
ending, also offers a way of approaching it -  and potentially finding in it a profoundly 
religious moment. For Altizer, the fall is total. It affects not just humanity but God. 
“From this point of view, everything which fallen man envisions and conceives as 
God is a fallen form of God ... the mystery, the distance and the transcendence of
God can here be understood as products of the fall.”^^"^  The Cliristian conception of 
the utter transcendence of God puts Him at an unbreachable remove from humanity. 
As Strindberg himself found, the fall makes it impossible to reach back to an original 
harmony -  hence, he finds the world to be a distorted mirror image of an unreachable 
original. Altizer argues that only an apocalyptic renewal of Clnistianity -  and an 
apocalyptic renewal of consciousness - can restore the breach -  and for this to become 
possible, theology has to reach beyond its credal boundaries.
::i7
I
A Dream Play ends on a promise, yet this promise emerges out of an apocalyptic 
negation. The promise is implied in the bud that finally blossoms above the burning 
castle. Out of an absolute negation emerges a universal compassion. Altizer suggests
-.i,
a way of reading this; that an apocalyptic darkness may give way to a transformation 
of consciousness and of experience, even a transformed world. He affirms the i
,,,,y:1f, 
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possibility that “the loss of all we have known as identity and selfhood can be 
accepted and affirmed as the realization of the presence and compassion of Clirist.”^^ ^
Perhaps this is why the concluding vision of A Dream Play is so moving.
Here, too, the play seems to take on a liturgical role. But just as the received 
categories of metaphysical theology cannot contain and interpret the apocalyptic 
vision Altizer alludes to (and Strindberg here presents such a vision, or so I have 
argued), the kind of liturgical theatre emerging in ^  Dream Play can only take place 
outside the Church. In this Strindberg anticipates Grotowski: a theatre of the holy is 
necessarily a theatre of blasphemy.
■ ■ I
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4. Four Chamber Plavs
To appreciate the extent to which Strindberg with a number of contemporaries made 
modern theatre possible, you first have to appreciate the state of theatre when he 
began his career. In the 1860s and 70s, Sweden’s Royal Theatre required that all new 
plays
[...] should preferably be in five acts [...] division into scenes or scene- 
changes were not liked [...] every act ought to have a heginning, a middle and 
an end. The end of an act should be a place for applause, accomplished by an 
oratorical flourish, and if the piece was in un-rhymed verse the last two lines 
should rhyme.
Plays typically contained monologues and solo-pieces for the star-players, and 
required a declamatory style of acting. By Strindberg’s account, when he wrote his 
first play according to this formula and read it to his friends he found that the whole 
play was one immense longeur.^^^ Strindberg looked back to this as the ultimate 
origin of his chamber plays, foraied by the need that had driven most of his 
subsequent dramatic writing; to discover the requirements for a revitalised theatre.
Strindberg credits the founding of the Théâtre Libre in Paris in 1887, and its opening 
production of Zola’s Thérèse Raquin, with first revealing the possibilities of a 
concentrated piece of theatre embodying a strong t h e m e . T h i s  appears to have 
inspired Strindberg to write his naturalist masterpieces The Father, Miss Julie and 
Creditors. The renewal of theatre brought about by naturalism was short-lived, 
however, and shortly after the tmm of the twentieth century the theatrical avant-garde
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 64, p. 11 
'"’ Ibid., pp. 11-12
308 Ibid., p. 12
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turned to music for inspiration when the Austrian diiector Max Reinhardt opened the 
Kammerspiel-Haus in Berlin. Here, as Strindberg puts it, “the concept of chamber 
music [was] transferred to drama: the intimate proceedings, the meaningful theme, the 
sophisticated t r e a t m e n t . T h i s  was the inspiration for Stockholm’s Intimate 
Theatre, opened in 1907 by the actor August Falck specifically to stage Strindberg’s 
work.^^® The place really was intimate: a mere 161 seats in the auditorium and a 
cramped stage.^ ^  ^  It was for this theatre that Strindberg wrote his Chamber Plays. 
Strindberg describes the intent of the Intimate Theatre and of his Chamber Plays as 
follows:
In the drama we look for a strong meaningful theme, but with limits. In 
production we avoid all show, all calculated effects, places for applause, star- 
roles, solo-numbers. No preconceived form shall bind the writer, as the theme 
dictates the form. Freedom, that is, in the treatment, bound only by the unity 
of conception and style.^^^
This theatrical space aimed to make a more genuine communication between actors 
and audience possible. Its intimacy allowed subtle shifts of expression to register with 
the audience. And whereas the large commercial theatres of the day required actors to 
shout their lines,^^  ^at the Intimate Theatre the voices could be heard throughout the 
auditorium without the actors having to project, allowing subtle changes in tone to
Ibid., p. 13 It seems that two of Strindberg’s own early one-act pieces, Den Fredlose and Bandet, in 
turn inspired Max Reinliardt.
Strindberg often had difficulty getting his plays performed in Sweden. Thus Miss Julie, written in 
1888, had its world-premiere in Copenhagen (although even this was ftaught -  the original 
performance was cancelled due to charges of obscenity). Its Swedish premiere only took place almost 
twenty years later, in 1905.
The recently re-opened Intuna Teatern is even more intimate, with just 95 seats arranged in an arc 
around a stage that bulges out in the centre.
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 64, p. 13
As Strindberg puts it “there are theatres so large ... [that] you have to yell declarations of love, 
communicate a confidence like the report of a rifle, whisper the secret of youi" heart in a fiill-throated 
shout.” Ibid., p. 14
131
remain audible. The Chamber Plays make use of these qualities; they are small-scale 
dramas with a domestic setting. The closeness of the audience, virtually nose to nose 
with the actors, in any case makes this almost inevitable. These are plays in which 
“the plot [focuses] more on imier rather than outer events.
The Chamber Plays, in contrast to To Damascus and A Dream Play, have a much 
more naturalistic causal narrative logic. Although still fresh, they look, at a distance 
of a hundred years, more conventional and more realistic (bearing in mind that the 
conventions of realistic theatre were themselves still fairly new at this point): they do 
not attempt in the same way to put a dream on stage. The action, the characters and 
the setting are deceptively realistic and everyday (the building in The Storm, for 
instance, is described as a “modem house exterior”). However these plays still have 
something of the “hoirible half-reality” of To Damascus. This is especially true of 
The Ghost Sonata, with its pleasure in the grotesque verging at times on gothic horror. 
They are dark pieces, obsessed with mortality and crime. As one critic puts it, the 
characters are “caught in various stages of damnation.”  ^ This makes them more 
than naturalistic. They deal not so much with the dissection of social relations, 
though they have an element of that, but rather with a metaphysical unease. We will 
explore what I mean by this as we look in more detail at each Chamber Play in tum.^^^
One further aspect of the Intimate Theatre, for which these plays were written, bears 
on the inteipretation. Strindberg was deeply impressed by a painting by the Swiss
Ibid., vol. 58, p. 368
Lagerkrantz, August Strmdberg, p. 333
I have omitted any discussion of Strindberg’s fifth and final chamber play. The Black Glove. 
Written one and a half years after the last of the other chamber plays, it is a Christmas play given over 
largely to moralistic sentimentality. At base, it contains a vicious morality of a kind that Strindberg 
elsewhere questioned and undermined.
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artist Bôcklin entitled Toten-lnsel (The Isle of the Dead).^^^ There are several 
versions of this painting, but the one Strindberg knew depicts a rocky island with a
grove of cypresses in the middle. To the right are entrances to what appear to be 
tombs cut into the rock. In the foreground a small boat approaches the island across 
calm waters; in the hoat a figure slirouded in white stands looking towards the island, 
in front of him in the boat a white coffin. A copy of this painting hung to the right of 
the stage in the original Intimate Theatre, while a copy of another Bôcklin painting, 
The Isle o f the Living, hung to the left. The events onstage, then, take place in a 
borderland between life and death. Indeed, Strindberg began to write a chamber play 
called Toten-lnsel. In this drama, which exists only as a fragment, a dead man, Assir, 
is ferried to the Isle of the Dead, awakens and undergoes a Swedenborgian 
“disrobing.”  ^ As in the dream plays, scenery changes and characters appear 
according to imaginative leaps and changes of mood. The post-mortem world
inliabited by Assir is partially a projection of his own mind. Strindberg never 
completed Toten-lnsel, but the fr agment of it that exists leaves a space for a play
within the play. It appears that Strindberg originally intended Toten-lnsel to form a
■■
fr ame around the fourth chamber play, The Pelican.^^^ Strindberg seems to have
intended with these plays to expose and explore the human soul.
'L
If the theatrical space of these plays blurs the boundary between life and death, it is 
also a place where inner and outer blur into each other. This bears on another factor 
shared by all Chamber Plays: the nature of the settings. Each one takes place in and 
around a house or apartment building. These are not just backdrops to the action, but 
integral to it. In his life, Strindberg was acutely aware of buildings’ atmospheres, the
Arnold Bôcklin, Toten-lnsel, third version, National Gallery, Berlin 1883 
See below, p. 143
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 63, p. 409
g
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imprint left by former tenants. Thus the building in The Storm has a character -  it is 
secretive and deceitful. In other words, the settings express the states of mind of the 
characters.
In this, Strindberg probably took his cue from the writings of Eiumanuel Swedenborg. 
Swedenborg treats heaven and hell as states of mind. Thus he denies that Satan was 
the cause of hell. Rather, he holds that hell comes from human beings, and after death 
the soul departs to whatever region most closely confonns to its own tendencies, 
whether hellish or heavenly. In the Arcana Coelestia he states that after death 
everyone comes “into that hell or into that heaven in which he has been while in the 
world. Indeed, he states that to vicious natures, heaven is stifling and appears a 
hell.^^  ^ Swedenborg had, then, an oddly psychological theology: he envisioned the 
post-mortem states of the soul as literal heavens and hells, but these heavens and 
hells, actual places as far as Swedenborg was concerned, were also externalisations of 
each individual’s state of mind. Under Swedenborg’s influence, the stage was made 
by Strindberg “to serve as the area in which the subtle and unseen tremors of the soul 
would manifest themselves in the visible and palpable things of the physical 
world.”^^ ^
Deceit and crime hide behind the façades of the buildings at the centre of each of 
these dramas. They express in physical form the mental lives of the characters who 
live in them. All these dramas, furthermore, take place in a borderland between life 
and death, and the buildings also represent the world. Here, the world itself shows an
Emanuel Swedenborg, The Essential Swedenborg: Basic Teachings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 
Scientist, Philosopher and Theologian (New York: Twain, 1970), p. 105 
'J' Ibid., p. 119
Evert Sprinchom, Strindberg as Dramatist (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 107
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elegant exterior but deceitfully hides its true nature. Behind each façade lies an 
uneasy consciousness of the void. And for all Strindberg’s overtly stated faith by this 
point of his life, his words from the original ending of Inferno still echo uneasily here: 
“What a jest, what a miserable jest, this life is after all!”^^ ^
Ovader (The Stormf^^
The Chamber Plays represent a partial return to naturalism, evident here in the setting: 
it takes place at a particular time and in a particular place. The play is set in the city 
during the “dog days” (rôtmânadsvârme) of late summer, when most Swedish city- 
dwellers are out in the countryside. Although the city is never named, from 
references to the archipelago (skârgârn) and southerners, it seems fair to conclude that 
the play takes place somewhere in Stockholm. The setting is the fr ont of a house or 
rather apartment building with a comer to the right, beyond which is seen a square 
with roses and other flowers. There is a letterbox set into the corner, while toward the 
left of the house’s façade is a low doorway leading both to a courtyard and to the 
confectioner’s in the basement. This set takes on something of the quality that Freud 
described as “das Unheimlich,” the u n c a n n y . T h e  German word Heimlich, as 
Freud explains, means homely but also carries the sense of something secret, hidden. 
Unlieinilich, then, takes on the meaning both of something strange and of something 
exposed. The play’s protagonist, the Gentleman, lives a well-ordered life in a well- 
ordered apartment in which memories of his past are carefrilly controlled or
Sti'indberg, Inferno, 272
The Consul is listed in the diamatis personae as ’The Brother, a Consul”. In writing about the play, 
it quickly gets confusing to refer the Brother, and then talk about the Brother’s brother, ie. the 
Gentleman. Referring to him as the Consul proved easier.
Sigmund Freud, ’’The Uncanny” in The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, vol. 17, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), pp. 219-252
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suppressed. However, he is at times disturbed by the heat coming from the 
Confectioner’s flat in the basement, at other times by the noise from the apartment 
above his. As we learn in the course of the play, the latter especially turns out to be 
connected with a past, the chaos and distress of which the Gentleman has been trying 
to pretend did not exist. Thus the set itself is a physical projection of the Gentleman’s 
psyche, apparently well-constmcted and orderly, but concealing horrors that threaten 
to destroy him.^^^
Like the other Chamber Plays, The Storm is naturalistic in its return to something like 
the causal narrative logic of Strindberg’s pre-Inferno work. It has a tliree act 
structure, and ties up all the narrative threads at the end. It does not contain the 
deliberate dissonance and fragmentation of A Dream Play or, to a lesser extent, To 
Damascus. This more conventional narrative structure itself has theological 
implications. It lends itself to a temporal progression in which a providential design 
gradually becomes evident, working with an ultimately benign end. However, an 
undercurrent of unease remains tliroughout the play. The protagonist is, in the final 
act, confronted by the void. The confrontation lasts only a moment before the ending 
resolves all the loose ends, together with the protagonist’s doubts and fears. A 
providential design seems here to trump the crisis brought on by facing an ultimate 
emptiness. These themes play out through a rather involved plot, which I summarise 
here, before moving on to a more detailed discussion.
In the opening scene, the Consul’s conversation with the Confectioner (who lives in 
the basement) reveals that a suiprising number of deaths have taken place in the
I do not intend here to do a lull Freudian reading of this play. For reasons I explain below, I regard 
Freud’s reductionistic account of the uncanny to be unsatisfying. Nevertheless, aspects of his analysis 
are acute, and take on a literal significance in regard to this play.
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building, that it is known as the “silent house”, and that new tenants have moved into 
the flat above the Gentleman’s (the protagonist, and brother of the Consul), although 
nobody has seen them. The Gentleman comes out of his flat (you can see into his 
drawing room through the ground floor windows) and complains about the new 
tenants, who have tonnented him with the sound of terrible music and card-playing, 
and the noise of carriages coming in the middle of the night to fetch people away. As 
they discuss this a man in a tuxedo (Fischer) emerges from the building to put a large 
number of letters in the letterbox.
The Gentleman reveals to the Consul the true story of his marriage. He had promised 
his wife, who was much younger, that when his age became burdensome he would set 
her free, and so a little after their child was bom he left. At this point the Consul tells 
the Gentleman that after he left her, his ex-wife murdered his honour to protect 
herself. The Gentleman reftises to hear more and merely says he wants to live in his 
flat with his beautiful memories. While the two old men go for a walk, a wine-seller 
comes looking for Mr Fischer, the tenant above the Gentleman. The Consul returns 
alone, and picks up a card dropped by Fischer, an invitation to the “Boston Club”, 
apparently a gambling den.
After a drawn out shriek from the upper flat, a woman emerges, clearly upset. The 
Consul moves towards her, and they recognise each other -  it is Gerda, the 
Gentleman’s ex-wife. In the ensuing conversation it emerges that the Consul knows 
considerably more about his brother’s relationship to Gerda than he has let on.
Indeed, he feels considerable guilt, for he accuses Gerda of dishonouring the 
Gentleman, and of tricking the Consul into taking her part. At this point the
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persuades Gerda to remain and face the Gentleman. At first the Gentleman does not 
recognise her, but there soon follow arguments and accusations about then past
Gentleman returns and goes into his flat. He does not see Gerda and the Consul, who 
are hidden by the comer of the house. By this point evening has fallen, and as Gerda 
and the Consul peer at the Gentleman through the window, he looks up and stares 
directly at them. At that moment, a flash of lightning illuminates the pan, and the 
Gentleman reacts with hoiror. However he quickly recovers himself, and unsure of
■what he has seen, calls to his brother to come in and play chess. The first act ends as 
.the Consul, ignoring his brother, accompanies Gerda to tiy and save her daughter
t
I
from the violent and dissolute Fischer.
Act 2 takes place inside the house, in the Gentleman’s living room. He sits playing 
chess with Louise, his maid, and complaining about the noise from upstairs and the 
heat from below, and for the first time intimates that he is unhappy and might move.
Immediately afterwards, however, he tells the Confectioner he will never move, 
repeating how he prizes isolation. Finally the Consul tums up, and in conversation 
raises the possibility that his wife may have re-married and his daughter acquired an 
abusive stepfather. The Gentleman reveals that he has been haunted by thoughts of 
his daughter, seeming to hear her footsteps and even her voice. The Gentleman exits,
clearly upset, to write a letter, and the Consul invites Gerda in. She is astonished to
■
find everything preserved exactly as it was, and explains to the Consul how she and 
the Gentleman had grown to hate each other. From Gerda’s account, it sounds like a
:stormy mairiage. It comes out in their conversation that Fischer has fled, taking 
Gerda’s daughter with him as a hostage to make Gerda follow him. The Consul
__
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together, when it comes out that the Gentleman was actually much more aware of 
what was going on than he has let on.
327
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The Gentleman is finally stirred to some kind of activity when a telephone call 
informs him that Herr Fischer has run away in the company of the Confectioner’s 
daughter. Gerda is suddenly struck with pangs of conscience, as her daughter is also 
with Fischer, and although the Gentleman refuses to go with her, he rouses his brother 
and sends them off to the police. Struck also by conscience, he questions Louise 
about Fischer. She says she has learned to keep quiet in the house. Finally breaking 
out of his passivity, the Gentleman acknowledges that thefr “assumed deafiiess”^^  ^has 
gone on too long and become life-threatening.
In the final act, most of the action takes place offstage. It has rained, and the 
Gentleman sits outside and converses with the Confectioner and with Louise, until the 
Confectioner’s daughter tums up. The Confectioner’s dialogue hints that he knows 
what has gone on, but leaves it ambiguous. The Consul returns, and reveals that 
Gerda has retrieved her daughter and Fischer has departed. The Gentleman, although
happy that everything has begun to sort itself out, fears that his ex-wife and daughter
will move in again. He is relieved when a telephone call informs him that Gerda and 
her child have moved in with Gerda’s mother. All the loose ends are tied up, and the 
Gentleman tells the Confectioner that soon he will move out of the silent house.
I
s
Superficially, the play eulogises the calmness of age, which despite a late storm is re­
established at the end. A providential design becomes evident in the later stages when
August Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, Guiuiar Brandell (ed.), (Stockliolm: Boimiers, 1951), p. 302
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everything works out for the best, and the Gentleman prepares to die. However, as
noted the play contains a repressed stratum of unease, of the uncanny, beneath the
surface. Indeed it mns as an undercurrent from the very heginning. Freud’s essay
,“The Uncanny” becomes useful here for its taxonomy of the uncamry. Fie begins 
from a linguistic dissection of the German heimlich, “the canny,” a word with two 
contrasting senses; i. the homely, domestic and tame; ii. the secretive, hidden and
produces a special sense of fear.
.furtive. While the fomier sense cannes overtones of security and ease, the latter
■f
*
connotes something “concealed, kept from sight... [and] withlield from others.
Thus the uncanny (das Unheimliche), which carries overtones of the supematmnl and 
fearful, shades into the canny (heimlich) F r o m  this follows Freud’s definition of 
the uncamiy:
the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is Imown
of old and long familiar.
He then argues via a variety of examples that the experience of the uncamiy arises 
“either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived 
by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem 
once more to be confirmed. Thus the uncanny contains within itself an ambivalent
motion; something repressed and secret is brought to conscious awareness and
*
Fear of death is a particularly potent soui'ce of the uncanny, and we encounter it at the 
beginning of The Storm: at the start of the play, the Consul and the Confectioner
____________________________
Freud, The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, vol. 17, p.
223
As Freud puts it, “heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence 
until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlichF Ibid., p. 226 
""Ibid., p. 220 
Ibid., p. 249
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discuss the unusual number of deaths in the house, the Consul commenting: “those 
four red blinds look like stage curtains behind which they rehearse bloody dramas ... 
at least that’s what I imagine.”^^  ^ This evokes a sense of unease. Despite the 
appearance of a modem apartment building in a prosperous suburb, the house seems 
from the start to hide unpleasant secrets. The Gentleman, similarly, lives secluded 
among beautified and false memories. Thus the building itself comes to resemble the 
state of mind of the Gentleman. The basement, where the bakery runs all night long, 
disturbs his sleep with its heat, whilst the new neighbours upstairs keep him awake 
with their noise. He carefully ignores the unpleasant events around him, maintaining 
himself in an apartment that has not changed in years, yet at night darker thoughts 
intmde and disturb his sleep, while the letterbox on the comer seems to hide many 
secrets; as the Gentleman himself says, “it has accepted confidences... The 
letterbox, we have seen, contains invitations to a gambling club run by his ex-wife’s 
husband. As this is revealed the Gentleman recalls a great many things he would 
rather forget. The Gentleman’s calm demeanour therefore hides a guilty conscience.
He abandoned his wife and child, and has suppressed the realities of the life they 
shared -  that it was marred by infidelity and jealousy, and characterised as much by 
hate as by love.
We have also seen that the Consul had quite probably had an affair with Gerda, and 
that the Gentleman had been half-aware of it. Thus the Gentleman reacts with horror 
when he sees, by a lightning flash, Gerda and the Consul standing next to each other 
outside his window. His look of horror implies perhaps a supernatural dread, that he 
has seen a memory that haunted him made real.
%
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, pp. 289-90 
Ibid., p. 290 1#
,.:s;
i
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This Freudian return of the repressed coincides with the play’s Swedenborgian aspect. 
Indeed, if the set is a model of the Gentleman’s psyche, it also resembles
perceive thefr surroundings according to the qualities of their own minds. Thus the 
“silent house” corresponds to the Gentleman’s own deliberate isolation. He tells his
:Swedenborg’s account of the post-mortem state of the soul when the newly deceased
brother “I am closing my accounts with life and with people, and I’m afready packing
.for the journey; the loneliness is not so good, but when nobody has any claims on you, 
you’ve won your f r e e d o m . H e  has become blind by choice, as have the other 
occupants of the house. Louise tells the Confectioner that she “love[s] the calm and 
the dignified, pleasant reserve, when you don’t say everything and when you feel 
bound to overlook the less pleasant everyday.. The Confectioner says that his 
wife is going blind but does not want an operation: “There’s nothing to look at, she 
says, and she sometimes wishes she was deaf as welL”^^  ^ This implies the opposite, 
that there is indeed something to see and listen to, but she does not want to. The 
Confectioner himself seems to realise this, saying “We old people love the dusk, it 
hides so many failings in us and in others.”^^ ^
I
Just as the building seems to conceal crimes, the Gentleman’s reserve and nostalgia
conceal the truth about his past. He is already haunted by memories of his wife and
child before he finds Gerda in his flat. And he is quite literally kept awake hy them at
night, although he does not know it is them. When he finally meets Gerda, the
confrontation shatters the illusion of then happy marriage. He accuses Gerda of
____________________________
Ibid., p. 290 
Ibid., p. 292 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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turning his colleagues and employees against him, and of leading his own brother to 
betray him. He goes on that her careless talk led to doubts over their daughter’s 
legitimacy. Gerda seems to have been unfaithful. In Act 3, for instance, seeing the 
Consul approaching, the Gentleman launches into a tnade about his ex-wife’s ability 
to seduce everyone except him. He found her ugly and stupid where all others found 
her beautiful and intelligent. This, together with the Consul’s sense of guilt, imply 
that Gerda had an affair with him. It may also imply that the daughter was actually 
the Consul’s. This would explain the references to the Gentleman being too old for 
Gerda: that he had become impotent tlrrough age. In their divorce case, he says, he 
had testified that he had become too old, going on “I could hardly say we were too old 
when we got married, because then the child’s arrival would have had an unpleasant 
interpretation, and it was our child, wasn’t it?”^^  ^ The Gentleman seems to have 
doubts about his child’s parentage himself. This is an old theme for Strindberg, the 
father duped into bringing up someone eise’s child.^^  ^ One other thing comes 
partially to light: the implication that they married out of lust. Wlien Gerda asks the 
Gentleman why he married her he replies “You know well enough why a man gets 
married; and you also know I didn’t need to beg for your love.”^^  ^ The heat issuing 
from the basement of the silent house also, then, stands for the Gentleman’s stifled 
libido. The Gentleman’s attempt to escape his past is also an attempt to escape his 
own desire. However he has not escaped its consequences, and sexual desfre drives 
all the misfortunes in the play. It drove the Gentleman, already old, to many Gerda; it 
caused their divorce; it causes Fischer to run off with the Confectioner’s daughter.
Ibid., p. 300
This was particularly the case in Strindberg’s gr eat naturalistic drama, The Father.
340 Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 300
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The stripping of the Gentleman’s pretences alludes to another Swedenborgian 
doctrine, this one again having psychological implications. According to this, after 
death the souls of the departed find themselves in a disrobing room, in which, in 
Sti'indberg’s words, “they are stripped of the clothes they were forced to wear by their 
society, their social circle and family; and the angels presently see how they really 
are.” "^^  ^ In fact there is an element of this disrobing in all the Chamber Plays. While 
this has a moralistic overtone in Swedenborg, Strindberg felt very uncomfortable 
about it. As he says in A Blue Book, “a person who feels shame for his faults of 
course conceals them; and to brag about his wrongdoing is shameless. Is it right to 
call that hypocrisy? - Hardly, especially as it’s equally wrong however you 
b e h a v e . F o r  Strindberg, it further illustrates why it is so hard being human.
Indeed, he calls it “impossible.
The ‘disrobing’ of the Gentleman has contradictoiy effects. On the one hand, the 
narrative takes a redemptive turn beginning in act 2. On the other, it leaves a void. 
Towards the end of Act 2 the Gentleman, at last tlirowing off his passivity and the 
fraudulent cahn he has so carefully maintained, sends his brother to retrieve the 
Confectioner’s daughter, as well as his own. He tells his brother not to say anything 
to Herr Starck, the Confectioner, for “everything can still be set right. Poor man -  
and poor Gerda [.. There is in this an acknowledgment of wrong-doing on all 
sides. Significantly, the cause has been lust -  both the cause of Gerda and the 
Gentleman’s wedding, quite possibly of thefr separation and divorce, and now of the 
abduction of Gerda’s daughter and the seduction of the Confectioner’s daughter. The
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 65, p. 56 
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play adheres to the sexual morality of the day here, and coincides with Strindberg’s 
own agonising guilt over sexual desire. But there is here also a redemptive hope. As 
if to make sure the audience could not miss the redemptive theme, in the line 
immediately preceding, the Consul declares that he naturally wishes to help, adding 
“[w]e are all human beings in Jesus’ name!” '^^ ^
above him, and he will find the same situation repeating itself, like a lesson repeated 
over and over: “do it again, do it again, always repeating old l e s s o n s T h i s  is a 
recurring motif in Strindberg. His characters frequently express the fear that they
The final act resolves conflict into reconciliation and implies a redemptive conclusion 
to suffering. It also implies a re-integration of the Gentleman’s psyche on a sounder 
basis, as he has lived tln ough the return of the repressed. When the Confectioner’s
daughter returns, upset and afraid, he adopts a forgiving and conciliatory tone. At
I
this, the Gentleman remarks that everything is righting itself. A beneficent 
providential design seems to become evident, as some long-standing themes in 
Strindberg’s work get an afring before they are resolved. Thus the Gentleman feels a 
surge of anger and jealousy as the Consul returns to explain that Gerda grabbed her 
daughter off Fischer and escaped. He angrily rejects the Consul’s attempt to point out 
the extenuating circumstances around Fischer’s behaviour. He does not wish to hear
an enemy praised. He wonies that his ex-wife and child will once again move in
■
43
must repeat the same lessons over and over, without end. The significance here is that 
eternal recurrence undoes a sense of meaningful pattern and defeats progress.
Without the possibility of progress, providence becomes impossible. Repetition can
 __
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also occasion, as Freud points out, an experience of the uncanny. Freud relates this
to the character of neuroses themselves that typically entail involuntary repetition. 
The Gentleman then reflects that Gerda’s jealousy over Louise shows that there is a
vengeful justice in life. He remarks bitterly that nobody sees the justice in their own 
humiliation, that justice is only for others. This, again, is familiar stuff from 
Strindberg, but it has a particular point to it. The phone rings, and the Gentleman is
sure that it means bad news. To his suiprise, he finds out that Gerda and their child
1have moved in with Gerda’s mother. All has worked out for the best, despite the
Gentleman’s fears. The ending attempts to resolve Strindberg’s characteristic 
dissatisfactions with life: that it is a meaningless jest; a futile series of repeated 
lessons; characterised by jealousy, humiliation and strife. The storm of the title has
passed, and it has purged the Gentleman’s life. “That was a blessed rain,” he 
declares.
The stonn has also, however, left a void. It was always there, but the Gentleman has 
avoided gazing into it by surrounding himself with illusions. This may be why he 
says he finds the long summer evenings unnatural -  the daylight reveals too miich. '^^  ^
The sight of his empty flat prompts him to say“[...] empty rooms when they’re well- 
lit are more horrible than darkness ... you see g h o s t s . H e  complains that Gerda
has destroyed all his beautiful memories “and there is nothing left.”^^  ^ The void left 
by the storm horrifies the Gentleman: “It looks so empty in there! Like it does after
' - 4-------------------------------------------
Freud, The Standard Edition o f  the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, vol. 17, pp.
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someone has moved out ... and up there, it looks like it does after a conflagration 
But the void also represents fi‘eedom; Louise points out, “But this is liberation!” The 
climax o f^  Dream Play, dramatically and thematically, occurs when the Daughter 
opens the clover-leaf door and reveals the secret of the universe: nothing. This
vacuum is ambiguous. It could be taken as an absolute negation, a niliilistic abyss 
that robs the world and our life in it of significance, Strindberg refers to this 
possibility at the end of Inferno when he declares life to be a miserable jest. The 
abyss could also be a divine void, liberating by its very groundlessness. Either way, it 
strikes suspicion if not downright fear into the hearts of the four Deans, who 
immediately embark on persecuting the revealer of this mystery. In the above lines 
from The Storm the void returns. Louise sees it as the Gentleman’s liberation, but for 
the Gentleman himself it holds destruction.
I have implied a parallel between the imposition of a Providential design as a means 
to explain away the unease expressed in the play when the Gentleman confronts the 
void, and a naively Freudian reading that resolves the unease caused by repressed
complexes resolved by a process of psychoanalytic exposure to restore psychological 
cafrn. Freud helps to identify and analyse some of the unease running like an 
underground stream under the play and occasionally breaking out above ground, yet 
ultimately a thoroughly Freudian reading does a disservice to the play. This is
because it must reduce the play to Freudian categories. Thus Freud’s analysis of ETA
Ï
Hoffinan’s stoiy “The Sand-Man” reduces its uncamry terror to a childhood complex 
-  the fear of castration. This is Freud’s most characteristic move: to reduce the 
uncanny in all its varieties to an “infantile factor” or a psychological complex. This is
I1
Providential design.
Brânda Tomten (The Burnt House)
This theme is remarkably consistent in this essay. See, for example (this is not an exliaustive list), 
Freud, The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund F?~eiid, vol. 17, pp. 235, 
240, 244.
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accompanied by a glib equation between childhood fears, “primitive” beliefs and 
neurosis.^^^ The Storm is not, however, reducible to these terms. For Freud accepts, 
seemingly as self-evident, the post-enlightenment rationalistic and materialistic 
interpretation of the world; while Strmdberg continually questions what the world is.
-The latter’s dramatic investigation of character and memory is therefore situated 
within a drama that does not take a scientific materialistic world-view for granted. In 
The Storm the return of Gerda and the resurfacing of the Gentleman’s suppressed 
memories destroy the latter’s illusion of a homely, pleasant life. Indeed, his life as he 
has represented it is a sham. But this removal of his illusions forces the Gentleman, 
for a moment, to confront the void. This void belies not only his past and his social 
life, it belies the world. A psychoanalytic ‘closure’ of the play is no less an 
explaining away than the assertion that a divine Providence does after all organize the 
world.
'h.!'
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An uneasy sense of ultimate emptiness, then, underlies the Gentleman’s superficial 
calm. As events strip him of his illusions, he confronts, for a moment, this emptiness. 
He looks into the abyss. However, the neat conclusion re-asserts the operation of a 
divine Providence. Life does, after all, follow a naiTative pattern with a more or less 
happy ending and everything, finally, works out for the best. The ultimate emptiness 
that confronts the Gentleman, however, returns to haunt the three subsequent
Chamber Plays, and they end with much less certainty about a benevolent
Quoted in Lamm, Strindberg och Makterna, p. 133 
St'indberg, Shifter, vol. 12, p. 311
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In this play, a crime has been committed, and the investigation implicates everyone.
A house has burnt down, apparently from an act of arson. Into this walks the 
Stranger, a son of the house who has wandered the world for many years. He 
gradually reveals the corruption of his respectable family. In doing so, he finds that a
web links the destinies of everyone. Furthemiore, this web consists of mutual guilt; 
all are simied against, and all are guilty. This resembles the conception of karma 
found in HP Blavatsky, whose Secret Doctrine Strindberg had read, according to 
which ‘“every person from birth until death weaves around themselves tlmead after 
tliread, as a spider its web.’”^^"^  The play thus explores two related themes: original 
sin, and life as a web. It addresses the question, is this web redeemable?
IThe play opens on the burnt out ruin of the Dyer’s house. The ruin reveals that the 
house had a double wall. Thematically this becomes important. The double wall 
stands for the duplicity of the family that lived there. The profession of the head of 
the household also relates to this duplicity. He dyes cloth, changing its appearance. 
The house has had a malign influence on its occupants, as the Old Woman explains:
[...] so much has happened in this house, so much. I thought the time had 
come for it to be smoked out -  Ugh, what a house! One came, another went, 
but they always came back, and here they died, here they were born, here they 
got married and divorced.^^^
This suggests that the house, like the cave in A Dream Play, represents the world. Its 
occupants are bom, live and die inside it, and they are forever bound to it. They 
cannot escape.
!
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Behind the house lies an orchard. This carries Edenic overtones. It is under a tree in
this orchard that the Stranger suffers his own personal fall. Strindberg interweaves a
Biblical motif here, in a technique he also used iiivf Blue Book. In the latter, he
recounts two visits to an island in the Stockholm archipelago. On his first visit, he 
.sees it as a paradise. On his second, some years later and having lost his innocence, it 
resembles hell:
My verdant isle, my youth’s first paradise became so ugly to me, so horrible 
... the lovely bays began to stink, so that I got malaria; the mosquitoes 
tomrented us all night and got tlu'ough the finest net; if I wandered in the 
woods and stooped to pick a flower, an adder would raise its head.^ *^^
The island, which once seemed an Eden, is now foil of serpents. Sexual awakening 
has intervened between the two (in this piece, he mentions that his companions were 
treating “incurable diseases,” presumably a reference to syphilis. The only cui’e, at 
the time, was to inject mercury.) In A Burnt House, Strmdberg makes similar use of 
the book of Genesis. The Stranger recounts his own sexual awakening: he found a
■ "book hidden on his father’s bookshelf- “a certain knight’s notorious memoii's” -
I
J :
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and sat under an oak tree to read it. “We called it the tree of knowledge all right. And 
with that I left childhood’s paradise and was initiated too early into the secrets th a t... 
well! ”358 depiction of the post-fall world m A Burnt House is, like that in ^  Blue 
Book, also grim. In A Blue Book, the pupil says “we slandered each other, suspected 
each other, even of theft [...] we quairelled fi'om morning till night. So the 
community round the burnt house pursues petty hatreds and rivalries. Everyone
______________________
Strmdberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 65, p. 29
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suspects everyone else, and they all slander each other. As the Old Woman says, 
“everyone quarrels and grates on each other in this neighbourhood.”^^®
In The Storm, the Gentleman goes thi'ough a Swedenborgian ‘disrobing’. This 
disrobing motif is repeated in The Burnt House. The Stranger, who turns out to be the 
Dyer’s brother, returns after many years travelling the world. The Dyer reacts with 
alarm and guilt as the Stranger begins to sift thiough the ruins. The Stranger tells the 
Dyer about an old schoolmate he met in America, who revealed during a train journey 
the truth about their respectable family. Their parents were scoundrels, the family 
fortune based on smuggling. The Stranger points out the double walls. He says his 
hair turned grey that night as he had to revise his image of the entire family:
I had to sit and repaint all then faces, strip them, pull them down, and get them 
out of my mind. [...] Then they began to haunt me; bits of the smashed figures 
put themselves back together, but not quite right, and they became a waxwork 
museum of monsters.
All the ‘uncles’ who visited the home to play cards and stay for supper when they 
were children were also smugglers. The family’s respectable reputation was a sham, 
and their parents were criminals. Viitually all the characters in the play are similarly 
deceptive. So, for example, a man that the Stranger had revered for his honesty, 
turned out to be a crooked policeman and manipulator. Similarly, the Dyer had 
deprived his brother of his inheritance. The Stranger himself wrecked the Painter’s 
chances of an artistic career.
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 311 
Ibid., p. 315
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This mutual wrongdoing does not ultimately result, in these plays, from conscious 
malice or hypocrisy. It reflects the nature of the world, and the nature of character 
according to Strindberg’s conception of it. The play di'amatises this when the 
Stranger tells the Wife that she does not fit the way she had been described. The Wife 
replies:
Wife: Yes, people do each other such injustice, and they re-paint each other, 
each one in then own image...
The Stranger: And they go round like theatre directors and give out roles to 
each other; some accept then role, others give it back and prefer to 
improvise...^^^
The injustices people do each other cannot be blamed on bad character because, 
according to Strindberg, character is nebulous. Thus the Stranger fails to find out 
from the Stonecutter what character his sister-in-law has. The Stonecutter caimot 
understand what the Stranger means. The Stranger exclaims in frustration “I mean 
her temperament!”^^ ,^ to which the Stonecutter replies, “with me it depends who I ’m 
talking to. With a nice person I’m nice, and with someone nasty I become a wild 
animal.” ®^"^ The Stranger tries to make himself clear by asking what she is like in 
general. The Stonecutter replies that she’s “like other people, mostly; gets angry if 
you tease her; becomes pleasant again; you can’t always be in the same mood.” They 
continue
Stranger: I mean, is she happy or gloomy?
Stonecutter: When things are going well, she’s happy, and when they’re going 
badly she’s sad or annoyed, like the rest of us.
Ibid., p. 324 
Ibid., p. 322
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Character here is essentially reactive. We react to others and to our surroimdings, or 
we play out roles the way an actor does. Attempts to reach an essential core, 
however, fail. People behave the way they do because of circumstance. This is the 
paradox of the world after the fall. The web that traps the characters is, the Stranger 
says, “a net that hasn’t been made by human beings.”^^  ^ Because they live in a fallen 
world, people camiot help acting as they do, and they cannot bear much responsibility 
for their actions. Strindberg makes this point explicitly in A Blue Book, in the passage 
about the disrobing room quoted above.^ ®®
The apparent hypocrisy and vacuity of the characters mirrors the duplicity of the 
world, so that people “cannot see what is, but only what seems to be.” ®^^ The good 
reputation of the Stranger’s family, like the reputation of everyone in the play, is a 
sham, but this is because the world itself is deceitful. The Stranger, recounting a near­
death experience after he attempted suicide, says that he found another world like this 
one, except that there everything is what it appears.
While the Stranger reveals the web that binds all the characters to each other, a kind 
of Passion narrative plays out, mostly off-stage. The one innocent character, the 
Student, is accused of arson and arrested. In the final scene, the Wife reports that the 
Student will be punished for the crime. Offstage, a drama of atonement and sacrifice 
has taken place: the Student is a scapegoat, an iimocent punished for the wrongdoing 
of others. And yet the atonement never arrives, because ultimately there is nothing to 
atone for. The background to the Passion narrative as a sort of scapegoating is this: 
the human race inherits the guilt of Adam and Eve for the original crime, and Chi’ist
Ibid., p. 325
See above, p. 143
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pays the price for theii* sin in order to redeem humanity. In The Burnt House, 
however, nobody is responsible. The Stranger asks the Wife who is guilty, and she 
replies “No-one! — The fire was an accident!”^^  ^ Although everyone sins, nobody is 
really guilty because they cannot help what they are. In a passage that recalls the 
Prologue o f^  Dream Play’^  ^the Stranger says that the human race is “dizzy” from 
the spinning of the Earth, and acts out of madness. The Student does not, therefore, 
pay the price for another’s crime, and thereby atone for the collective guilt of 
everyone else. He is punished for something that was not even a crime. His suffering 
is meaningless. The Stranger therefore offers the Wife the only crumb of comfort he 
can, telling her “[sjuffer! It will pass! This also is vanity.
Halfway through the play, the Stranger offers up a curious prayer composed of 
questions:
You little world: the densest of all the planets, the heaviest, and therefore so 
heavy for you, so difficult to breathe, so heavy to bear; the cross is your 
symbol, though it could have been a cap and bells or a straitjacket -  world of 
illusions and madmen -  Eternal one! Has your earth gone astray in space?
And how did she come to spin round so that your children became dizzy and 
lost their understanding, so that they can’t see what is, but only what seems to 
be? Amen!^^^
The cross is an appropriate symbol for the world, signifying as it does the world’s 
suffering. This passage, however, equates the cross with a cap and bells or a 
straightjacket, robbing the cross of its redemptive meaning. Original sin endows
Ibid., p. 325
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suffering with meaning and Clirist’s atonement gives the world a purpose and 
direction, a telos. The Stranger refers to the world as a web, a cloth or a net. The 
crucifixion, terrible as it is, promises to endow this cloth with weight and significance.
More terrible is the possibility that this cloth is completely without significance. It is 
a piece of madness, full of illusions.
The play offers a bleak assessment of the human condition. Wlrile we do not bear 
ultimate responsibility, our actions and our suffering are ultimately futile. Like the 
protagonist of The Storm, the Stranger stands somewhat outside life and observes. He
■returns after many years away and spends his time asking questions, revealing others’ 
deceit and, quite literally, sorting tlirough the ruins. He says of himself that he has
stood outside himself ever since his childhood attempt at suicide:
I thought I was in another’s body; I took life with a cynical calm [ ...] !  
regarded myself as iff was another, and I observed, I studied this other and his 
fate
In The Storm, however, the Gentleman ultimately ceases to be a spectator, and when 
he does so finds a beneficent Providence is after all at work. The Burnt House offers 
no such comfort. Here human action is futile. We may not ultimately bear 
responsibility for our condition, but nor can we do anything to remedy it. Towards 
the end of The Burnt House, the Stranger declares “what a weave of lies, mistakes, 
misunderstandings! And you are supposed to take this s e r i o u s l y ! L i k e  the 
equation of the cross with a straightjacket or cap and bells, this echoes the sentiment 
at the end of Strindberg’s Inferno, “what a miserable jest this life is after all.”
JIbid., p. 316
Ibid., p. 324
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The Burnt House ends without a conclusion. Although no crime has been committed, 
an imiocent man has been punished. The Stranger, having examined the weave of 
life, finds he cannot take it seriously. At the end of the play he wanders off into the 
world again, canying on much the same as before. And yet the play is not utterly 
bleak. The Stranger’s curious prayer offers, it seems to me, something other than 
blank despair, even though it consists of negations and questions. In fact, the prayer, 
like the play itself, is a question without an answer. Like A Dream Play, it confronts 
theodicy and finds it inadequate. It suffers the same metaphysical unease -  a distrust 
of metaphysics as a closed system. However, the Stranger still offers up a prayer.
That he does so, and that the prayer consists largely of questions, seems to open the 
possibility of some kind of transcendence.
Spoksonatan (The Ghost Sonata)
The Ghost Sonata continues one of the main themes of the previous Chamber Play, 
The Burnt House. The characters are all linked by a karmic web whose warp and weft 
is made of crime and deceit. It also bears a strong relation to both A Dream Play and 
some of Strindberg’s pre-Inferno naturalistic dramas. Like A Dream Play it moves 
from naïve innocence to disillusionment, opposing another vision of cosmic order to 
the penal and perhaps infernal drudgery of everyday living. Strindberg also ends The 
Ghost Sonata, as he does A Dream Play, with a vision. Scene 2 reworks elements of 
both The Father and Miss Julie, two of Strindberg’s great naturalistic dramas -  the 
father who has unwittingly raised another man’s child; the struggle for mental 
domination; killing another by the power of suggestion - but in such a different 
atmosphere that this amounts to a reassessment of these earlier works.
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possesses, including his family name and his rank. Having gained a total ascendancy 
over the Colonel, the Mummy (in fact Hummers mentally deranged ex-lover who has
Î
IStrindberg originally subtitled the play ‘kama loka’, a term he derived from HP 
Blavatsky. Kama Loka is a post-mortem state that Blavatsky equates with limbo and 
H a d e s . I t  is a semi-material place inhabited for a time by the newly deceased, as 
they await a second death, this time the death of the baser part of the personality. 
Strindberg was very probably thinking of kama loka as this world. Certainly the play 
is full of phantoms, both literal ghosts and a ghoulish set of characters, one of them a 
mummy, who appear to exist in a kind of living death.
I
'
The play is stmctured as follows: in scene 1, the Student (Arkenholz) having spent 
the night binding up wounds after a house collapsed, meets the Old Man (Hummel), a 
wheelchaii’-bound cripple, who promises to get the Student into the house that seems 
to the latter a paradise. Along the way, we learn that the Student’s father was in debt 
to Hummel, and had resented him bitterly. Hummel appears to be rather sinister, 
binding others to him (like his servant Johansson) and playing with their destiny.
However he is terrified of a phantom milkmaid that only the Student can see. We 
learn that Hummel’s ex-fiance inhabits the house, as does his ex-lover whose statue 
can be seen tluough the mirror. In fact the involuted relations between Hummel and 
the occupants are so complex as to defy sorting out entirely. Hununel arranges for the 
Student to sit next to the Colonel and his daughter at the opera, mainly as a way of
inveigling himself into the house via the Student. In scene 2, Hummel confr onts the 
household, and in a terrifying show of strength strips the Colonel of everything he
lived in a cupboard for the last twenty years) proceeds to strip Hummel, revealing that
- , -----------------------------------
HP Blavatsky, The Key to Theosophy (Theosophical University Press Online Edition,
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he lured a young girl out onto the ice one winter, because she could incriminate him, 
and murdered her. This was the Milkmaid whose ghost so terrified Hummel in scene 
1. The Mummy reduces Hummel to an automaton, tells him to enter the cupboard in 
which she has lived, and orders him to hang himself with the rope he finds there.
They draw a Japanese death screen in front of the cupboard as Hummel dies. Scene 3 
involves mainly the Student and the Young Lady. It begins with idealistic exchanges 
and young love, but quickly sours, particularly after a brief exchange with the Cook, a 
female counterpart of Hummel. A sense of life’s dmdgeiy rapidly stifles their love, 
and the scene ends with a desperate appeal for salvation from the Student as the 
Young Lady dies, again behind the death screen.
As with the other Chamber Plays, the drama is intimately involved with the building 
it takes place in and around. Like both The Storm and The Burnt House, the house in 
The Ghost Sonata represents the world, and all the characters in scene 1 imagine with 
its apparent beauty and the elegant people inside, it must contain a paradise. Even in 
the stage directions, Strindberg hints at what is to come, describing it as a “husfasad”, 
fasad having the same double-meaning as the English façade.
The play quickly creates an uncanny atmosphere, mixing the realistic, the fantastic 
and the grotesque. The play opens on a Sunday morning with Hummel in his 
wheelchair reading a newspaper while a Milkmaid washes her hands and gets a drink 
from the public fountain. The Student enters looking dishevelled and has to persuade 
the hoiTified Milkmaid to part with the scoop and let him drink. We learn just after 
this that Hummel could not see the Milkmaid, but reacts with hoiTor when he hears 
the Student’s description of her. Then there is the ghost of the dead Consul, so vain
!■
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even in death that he comes out of the house to count his wreaths and check if the flag 
is flying at half-mast. And there are strains in the otherwise realistic fabric of the 
play. Just after Hummel introduces himself to the Student, he tells him that he once 
had a friend who always mispronounced window (in Swedish, fonster) in a particular 
way (as ‘funster’), and that the Student is the only other person he has ever heard who 
does the same. Hummel says this apparently in order to find out if the Student is 
related to his old friend (which he is -  the Student is his son), but the point here is that 
the Student has not yet said the word ‘fonster’. This has puzzled a number of readers, 
but it suggests various possibilities. It implies, perhaps, that Hummel is already well- 
aware of who the Student is, but is using this to inveigle his way into the latter’s life.
It also has a symbolic i mpor t ance . Near  the end of scene 1, Johansson tells the 
student that Hummel “breaks into houses, crawls in through the window, plays with 
people’s destiny, kills his enemies and never forgives.”^^® So at the begiiming of the 
scene, Hummel enters the Student’s life through a window and starts meddling with 
his destiny.
The characters are all linked to each other in a kind of web, and typically for '#
Strindberg the strands of this web are made of secrets, deceptions and crimes. The 
Student’s father and Hummel were involved with each other, although, as we learn 
that what Hummel says about this is lies, the exact nature of it remains obscure. At 
any rate it seems to involve unpaid debts. The Dark Lady is the illegitimate daughter 
of the dead Consul and the Doorman’s wife, as a consequence of which the Doorman 
got his job. Hummel bound his servant, Johansson, to him by discovering that the 
latter had conunitted a crime -  or as Johansson calls it, “a blunder.” Instead of
Egil Tornqvist points this out in Strindbergian Drama, pp. 228-9 
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handing Johansson to the police, Hummel made him his slave. All this happens in the 
fu'st scene, and it seems to embody a very cynical view of humanity. However, it 
establishes two important things -  the Student’s essential goodness, and Hummel’s 
sinister manipulation of others. The Student enters, as we have seen, looking 
dishevelled, and the Milkmaid (whom we do not yet know to be a phantom) reacts 
with hon or, apparently suspecting the student of a night of debauchery. Finally the 
Student has to explain that he has been binding up wounds all night at the house that 
collapsed the previous evening. This immediately makes the Student a sympathetic 
character, but what is important here also is the register of the Swedish.^^^ It switches 
between formal and informal in a way that is hard to render in modern English, in part 
because Swedish at that time still made a distinction between “you” and “thou” (“ni” 
and “du”). There is for instance a switch in tone when the student says
Jag ar orakad, jag vet d e t... Giv mig en dryck vatten, flicka, ty jag fortjanar 
det!^^^
I am unshaved, I know ... Give me a drink of water, girl, for I have earned it! 
The second part has in Swedish an elevated, almost Biblical tone -  partly from the 
rhythm and partly the vocabulary (using the more formal giv instead of ge, for 
example). This is quite deliberate. The Student goes on “jag har fôrbundit sarade och 
vakat over sjuka hela denna natt.” Again the tone is elevated -  he has “bound up 
wounds and watched over the sick all this night.” As well as imbuing the Student 
with stature, it also refers to the parable of the good Samaritan who tended the man 
set upon by robbers and “bound up his wounds” (Luke 10:34). He is imiocent, and
This point, and the salient points of the discussion that follows, I owe to Tornqvist, Strindbergian 
Drama, pp. 231-233
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despite being a Sunday-child who can see what others cannot, he is also, like Indra’s 
daughter in A Dream Play, naïve.
We see this as Hummel works his way into the Student’s life. We see how easily he 
persuades the Student that his father owed Hummel a debt of gratitude for bailing him 
out financially, thereby making the Student also beholden to him. Hummel is not 
interested in money, but in making others do his will, and so he tells the student “if 
you do me small services, I am w e l l - p a i d . A  little later Hummel places his hand 
on the Student and starts to drain the life out of him, causing the Student to ci*y out 
“Let go of my hand, you’re taking away my power, you’re making me cold, what is it 
you want?”^^® His manipulation of others drains them of independent will, as we 
have already seen with Johansson. In fact Johansson says of him “he is like a horse 
thief at a human fair, he steals people, in many different ways.”^^  ^ He always makes 
use of the police, befriending them and then pumping them for information. He is 
malicious, sinister, manipulative, and he dominates everyone. In scene 2 he uses this 
to destroy the Colonel without compunction. In fact scene 2, despite its honnr film 
trappings, strongly resembles some of Strindberg’s naturalistic plays. As a believer in 
the scientific pretensions of naturalism he writes in these earlier plays in accord with 
psychological theories, albeit idiosyncratic ones, in a way that after the Inferno crisis 
he did not. These ideas were mainly associated with a battle of wills, which seemed 
inevitable whenever two people spent any time together, and which would eventually 
result in victory for one, defeat for the other. In his essay ‘Soul Murder (Apropos 
Rosmersholm)’, Strindberg explains this psychological version of the survival of the 
fittest: that whereas people once fought physically, they must now resort to more
Ibid., p. 330
Ibid., p. 332
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subtle and civilized means of killing each other.^^  ^ The result may not be physical 
death, but a paralysis of the will. Strindberg expands on this theme in a thinly
1disguised autobiographical story, ‘The Battle of the Brains’. Discussing the
susceptibility of the mind to suggestion, he states . .suggestion is only the stronger
brain’s stmggle with, and victory over, a weaker mind, and ... this procedure is
applied unconsciously in daily life.”^^  ^ After a struggle of wills between the narrator
and his young travelling companion, the nanator trumpets his victory: “I laughed with
a sense of superiority, because 1 know that it is my powerful mind that activates his
powers of locomotion, and that I have hypnotised him so that he suffers from the
hallucination that it is he who sets me in motion ... I have him under my gaze all day 
.long, and I drip my thoughts into his brain in the form of well-crafted sentences.”^
.This domination of others by the stronger-willed, even to the point of activating 
others’ “powers of locomotion” resembles Hununel’s relationship with everyone 
around him. At the end of scene 1 he even persuades a group of beggars to pull his 
wheelchair lilce a chariot, literally conunanding their powers of locomotion. This 
becomes even more apparent when we look at scene 2, especially in comparison with 
the dramas that Strindberg wrote in his naturalistic period.
Scene 2 takes place inside the house, and opens with an exchange between Johansson
;
and Bengtsson, the butler, on the hellish life inside the house that seemed ft om the 
outside a paradise. This includes a satirical description of the occupants’ daily
“ghost-supper”: “They drink tea and don’t say a word, or the colonel talks away by 
himself; and then they nibble on biscuits, all at the same time, so that it sounds like
Strindberg, Selected Essays, pp. 64 - 72 
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rats ill the attic.”^^  ^ Hummel sneaks in on cmtches, and confronts the Mununy, who 
at first tallcs like a parrot. He tells her he has come for his child, the daughter they had 
together (although her husband, the Colonel, believes the child is his). It appears that 
Hummel seduced the Mummy in revenge for the Colonel seducing his fiancé.
Hummel has come to exact revenge against the Colonel and the Mummy appeals to 
Hummel to spare him. Hummel refrises. When the Colonel enters we learn that 
Hummel has bought up his debts, and with smooth menace he reduces the Colonel to 
the state of a slave.
Colonel: [...] Wliat do you want now?
Hummel: 1 want to be paid, in one way or another.
Colonel: In what way?
Hummel: Very simply -  let’s not talk about money -  just tolerate me in your 
house, as a guest!^^^
Hummel demands that the Colonel fires Bengtsson, pointing out that he owns 
everything in the house and may dictate the Colonel’s domestic aiTangements. Within 
a few lines, Hummel is tyrannizing the Colonel, but he does not stop there. The 
Colonel attempts to retain some dignity by saying that his coat of arms and his good 
name still belong to him:
Hummel: No, not even that! (Pause) You are not an aristocrat!
Colonel: You should be ashamed!
Hummel: If you read this extract from the College of Arms, you will see that 
the family whose name you bear has been extinct for a hundred 
years.^^^
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The Colonel is forced to concede the truth of what Hummel says, and hands over his 
ring. But Hummel goes on mercilessly to prove that the Colonel is not even a 
Colonel: he had received his commission in the American voluntary service, “but 
after the Cuban war and the reorganization of the army all such titles were 
withdrawn.. Even this is not enough. Hummel goes on “take off your wig and 
look in the miiTor, but take out your teeth first and shave your moustache, have 
Bengtsson loosen your corset, and we will see if a certain servant XYZ doesn’t 
recognize himself; he who used to scrounge food in a certain kitchen.. Hummel 
utterly destroys the Colonel, forcing him to aclaiowledge that everything about him is 
humbug and reducing him to nothing. In this battle of the brains, Hummel has won a 
devastating victory.
As we have seen, Hummel is the biological father of the Colonel’s daughter, and 
Hummel goes on to destroy the Colonel. This echoes the plot of The Father, one of 
Strindberg’s naturalistic works from before his Inferno crisis, in which the eponymous 
father, a Captain in the army, is destroyed by his wife Laura. Laura accomplishes this 
by driving the Captain out of his mind with the suggestion that she has been 
unfaithful, and that thefr daughter is not in fact his. The details are so similar that the 
echo must be deliberate. Here however the tone is different. In “The Battle of the 
Brains” the protagonist takes a savage pleasure in the contest. He has a zest for life, 
however brutal it is. The Father, too, proceeds with a raw emotional violence, and 
not without a certain pleasure in battle. In The Ghost Sonata, the battle comes to 
seem both terrible and ruthless.
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There are further echoes of Strindberg’s naturalistic work, both in Hummel’s 
pontificating and in his final undoing at the hands of the Munrmy. Having reduced 
the Colonel to pliant servitude, Hummel sits in on the ghost-supper and dominates the 
company. He wishes everyone to be silent, because
silence camiot hide anything ... although words can; 1 read the other day that 
different languages really came about among primitive people in order to hide 
one tribe’s secrets from another.^ ®®
That language should be a means of deception, not communication, in order to protect 
ourselves from others fits perfectly with Strindberg’s earlier ideas on soul murder and 
domination of others by suggestion, in other words a brutal and ruthless struggle for 
survival. The parallel with Strindberg’s naturalistic work is frirther suggested by 
Hummel’s demise. Just as Hummel stripped the Colonel, so the Mummy now strips 
Hummel. She points out that Hummel is a thief of people, who killed the Consul with 
debt-notes and bound the Student with a fictitious debt owed by his father. She then 
calls in Bengtsson to explain the blackest point in Hununel’s past. Hununel, 
panicking, begs the Mununy to stop. The Milkmaid appears in the hallway, seen only 
by the terrified Hummel, as Bengtsson comes in and explains his past:
He scrounged food from my kitchen for two whole years [...] he sat out there 
like a vampire and sucked all the goodness out of the house, and we became 
like skeletons.
Here too Hununel had gained total ascendancy over the occupants of a house and 
proceeded to plague them. Bengtsson goes on to reveal that under an assumed name 
in Hamburg, Hummel had lured a girl onto the ice in order to di'own her, because she 
had witnessed one of his crimes.
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Having stripped Hummel as Hummel stripped the Colonel, the Mummy tenderly kills 
him. She passes her hand over his face, a gesture perhaps suggesting hypnotism, and 
takes his debt-papers and will off him. She strokes his back and, repeating 
Bengtsson’s line from beginning of the scene, says “Pari'ot! Is Jacob there?”
Hummel starts babbling and squawking like a parrot, as the Mummy did earlier. The 
Mummy then tells Hummel “Get up and go into the cupboard where I sat for twenty 
years and wept for our misdeed -  There’s a rope in there like the one which you used 
to strangle the Consul, and which you were going to use to strangle your benefactor 
... Go!” ®^^ Hummel goes into the cupboard, a death screen is drawn in front of it, and 
Hummel hangs himself. Hummel loses his will and pliantly obeys the slight 
suggestion from the Mummy, as if he were hypnotized. He even, with her prompting, 
squawks like a parrot. She tells him to go into the cupboard, and again only drops the 
suggestion in his mind that he might hang himself, without actually saying it. Miss 
Julie ends in a very similar way to this scene. Jean plants the suggestion that Miss 
Julie should cut her tliroat. Shortly afterwards, as if in a trance, Julie takes a razor 
from Jean’s hand. Again she seems to be under a hypnotic spell. Jean has won the 
battle of the brains, and subdued her will. The play ends with Julie going out to the 
woodshed with the razor in order to kill herself.
Now Strindberg’s naturalistic drama has no overt ethical or religious agenda. It does 
not pass judgment on anyone. At most it occasionally indulges a taste for the 
Nietzschean superman, but more commonly it is morally neutral. We may be moved 
to pity for the characters, but the play depicts a struggle for survival that overrides
392 Ibid.
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The final scene is symbolically important, however. We have seen that the passage 
from life to death informs all the Chamber Plays. It is in this final scene that life and
393 Ibid.
purely ethical demands. In The Ghost Sonata, however, this unending conflict comes 
to betoken a life that resembles damnation. All the apparent beauty of the house, all 
the fine achievements and honours of those who inliabit it, turn out to be humbug. 
Everyone in it is guilty of secret crimes, with the exception of the Young Lady and 
the Student. And there is certainly no zest in the battle, in this civilized counterpart of 
nature red in tooth and claw. In fact the house’s inhabitants all seem half-dead; they 
have become ghost-like. Although we may doubt that the Mummy is as innocent, or 
Hununel as guilty, as she implies, she regrets that they are as they are: “We are 
miserable people, we know it; we have broken laws and we have erred, like everyone; 
we are not what we seem, because we are basically better than ourselves, when we 
dislike our faults.” ®^^ It is the theme of salvation that scene 3 takes up.
Scene 3 sits somewhat oddly with the fii’st two scenes. The dramatic action of the 
play begins in scene 1 and concludes in scene 2. The main action of the play 
therefore concludes before the final scene. Adding to this dislocation, the first two 
scenes take place on one day, while the thfrd scene happens at least a few days later.
It takes place mostly between the Student and the Young Lady, and begins with them 
expressing lyrical and idealistic ideas about life, before the entrance of the vampiric 
Cook, the female counterpart of Hummel. The idealism rapidly dissolves in bitterness 
and argument, and ends with the Young Lady’s death.
■I
death confront each other. There are some very suggestive resemblances between The
F
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Ghost Sonata, in particular, and the form of the Japanese No drama. The Japanese
traditionally made a sharp division between two worlds: the natural and the 
,supernatural; or this world and the next. Japanese temples and sluines are situated on 
the margin of civilization, placing them symbolically at the edge of this world -  they
Iinliabit the boundary between the two worlds. It is on this boundary that No, also, is 
situated.^ ®"^  The Chamber Plays situate themselves in this same borderland, as the two 
paintings flanking the stage of the Intimate Theatre emphasized. Furthermore, the 
No combined ritual and drama. While the first part of a No play depicts a human 
situation, often one involving the transition from life to death, the second resolves this 
situation into a ritual. The fu'st two scenes of The Ghost Sonata depict a state of
isuspension within a world that is made of deceitful appearances. The social pretences that scene 2 lays bare are of a piece with this. The final scene, as it ends, becomes 
ritualistic in the use of music, lighting and the rhythm of the language.^®®
The room is decked out with hyacinths and decorated in a “somewhat bizarre oriental 
style,” ®^^ On the tiled stove sits a statue of Buddha with a shallot bulb in his lap, from 
which a stem has shot up, bearing a globe-like cluster of white star-flowers. This 
becomes the occasion for a sort of cosmic vision -  at least the Student’s explanation 
of this image describes a cosmic harmony which, as in A Dream Play, comes to seem 
distant in the disillusionment that follows. In fact there is a hint of this already when 
the Student complains that although he loves flowers, their scent confuses his senses, 
 ----------------------------Kiyoshi Tsuchiya, ‘TSTô and Purification: The Ait o f Ritual and Vocational Performance” in Studies 
in the Literaiy Imagination, vol. 34, No. 2, Fall 2001, p. 100
See above, p. 132
I do not claim any direct influence here from No. No has, however, ancient ritual roots, bearing 
resemblance with other historically and geographically separate traditions (see Tsuchiya, p. 95). As 
Strindberg was here thinking about mortality, it is perhaps not sui'prising if  he hit upon a form that 
bears a resemblance to the dramatic forms of other cultui es. At any rate, the similarities of theme and 
to some extent of structure are striking.
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 341
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deafens and dazzles him; it shoots poisoned arrows that make his heart sink and his 
head hurt. The hyacinth room with all its apparent beauty dulls the senses and 
poisons the Student, whom we have already seen to be an innocent and good-natured 
man. This recalls the Daughter’s lines û'omA Dream Play, when she explains to the 
Poet that she has suffered most from “simply existing; to feel my sight weakened by 
an eye, my hearing dulled by an ear, and my thought, my bright afry thought bound in 
the fatty labyrinth of a brain.” ®^^ Like the honey in Porphyi y’s explanation of the 
cave of the nymphs, the hyacinths represent worldly pleasure. They appear beautiful 
and attractive, but their scent acts as a poison. It is significant, then, that the Young 
Lady lies dying in a room full of hyacinths. The statue of the Buddha then represents 
an apocalyptic hope: the transformation of the poisoned life, indeed the 
transformation of the world. As the Student says: “It is [] an image of the Cosmos ... 
That’s why the Buddha sits with the bulb of the earth in his lap, brooding on it with 
his gaze in order to see it sprout upwards and ti-ansform itself into a heaven. -  The 
poor earth will become heaven! That’s what the Buddha is waiting fbr.” ®^®
This vision looks forward to a transformation of ugliness into beauty, of the earthy 
into the heavenly. But Strindberg as usual camiot let it stand like that. He must 
question it, even attack it, and so in the thfrd scene this vision gives way to 
disillusiomnent. In the Swedish, this scene begins with the Student and the Young 
Lady talking to each other with the formal “ni”, but just for a moment, when they 
reach an ecstatic togetherness, they both switch to the familiar “du” form:
Froken: [] Vilkens tanke var det?
Studenten: Din!
Strindberg, TillDamaskus / Ett Dromspel, p. 195 
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The Young Lady: Whose thought was it?
The Student: Yours!
The Young Lady: Yours!
This ecstatic love changes almost within a breath to disillusionment. The Student 
asks why the Young Lady’s parents (who can still be seen thi'ough a doorway) sit so 
quietly. She replies “[b]ecause they have nothing to say to each other, because the 
one does not believe what the other says. My father puts it like this: What’s the point 
of talking, when in any case we can’t fool each other?” ®^^ Again, language is used to 
conceal motives and fool enemies, but the two parents know each other too well to be 
fooled. This image of marriage, of two enemies too worn out to fight any more, is a 
bleak one. The Young Lady’s parents do not have even the zest for battle that Edgar 
and Alice have 'm Dance o f Death. The scene places side by side the fresh love of the 
Student and the Young Lady and the dreary silent defeat of the Young Lady’s parents. 
In fact they are almost literally side by side, as the stage directions state that the 
parents can still be seen: the Colonel and the Mununy sit listless and silent. We see 
them after the great battles in which Strindberg had once delighted.
The verdict on his earlier naturalism seems grim, and all the more so in the depiction 
of domestic life that follows. The Cook enters, a female giant who “belongs to the 
vampire family Hummel.”"^®^ She sucks the nourishment out of everything she cooks: 
“everything she touches loses its juice, it’s as if she sucked it out with her eyes.” ®^^
Ibid.
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This is part of the great struggle depicted in Strindberg’s naturalistic works. As the 
Cook replies, “You suck the juice out of us, and we out of you.”"^®"^ This grim struggle 
is inlierent in life, but here it is no longer the naturalism that “seeks out the points 
where the great battles are fought, [...] which delights in the struggle between natural 
forces.”"^®^ Wliile the struggle between classes, the struggle between spouses, the 
battle of wills in the previous scene, are the condition of life, this life now seems a 
brutal prison. Up to this point, the play is tragic rather than cynical. The moment of 
ecstatic closeness between the Student and the Young Lady is not denied, but it gives 
way very fast to the struggle and drudgery involved in living. Life itself defeats love. 
The Student tells the Young Lady “I would slirink from nothing to win your hand,” 
only to say a few moments later “Do you know what I think of you now?”"^®®
The Student seeks either a salvation from or transformation of this life. The latter 
hope is expressed in the Buddha statue. At intervals thioughout scene 3, the Student 
cries out in despair “Cor in aethere”, appealing to a “heart in the heavens.” This need 
for a salvific escape from the world goes along with a conviction that the world is 
false and deceitful. In part, he wants to escape a world of appearance and illusion, 
into a world of the real. In the previous scene, first the Colonel and then Hummel 
were mthlessly stripped. In scene 3, again, life is made up of umeliable appearances. 
The Cook serves up coloured water instead of gravy (she carries a Japanese flask with 
“scoi-pion-letters” on it -  ie. a bottle of soy sauce). This net of deceit is emphasized 
further in the student’s description of Hummel’s funeral, which was “very solenui and 
beautiful.”"^®^ The seiwice is conducted with great dignity by a priest who was
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aiTested the next day for embezzling church funds. The funeral procession was led by 
an old fi'iend of Hummel’s, who it turns out had “loved” Hummel’s son (the 
ambiguity is present in the Swedish), and from whom Hummel had borrowed money 
(implying perhaps that Hummel had extorted it by blackmail). In other words the 
whole solemn beautiful ceremony is humbug. Companionship also, for the most part, 
amounts to nothing. The Student relates how his father had acquired a circle of 
acquaintances, “whom for brevity’s sake he called friends.”"^®^ One day, the father 
held a party, and tired of wearing a polite mask he said exactly what he thought, “and 
in a long speech he stripped the entfre company, one after another, exposing all their 
falseness [...] , and wished them all to go to Hell!”"^®^
This of course resembles scene 2, with Hummel’s stripping of the Colonel. Yet 
cynical as all this seems, these hypocrisies and illusion are absolutely necessary for 
life to continue. The Student himself seems to realize this when he says “I sometimes 
get a violent longing to say everything I think; but I know that the world would 
collapse if people were really honest.”^^  ^ And indeed, according to his account, his 
father ended his days in a madhouse, while Hummel is himself undone by the 
exposure of his secrets. Strindberg shows his skill as a satfrist in his description of the 
ghost-supper, and again in the Student’s description of the father’s speech and 
Hummel’s funeral. Yet he also finds that hypocrisy and self-delusion are essential to 
survival. Thus Hummel’s stripping of the Colonel is an act of terrifying violence.
We can only feel pity as the Colonel, however pompous, is reduced to nothing. And 
the Colonel himself is not imiocent -  he had seduced Hummel’s fiancé. Hummel had 
some reason to feel resentful.
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No wonder the Student expresses such disillusionment at the end of the play: “There 
is something rotten here! And I thought it was paradise, when I first saw you come in 
here.”"^’  ^ The play still has in the background the sort of Platonic, if not in fact 
Gnostic, view of the world that lies behind A Dream Play. The house appears 
beautiful from outside, but within it everything is deceptive, and the lives of the 
inliabitants are blighted, not least by the necessity to harm each other in order to 
survive. As Strindberg said o f^  Dream. Play, the hardest aspect of life is “to do 
others harm, which you are forced to if you want to live.”^^  ^ This shift of attitude is 
the fundamental change between Strindberg’s naturalistic drama and this one. The 
context of the drama here is mythic, and the mood one of regret that life should be this 
way. The drama is not so much interested in the individual characters, but in their 
situation. All are essentially guilty, all are trapped in this house where deception and 
guile are absolutely necessary. We saw earlier that Strindberg’s naturalistic work 
eschewed ethical judgments. The Ghost Sonata is not really ethical either, even 
though it is so concerned with crime and guilt. All the characters are caught in the 
same net. To this extent, the Mummy’s claim to moral superiority over Hummel is 
suspect. She places all the blame for their misdeeds on him, and she takes her 
revenge. No wonder, either, that the Student at the end invokes Jesus as liberator;
Jesus Christ went down into hell, which was his wandering on the Earth, into 
this madhouse, this prison-house, this mortuary the Earth; and the madmen 
killed him when he tried to free them, but the bandit they let go 
Salvation, if it is to be found anywhere, lies in fi-eeing oneself from a fallen world. 
Thus the Mummy can claim to be better than Hummel, only to the extent that she
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recognizes and regrets her own shortcommgs. To this extent, she is, as she puts it, 
better than she is. As the Young Lady dies, the Student tells her “The liberator is
4M
I
coming! may you be greeted by a sun that doesn’t burn, in a house without dirt,
'
by friends without shame, by a love without
It is towards the end of this thfrd scene that the play becomes ritualistic, but this 
ritualism becomes apparent as all the Student’ s illusions have vanished:
And I thought this was paradise the first time I saw you enter here [...] I saw a 
Colonel who was no Colonel, I had a noble benefactor who was a bandit and 
had to hang himself.
■Och jag trodde det var paradiset, nar jag sag er intrâda bar forsta gângen [...] 
jag sag en overste som icke var nagon overste, jag hade en adel valgorare som 
var en bandit och fick hanga sig."^ ^^
The Student has reverted here to addressing the Young Lady by the formal er rather 
than the informal dig. The formal register signals the shift that gi*adually takes place 
from this moment into a ritualistic mode. The repetitions and parallelisms of the 
following lines take on a quasi liturgical formality. It is in this formal register that he 
notes the failure of sight (and by extension of his senses) -  that what he perceived as a 
paradise, and everything in it, was in fact fr audulent. The liturgical formality 
becomes explicit when the Student exclaims “Sursum Corda”'*’^  (“Lift up your Ihearts!”), the opening of the Mass. He begs the Young Lady
Forsok en gang till att sla eld och purpur ur den gylhie harpan ... forsok, jag 
her, jag befaller pa mina knân ...
Ibid.
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Try once more to strike fire and purple from your golden harp ... try I beg 
you, I command you on my knees..
The formality of the language is evident here even in English, and while a whole play 
consisting of such lines would quickly become very tedious, here it endows the 
Student with a dignity that he also revealed in scene 1, as we have seen. By uttering 
the “sursum corda” he has taken on the role of a priest, a role reflected in the formal 
dignity of his language. As a priest, he attempts to mediate between two worlds, yet 
he finds he cannot. Taking up the harp himself, he finds it will not make a sound. To 
his despair he finds that love is poisoned, as is the world:
To think that the most beautiful flowers are so poisonous, are the most 
poisonous, the curse rests on the whole of creation and life.'* '^
The flowers, we have seen, stand for worldly existence, as they stand for love and for 
sex. A flower quickly withers after blossoming, its form giving way to formlessness. 
They stand, then, for a life which is transitory, and for a beauty that blinds and 
sickens. But the Student also finds himself waking up here. He begins to distance 
himself fr om his perceptions, declaring
there are poisons that deaden your vision, and poisons that open the eyes - 1 
must have been bom with the second kind, because I cannot see the ugly as 
beautiful or call what is evil good, 1 camiot!'”^
The Student goes on to describe, in the lines quoted earlier, Clirist’s incarnation as a 
descent into a madhouse. Here, again, the Student’s speech takes on a quasi-liturgical 
formality in the rhythmic repetitions of his speech: Jesus’ descent into the world was a 
descent into hell, into
417
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dârhuset, tukthuset, bârhuset jorden'*^*’
Rendering this into literal English it becomes awkward: the madhouse, the prison- 
house, the mortuary-house the earth.” The repetition of “huset” emphasizes the 
rhythmic formality of the lines, giving it the quality of an incantation.
The Student, we have seen, has become aware of the deceptive nature of his own 
senses. This suggests that The Ghost Sonata is, like A Dream Play, beginning to 
function as Platonic theatre.'*^’ The lines analyzed above cease to register only as 
dialogue. They become a meta-theatrical element, emphasizing the artificiality of the 
fiction portrayed on stage, and by analogy the fictive nature of perception. The 
painting that hung beside the stage of the Intimate Theatre would have reinforced this 
meta-theatrical element. The actor playing the Student, if this aspect were to be 
emphasized in performance, would then take on a role exceeding that of playing a 
character -  he would take, for the duration of this final passage, the role of a kind of 
priest.
Returning to the analogy with No, the purpose of the performance, as of the acting, is 
the transformation of ugliness into beauty. As Tsuchiya puts it, “the actor’s task is to 
become a flower -  that is, to place himself at the meeting point between the two 
worlds, to embody a lingering passion, transform it into a flower, then to dissolve it 
into darkness, which completes the tragic but purifying t r a n s i t i o n . T h e  ending of 
The Ghost Sonata moves into this linking of two worlds, as the haip’s strings begin to 
sound and the stage fills with white light. The Student sings the “Song of the Sun,”
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which intimates a vision of an invisible world. Finally, he pronounces a blessing on 
the Young Lady as she dies:
You poor little child, child of this world of illusions, guilt, suffering and death;
Again, a literal translation into English sounds awkward, but in Swedish it has a 
melancholy dignity emphasized by the repetition of sounds (“villomas, skuldens, 
iidandets varld”) and the slow rhythm of the words. This blessing recapitulates the
this world of eternal change, disappointment and pain! May the Lord of 
Heaven have mercy on you on your journey...
I
Du stackars lilla barn, barn av denna villomas, skuldens, Iidandets och dodens 
varld; den eviga vaxlingens, missrakningarnes och smartans varld; Himmelens 
Herre vare dig nâdig pa farden..."*^ ^
.Student’s earlier perception of the world as false, but here the disillusionment and 
pain has been transformed into elegiac beauty: it has become a flower.
Like No, then, the play straddles two worlds and ends in a transformation; from life to 
death, and from disillusionment to tragic calm. But whereas No issues in a 
reconciliation with mortality, with the inevitable dissolution of all forms into 
formlessness, The Ghost Sonata ends in an apocalyptic hope. The Student addresses 
the Young Lady (here he switches again to the intimate du form):
[...] sleep without dreams, and when you awaken ... may you be greeted by a 
sun that does not burn, in a home without dfrt, by friends without shame, by a 
love without flaw.'*^ '*
He then addresses the Buddha;
-V-------------------------------------------
Strindberg, Slanfter, vol. 12, p. 344 
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You wise, mild Buddha, you that sit there and wait for a heaven to grow up 
out of the earth, lend us patience in the trial, purity of will, that hope may not 
come to shame/^^
This hope is represented, symbolically, by the star-shaped flower growing from the 
bulb in the Buddha statue’s lap. It is a hope that the poisonous sweetness of the 
flowers decking the hyacinth room will be transformed. This vision is easier to read 
than the one that concludes A Dream Play, yet here again Altizer becomes helpful.
For if he does nothing else, he makes clear that in the apocalyptic moment, everything 
that we know as the world, as everything we know as God, dies. Only in this utterly 
dark apocalyptic moment, the apocalyptic moment of the death of God, is God born.
It is in this darkness that a new world is also bom. If nothing else, A Ghost Sonata 
enacts the death of illusions, a literal disillusionment, and this moment of utter 
disillusionment is celebrated as holy.
I have suggested an analogy between A Ghost Sonata and No drama as a way of 
bringing to light the ritualistic elements present with particular force at the end of act 
3. These elements include the language, which moves from colloquial to fomial, 
rhythmic and repetitive. They also include the use of music and light; the whispering 
of the harp strings, the recital of the Song of the Sun and the stage filling with white 
light. All these elements disrupt the surface of the theatrical illusion, moving theatre 
away from the realistic and towards the liturgical -  but a liturgy, it must be stressed, 
outside the church as it is outside confessions and creeds. While A Ghost Sonata 
opens the possibility of a move towards a sacred theatre, and theatre as sacred space, 
it certainly does not explore this systematically or in any way exliaust it. Indeed,
425 Ibid.
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Strindberg was perhaps only marginally aware of the possibility he was opening up 
here. But if we take this ‘liturgical’ potential seriously, it also makes tremendous 
demands on any actor performing in it. No theatre requires absolute dedication from 
its practitioners. The vocation of the No actor is “to continue transfonning his 
ugliness thi oughout his life ... His task on the stage is to transform passion to beauty, 
and, in order for this to occur, he must face his own ugliness and transform it into the 
‘ f l o w e r . T h i s  type of flower “is the result of rigorous, lifelong t r a i n i n g . T h e  
Polish dfrector Grotowski, when he was still working in the theatre, also discovered 
that the kind of drama he sought similarly demanded an almost monastic discipline. 
Thus he made demands on the private lives of his actors, even while away from the 
theatre. Debauchery, or even shortage of sleep, mterferes with the particular intensity 
of concentration that Grotowski was seeking.'*^  ^ Furthermore, he demanded that his 
actors show an attentive respect for their work, a respect that borders on 
“solemnity.”'*^^
The fact that this should take place in the secular theatre, not m a sacred site, is itself 
important. The play draws eclectically on images and ideas from both Christianity 
and Buddhism, but it takes place outside the confines of any particular tradition. If 
there is a ritual, let alone liturgical, dimension to the play, yet it seeks communion 
outside the church. It also contains an inlierent tension. The ending contains, like the 
whole play, an absence. The play is full of deceptive appearances, surfaces that lack 
substance. So the ending too indicates an absence, and this in part gives it its elegiac 
tone. This world is the world of “illusions, guilt, suffering and death.” It is eternally
Tsuchiya, “No: the Ait of Ritual and Vocational Performance,” p. 102 
Ibid.
Jerzy Grotowksi, Towards a Poor Theatre, p. 217 
Ibid., p. 215
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changing. The Student appeals to “[y]ou wise, mild Buddha, sitting there and waiting 
for a heaven to grow out of the Earth. Death itself is invisible: both Hummel and 
the Young Lady die out of sight, behind the Japanese death screen. There is here a 
longing for a world that is stable, permanent, and real, a world without suffering, but 
by the same token that world has not come.
Pelikanen (The Pelican)
More than any other Chamber Play, the dramatic technique of The Pelican resembles 
Strindberg’s naturalistic diama. The play takes place enthely in one room. Its events 
happen over the course of an evening. The dramatis personae, particularly the Mother 
and the Son-in-law are closer to tliree-dimensional characters than flattened ‘roles’. 
The characters fit the naturalistic mould to the extent that they can be seen as the 
products of heredity and envhomnent. In short, the play adheres to the unities of time 
and place, and obeys the causal nanative logic that is sometimes shaky and sometimes 
completely abjured in other post-Inferno plays. It shares with the other Chamber 
Plays, however, an investigation of guilt and like them engages most deeply not with 
the motivation of individual characters but the situation they all find themselves in. 
Like the other Chamber Plays, it uses the motif of a house, in which the characters are 
imprisoned and condemned to live their lives.
A Return to Naturalism?
Wliile a play like Miss Julie is in a sense quite programmatic (ostensibly 
demonstrating a set o f ‘scientific’ ideas), and the Chamber Plays are as it were 
empirical, there is a resemblance, particularly in The Pelican, to the stage teclinique
Sti'indberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 344
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Strindberg developed in the 1890s. The Pelican is a compact piece of drama. It 
opens without preamble or explanation and flings the audience into the play, the 
background gradually becoming clear in the course of the action. The setting is 
realistic. Indeed, like Miss Julie, The Pelican takes place enthely in one room, in this 
case a drawing room rather than a kitchen. The Pelican also pivots around human 
conflicts in a way that To Damascus, for example, does not. Essentially, it depicts the 
conflict between a widow and her children. Strindberg puts these techniques to very 
different use, however, in this play. Essential to the naturalistic project (and at least in 
Strindberg’s case it was a project, as the preface to Miss Julie makes clear) was the 
aim of making literature scientific. Strindberg attempts to establish his naturalistic 
credentials m the preface to Miss Julie by stating that he took his plot from a real 
incident, and produces a theoiy of character motivation that was in part a riposte to 
criticism from Zola. Thus his ‘colourless’ characters cannot simply be categorised by 
one dominant trait. They are not fixed and thefr motivations are complex and 
multiple, and often half-unconscious. Some of these are connected with upbringing, 
some with heredity. Thus Julie is weakened by her aristocratic sense of honour and 
her conscience, while Jean’s lack of conscience makes him stronger. In fact, 
Strindberg describes him as the founder of a new species, “someone m whom the 
process of differentiation may be observed.”'*^ ’ Along with these pretensions to 
scientific rigour went a change in the relationship of the audience to the stage, as we 
have seen.'*^  ^ The audience of the future, Strindberg suggests, will observe the action 
with analytical detachment, obtaining a purely intellectual pleasure. To this end, the 
ideal theatrical space should consist of a small stage and a small auditorium, with the 
audience plunged into total darkness. This in fact closely resembles the conditions
Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, p. 61 
See above, pp. 70-1
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A ‘Battle of the Brains
of the brams’ as he called it, influenced The Ghost Sonata.^^^ In this battle, the 
stronger will controls the weaker by suggestion, and in the course of the fight “souls 
... get ‘ideas’, or suggestions as they are called, from one another, from the milieu ... 
and from objects.”'*^'* In Miss Julie physical objects -  Jean’s razor, her absent father’s 
boots and the servant bell - become the medium for thought-transference and 
suggestion. There are suggestions of a similar influence exercised by the possessions
See above, pp. 160-1
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Irealised twenty years later in the Intimate Theatre. Turning back to The Pelican, the 
characters are in a quite simplistic sense a product of environment and upbringing. 
The son is always hungry; however much he eats he is never full. This has come 
about because he was bottle-fed as a baby, and later suffered neglect from his 
parsimonious mother, who would only buy the cheapest and worst food available. He 
has grown up in a freezing house, and he is always cold. The physical coldness, 
constantly refeiTed to, also signifies the Mother’s emotional coldness. She did not 
breastfeed her children, nor did she nourish them, and so the son is frail and stammers 
and the daughter, despite her twenty years, is not full-grown. This is not worked out
:;ï
i:
with anything like the same detail as the depiction of character in Miss Julie, yet the 
very fact that we can investigate these sorts of questions about the make-up and
motivation of the characters signals a change fromrt Dream Play, and even from the 
other Chamber Plays. However, despite the return to a much greater level of realism, 
this drama, rather than demonstrating a “scientific” thesis, explores guilt, sin and evil. 
It is in a broad sense a metaphysical drama, and the background to it is again mythic.
We have already seen how Strindberg’s earlier theories on a battle of wills, or ‘battle
III■ 7:i
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Strindberg, Miss Julie and Other Plays, p. 60
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haunted. The Mother hears footsteps outside the room more than once. She seems to 
think the letter is the product of a ghostly hand, commenting “To think, he’s got up 
and he’s talking from the grave -  he isn’t dead!”'*^  ^ The father’s letter to his son
Î1:,
%
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of the Mother’s recently-deceased husband in The Pelican. Ffrst of all she cannot 
bear the sight of the uncovered sofa on which her husband died. Then she hears 
footsteps outside the room when no-one is there. The Mother reacts with unease,
.entering while a storm is blowing to find the rocking-chair moving. She shows signs 
of an uneasy conscience. There seems to be more to it than that, however. With the 
Son-in-Law, Axel, with whom she seems suspiciously close, she discovers a hidden 
letter from her dead husband to her son, accusing her of murder:
The Mother: Just think, he writes to his son that he died murdered.
The Son in Law: There are many ways to commit murder ... and your way 
had the advantage of not being punishable under the law.'*^ ^
In Strindberg, this means the kind of murder by suggestion in Miss Julie and, 
especially here. The Father. The attempt to suppress the letter then becomes a 
struggle to retain power over the household, a power that the son-in-law is already 
challenging. He tlueatens to drive her out or make her thefr maid. To retain her 
influence, she tears up the letter and puts the pieces into the tiled stove'*^ ,^ intending to 
burn them. When the son finds the pieces, he uses them to open his sister, Gerda’s, 
eyes and turns her against thefr mother.
The most peculiar aspect of this is that the stmggle should take place between the 
mother and the leftovers of her dead husband. The play implies that the house is
'ïi.
____________________________
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 352
Tlie old-fashioned way of heating homes in Sweden. A ‘stove’ covered in white tiles, with metal 
doors, in which birchwood was burned.
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 352 -i
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reinforces this impression, stating as it does that the father “died murdered”, as if he 
had somehow written it after dying. Of course this is capable of interpretation. It 
may be the ‘half-reality’ of The Ghost Sonata, but it is also capable of a naturalistic 
interpretation -  that the Mother’s conscience torments her. Her hearing of steps, her 
dislike of the uncovered sofa, her complaint about the smell of spmce twigs (a 
traditional funerary decoration in Sweden), her horror at the sight of the moving 
rocking-chafr attest to her sense of guilt. The Son seems deliberately to play on this 
when, hearing his mother approach, he gets up ft'om the rocking chair, which 
continues to rock until she enters. It produces an effect of horror on the Mother.
The point at which this battle of the brains comes together with the dream plays is in 
the characters’ own sense that they are sleepwalking tlirough life. Their will, for the 
most part, does not seem to be thefr own, though at points of particular pain they may 
briefly ‘wake up’. Thus when the son reads the terrible contents of his father’s letter 
he says “Now I am waking Ifom my s l e e p . T h i s  is vital to the play’s examination 
of sin and evil, which we will turn to in a moment.
The Pelican as Mythic Drama
The action of the play centers on a murdered father, who is never seen. The house is, 
or may be, haunted. The murdered man’s son receives a possibly supernatural 
message fr om his father revealing that he has been murdered, and the son swears 
revenge. This begins to resemble Hamlet, especially when the Mother asks Gerda 
“your Uncle Viktor has proposed to me; what would you say, if 1 married again?”'*^^
In fact the only purpose of this line seems to be to point up the resemblance. Uncle
Ibid., p. 360
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Viktor plays no other part in the play, and is mentioned only here. The Mother’s 
closest relationship is with her son-in-law, though even this turns sour. Why does 
Strindberg lay such stress on this resemblance? I believe it is in part the confrontation 
with responsibility and death that takes place in Hamlet. The dilemma Hamlet 
confronts in his “To be or not to be” soliloquy also confronts the characters in this 
play; whether to take their own lives to escape the world of troubles they inhabit. 
Strindberg found in Hamlet an echo of his own views on character, commenting 
“simple minds always talk about contradictions and inconsistencies, but everything 
that lives is compounded of elements that are not homogenous but have to be 
opposites in order to cohere ... Thus Hamlet himself is composed only of apparent 
contradictions: he is evil and good, hates and loves; he is cynical and dreamy, spiteful 
and indulgent, strong and weak, in one word: a human being, different every moment, 
as human beings are.”'*'**’
The Mother is monstrous. She is one of Strindberg’s vampires. In case we have not 
already picked this up by reference to her starving her children and draining 
everyone’s vitality by her peimy-pinching, the letter from her dead husband tells her 
son that “[s]he stole from the housekeeping, she made up bills, she bought the worst 
for the highest price, she ate in the kitchen in the morning and gave us the diluted, 
warmed-up remains [...] When our father discovered this, he warned her and she 
promised to improve, but she continued and made inventions using soya and cayemie 
pepper.”'*'** In other words, she behaves like the cook in The Ghost Sonata, who also 
dilutes and adulterates the food she has sucked the goodness out of, disguising the fact 
with soy sauce and paprika. And yet, we have seen, her conscience troubles her.
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 64, p. 68 
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 355
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More importantly, she cannot really be held responsible for her actions. We have 
already seen the effect of the children’s upbringing, making both the Son and Gerda 
frail and underdeveloped. But the Mother herself is the product of a cruel upbringing. 
As she protests to her daughter, “Do you know anything about my childhood? Do 
you have any idea what a bad home I had, what evil I had to learn there? It seems to 
descend tlirough the generation fr om above, but from whom? From the first parents, 
according to the children’s books, and it seems to fit...”'*'*^ In other words, they are 
all bom into this situation and inlierit the malice of thefr forebears, and therefore they 
camiot be held ultimately responsible. This is all the more so as the characters, as we 
have seen, for the most part find they have sleepwalked through thefr lives. The 
Mother’s children themselves acknowledge this.
Now this comes back to something the Mother says at the begimiing of the play. The 
servant, Margret, asks the Mother why she does not move. She replies “The landlord 
won’t allow us to leave, and we can’t move ourselves .. They find themselves 
trapped in the house. Indeed, the one room we see is cramped and closed-in, the 
consequent claustrophobia emphasized by the mother’s fust three lines, when she 
repeatedly commands “Shut the door!”'*'*'* This suggests a symbolic conelation 
between the apartment and the world. The symbol evokes again the neo-Platonic 
myth of the spirit’s descent into the world, and more harshly Strindberg’s own 
favourite trope of the world as a prison. One scholar suggests we read The Pelican as 
a companion piece to The Storm, written six months earlier, which reads in some
442 Ibid., p. 361 
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alternative is the sleep of death. For the characters in The Pelican, death means
Hans-Goran Ekman, Villomas Varld: Studier I  Strindbergs Kammarspel (Uppsala; Gidlimds Forlag,
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ways as a bleak re-assessment of the earlier work.'*'*^  He thus points out that the 
protagonist of The Storm is not in the same way trapped within his apartment- 
building; indeed, as the play ends he declares he will soon leave it. The Pelican, then, 
is bleaker, as the tenants cannot leave. We saw that The Storm ultimately asserts the 
operation of a guiding Providence on the world. Such an assertion is, if implicitly 
then also unavoidably, inseparable from a justification of the goodness of both the 
world and the creator-God. The theistic implications of The Pelican are then much 
more troubling. This play is not atheist -  the world does not suffer from God’s 
absence or inexistence. Rather, the characters find that God has shut them in, 
imprisoned them within the world. The landlord will not let them leave the house and 
they lack the power of willing their own movement. Here in a terrifying coincidentia 
oppositorum God has become a demon. It recalls the Gnostic Efterspel to the verse 
edition o ï Master Oloff"^^ This imprisonment, and the sleepwalking of the characters 
through life, is the situation they are born into. Thus the Son tells the Mother “you 
went as if you were sleeping and couldn’t be woken, so you couldn’t change.”'*'*^ The
Mother ‘wakes up’ towards the end and finds her situation horrible.
This, again, resembles Hamlet, at least as Strindberg interpreted him. He says of 
Hamlet, “he is humanity, when it steps fr om childhood into life and finds everything
quite different from what it had imagined. Hamlet is the alert youth, who discovers
that the world is out of joint and feels himself called to put it right, and he despairs 
when he puts his shoulders to the rock and finds it is stuck fast.”*'*^  For Hamlet, the
1997), p. 219 
See above, p. 89
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waking up from the sleep of life. Escape fr om the house means death, and the Mother 
attempts to escape by suicide when she prepares to jump tlirough the window.
The play ends, like A Dream Play, in conflagration. The Son sets light to the house, 
and standing with his sister desperate for escape she pronounces “No! Everything 
must bum, othemise we will never get out of here As they gradually succumb to
the smoke, the brother and sister dream of summer in the countryside, in what appears 
to be a memory fr om thefr childhood.
This is the bleakest of the Chamber Plays, and also the most completely apocalyptic. 
The Burnt House makes a gloomy assessment of human life, but remains open to the 
possibility of transcendence. The Ghost Sonata, while apparently endorsing the 
naturalistic world-view of Miss Julie and The Father, also retains a hope that the 
world can become transformed. Of all these plays. The Pelican remains most 
resolutely bound within worldly existence. It ends without hope. The only liberation 
available to its characters is death.
CONCLUSION
In all the Chamber Plays, the characters are trapped within or bound to a house. The 
characters are also bound, rather unwillingly, to each other. In all cases the house 
suggests worldly existence. The Storm ends on an optimistic note, as it seems that the 
Gentleman’s difficulties, and those of everyone else, can be confronted and dealt with 
-  indeed, a beneficent Providence seems to be at work. The remaining Chamber 
Plays are bleaker. Here salvation, if it exists, seems immeasurably distant. The
Strindberg, Skrifter, vol. 12, p. 361
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characters remain in a condition of bondage, and although some characters become 
aware of thefr situation, they can do nothing about it. The Burnt House and The Ghost 
Sonata do, however, hold out the possibility of transcendence. Indeed the latter ends 
on an aesthetic transformation of the fundamental ugliness of the house, but a 
transformation that is also a dissolution. If they open onto any kind of transcendence, 
it is one devoid of content. That is to say, they do not find a transcendent God, but 
they hint at a transcendent void.
As we have seen, the characters in the chamber plays exist in a state of suspension 
comparable to that of the Unknown in To Damascus. In general, they display a 
tension between meaningfulness and meaninglessness. It is thanks to the latter pole, 
meaninglessness, and the consequent sense of disorientation that these plays represent 
a sort of ur-absurdist drama. A comparison to Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is 
revealing. In both cases, the senses are untrustworthy. Thus the apparent cahn 
surrounding the apartment house in The Storm is fraudulent, the Stranger in The Burnt 
House discovers the double walls of his parents’ house, and the Student in The Ghost 
Sonata finds that the apparent paradise of the Young Lady’s apartment is in fact 
hellish. There is then a failure of the senses to identify or perceive coiTectly the world 
they open onto. In Beckett’s Godot, similarly, perception continually fails. Thus, 
attempting to find the tree by which they were to meet Godot, Beckett’s outcasts find 
themselves lost:
Vladimir. He said by the tree. {They look at the tree.) Do you see any others?
[]
Estragon: Looks more like a bush.
Vladimir: A shrub.
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Estragon: A bush.
Vladimir: A-. Wliat are you insinuating? That we’ve come to the 
wrong place?'*^ *’
Misperception in Godot goes hand in hand with miscommunication. Thus Estragon 
asks if it was that evening they were to meet Godot;
Vladimir: He said Saturday. (Pause.) I think.
Estragon: You think.
Vladimir: I must have made a note of it.
He fumbles in his pockets, bursting with miscellaneous rubbish.
Estragon: (veiy insidious) But what Saturday? And is it Saturday? Is it not 
rather Sunday? (Pause.) Or Monday? (Pause.) Or Friday?'*^* 
Communication and perception have been overwhelmed by doubt. In Godot there is 
no way to be sure of anything. Misunderstanding also mars communication in The 
Chamber Plays, although this theme is less developed in Strindberg. Thus, most 
obviously, Hummel in The Ghost Sonata demands silence, because words only serve 
to deceive others. As Ekman points out, the dialogue in the three latter Chamber 
Plays often becomes a source of deliberate deception -  or alternatively a source of 
truths too painful to acknowledge, as when the Mother in The Pelican replies to 
Margret’s complaints “I can’t understand a word you’re saying.”'*^^
Samuel Beckett, Waiting fo r  Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts (London; Faber and Faber, 1978) 
p. 14
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Language hides as much as it reveals and appearances lie. Words no longer remain 
fixed to thefr referents. Speech and perception have become problematic. The 
liturgical language of God as presence has also, therefore, become hollowed out.
All the plays discussed here contain an uncomfortable awareness of the void. The 
Storm closes off this awareness, finally, by asserting a direction and order to the 
world. The other plays are not so sanguine. The world as represented there is a world 
of illusion and deceit, distant (perhaps um eachably distant) from salvation. Thus the 
cmcifix could be exchanged for a straight)acket. But these are still not atheistic. 
Rather, the awareness of emptiness is itself a religious moment.
To the side of the stage at the Intimate Theatre hiuig a reproduction of Bocklin’s Isle 
of the Dead, the same image that ends The Ghost Sonata. Thus Strindberg declared, 
in the theatre’s physical trappings, that this was to be a theatre of mortality and the 
passage fr om life to death. This opens the possibility of a sacred theatre.'*^  ^ This 
possibility dominates the thinking of many subsequent theatrical practitioners. The 
awareness of the void also animates some of the best twentieth century drama from 
Pfrandello to Pinter. Why should theatre become a vehicle for this? Why should 
religious performance not have remained within the church? Perhaps theatre is more 
comfortable with the language of absence, more readily accessible by Strindberg’s 
day than the language of presence. In the conclusion, I explore some of these 
possibilities.
In fact, this could be regarded as tlieatre recaptui'ing its routes. Western tlieatre has always had a 
relationship to the sacred, right back to ancient Greece when tragedies were performed as part of sacred 
festivals.
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5. The Great Highway
Stora Landsagen (“The Great Highway”) was Strindberg’s final play, written in 1909, 
tliree years before his death. He seems to have written it quite consciously as a 
farewell to the theatre, describing it as his “avsked till livet och sjalvdeklaration” 
(“farewell to life and self-declaration”).'*^ '* As such, it contains attacks on a number of 
enemies and former friends, some of whom would have been well-known to a 
contemporary Swedish audience.'*^  ^ The play as a whole changes quite drastically in 
tone about half-way tlirough. Apart fr om the opening scene, the fust half is a satire 
on humanity along the line of the ship of fools, at times reminiscent of vaudeville. It 
also contains, as noted, veiled attacks against a number of Strindberg’s enemies. It is 
in scene four that the mood changes, and the play becomes a sombre meditation on ' 
mortality. Here I want to focus on those aspects of the play that most directly speak 
to my main theme, the paradoxical nature of the Cliristianity that these plays 
apparently embrace.
Scene one, “in the Alps,” takes place on a nairow mountain path with a signpost in the 
background with one arm pointing upward, the other down. The play’s protagonist, 
the Hunter, enters alone. He speaks in unrhymed verse, as he does for the rest of this 
scene, in a monologue that has heavy symbolic overtones. In his first line he asks 
“Where have I come to, and how far?”'*^  ^ He declares that he wants to continue up the 
path, out of the world:
But this signpost is sticking out its arms.
'*^ * Strindberg, Sarnlade Verk, vol. 62, p. 251. The teiin ’’sjalvdeklaration” implies an audit, a kind of 
tax return for the ahnighty (and the public).
The Crematorium scene contains, for example, a very nasty attack on the recently deceased Gustaf 
af Geijerstam. Ibid., p. 250 
Ibid., p. 105
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As if it was warning me against the upward path!
A danger then, many dangers
On the path, that is steep and nan'ow!*^^
The Hunter has lived in the world, and found its bonds unbearable;
They bound me with thefr friendship,
[...]
Yes, there was waimth down there 
[...]
Music and flowers, candles and glass.
But the warmth increased, and it became stifling - 
He complains that among society he could not maintain his independence. It 
tlireatened his selfhood; indeed he had had to put aside his soul.
The opening monologue suggests a parallel with Ibsen’s verse drama Brand(^^^ Brand 
also begins with its protagonist struggling across a dead, snowy landscape (m his case 
a glacier). The dialogue o f Brand's opening scene emphasises the perilous risk that 
Brand is taking in pursuing his path. Like the Hunter, he wishes to remain 
independent of society, to stand outside the world of humanity by sheer force of will. 
In scene one of The Great Highway the choice to continue upward demands that the 
Hunter sacrifice all his attachments to the world, and that the choice itself involves an 
ultimate risk.
However, there is a further element to the symbolism here. The Hunter longs for a 
Buddliist detachment. He wants to observe the world as if fr om a mountain-top,
Ibid. The Swedish is written in iambs, which I have not attempted to reproduce. 
Ibid., p. 106
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untouched by society and untouched by pain. He expresses this wish in a kind of 
aestheticism. The dust, the smoke, the breath of others had poisoned his blood, but he 
finds in the mountain
Wliite, clean snow 
Of sublimated vapour! Water-diamonds,
You are, lily-flowers by cold turned into stone.'*^ *’
The mountainside is beautiful, but cold and lifeless. The snow resembles diamonds, 
which although beautiful are hard, although clear are sharp-edged; or it resembles 
petrified flowers. The imagery here comiotes beauty and permanence, but also an 
existence that is hard and cold and unyielding. The Hunter himself apparently wishes 
to become like the snow, for he contmues 
Holy silence, draw your silken quilt 
Up over the head of this tired wanderer.'****
The Hunter seems to desire here to become like the snow. He wants to be covered by 
the snow, to become a part of the mountain. He longs here to become as cold and 
hard and beautiful as the mountain itself. He expresses a wish for self-annihilation, 
albeit an aestheticised self-annihilation, which is at the same time a wish to attain an 
unchanging permanence.
The Hunter, then, wishes to escape the world. He seeks to recapture a sense of self
i:
that would be permanent and unchanging. At one point, he sees in the snow and the 
mountainside the possibility of a transmogrification into something as permanent and 
solid as stone -  a peimanence that is, ironically, indistinguishable from death.
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 62., p. 106 
Ibid.
*
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The scene recalls Brand in a hirther sense. We examined, in the introduction, the 
relationship between and Kierkegaard’s “either/or”. In this opening scene, the
Hunter pauses by a signpost pointing in opposite directions. Wliile he makes clear his 
wish to continue upwards, yet his stopping here also implies a reluctance to go farther. 
He faces an either/or choice. He must either contmue upward or return to the valley, 
but stands there undecided. Midway tlrrough the scene, the Hermit enters asking 
Quo vadis, wanderer?
You have come half-way and look behind you.'*^ ^
This “quo vadis” appears to be ironic, as the Hunter does not know where he is going. 
He is trying to face two directions at once.
Finally, the Hunter finds that he cannot remain on the mountain. The Hermit 
convinces the Hunter that the self he lost in the world will not be found on a 
mountainside. A thfrd character, the Wanderer, enters from above, and together he 
and the Hunter descend back into the world. There is here an ironie re-enactment of 
the descent that opens A Dream Play. In that instance, the descent was the 
incarnation of a daughter of the gods, descending quite literally from the heavens.
Here the Hunter, having failed to escape the world of matter, of society, finds himself 
returning to it. This is the first station on the great highway, a title that becomes 
increasingly fronic.
The following two scenes are, as noted, largely satirical. Scene 2 (“By the 
Windmills”) begins with the Wanderer and the Hunter sharing a dialogue m which 
each completes the other’s sentences. Together with the way the Hermit addresses the
Ibid., p. 108
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Hunter as “wanderer” in the previous scene, this suggests that these two are aspects of 
the same man. Indeed, this scene contains reminders of the opening scene from To 
Damascus. The Wanderer is a diainkard, declaring “Because I am always lying on the 
operating table I have to chloroform myself.”'*^  ^ This line could have been spoken by 
the Unknown in his unregenerate state. Furthermore, the Hunter goes on to declare in 
Latin “NoU me tangere!”'*^* (“Don’t touch me!”), recalling To Damascus's Latin­
speaking beggar. This splitting of characters seiwes here an obvious theatrical 
function -  it allows the Hunter someone to talk to, instead of delivering a monologue, 
and gives him another character to play off. It also perhaps implies an alienation from 
himself. The Wanderer, whom the Hunter addresses as “Herr Inlcognito,”'*^  ^drinks 
and jokes and lusts after women. He represents the ‘lower’ aspect of the Hunter, who 
takes an earnest attitude to life. Wliile the Wanderer’s happy cynicism undercuts the 
Hunter, the Hunter at times attains a kind of stature thi'ough his lyrical passages that 
the Wanderer does not. This implies that the protagonist is himself split in two. One 
part of him is an earnest idealist, the other a cynical scoffer.
Wliile the Unknown’s alter egos in To Damascus seiwe to increase the audience’s 
sense of disorienting strangeness (a sense shared by the Unknown himself), the roles 
of the Hunter and the Wanderer are obvious. In the case of To Damascus the 
Unlaiown’s alter egos also seemed intended to serve as warnings. That play suggests 
a trajectory from a sinful existence, tlirough repentance to salvation -  a trajectory that, 
I argue, the play itself also undercuts. We have already seen that the Hunter is 
seeking salvation (thus he asks the Miller E. “does this road lead to the Promised
***' Ibid., p. 116 
Ibid., p. 117 
Ibid,, p. 116
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Land?”)-"^ ’^^  Unlike the Unknown, who starts looking for redemption when he is 
reduced almost to madness, the Hunter is already seeking it. He contains within
statement fi'om The Son o f a Servant, “[h]is new self revolted against his old one, and 
for the rest of his life they fought with each other like an unhappy maiTied couple who 
cannot get a divorce.
Miller E. accuses Miller A. of stealing the west wind. The argument takes on 
theological dimensions. Miller A. ’s argument gives a taste of the satke here:
Miller A.: But my mill was here first, and yours was built on wickedness. As
Ibid. p. 124
Sti'indberg, The Son o f a Sei'vant, p. 154
himself the contradiction between idealism and scepticism. This division recalls the
IIThe divided self of the Hunter/Wanderer bears, also, a relationship to Kierkegaard. 
They descend into the world but wish to remain aloof from it. In the Wanderer’s case, 
he is living in what Kierkegaard calls the aesthetic: he passes tlnough life fixed on 
enjoying himself, and therefore wants to remain detached. The Hunter, on the other 
hand, also wants to remain detached, but his reasons are more serious: he does not 
want to lose his self in the world. He desires his independence as part of a serious 
commitment to attaining spiritual fi eedom.
■
The social satke in scene 2 consists in part of an konic replay of the battle of the 
sexes, and in part plays on the difficulties of the Hunter and the Wanderer in 
remaining uninvolved and aloof fi'om the world. On each side of the stage are two 
windmills, Adam and Eve (named after two actual mills in Stockliolm at that time). 
Miller A. accuses Miller E. of stealing the east wind and damaging his business, while
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it’s going badly for both of us now, it would be better if it went well 
for one!
Miller E. : You mean for you? [ ...] !  have a better grain-filter than you, and 
my Eve mills faster, it turns more easily and it’s got new sails.
Miller A: But my Adam was built before yours, my mill-screw is made of 
boxwood...
The satire achieves an ironic distance, in part by the substitution of two mills as the 
source of contention, in part by the fact that Miller A. and Miller E. are both male. 
There is also a suggestion that this forms a play within the play, the Hunter and the 
Wanderer telling each other
Hunter: The play is about to start! An idyll with windmills,
Wanderer: a pastoral in minor-major; pay attention now!^^^
This is, in effect, a kind of marital squabble. It manages to be both a satke on 
marriage and on possession of worldly goods.
However, the Hunter and the Wanderer find themselves drawn into the argument 
when Miller E. suggests they appeal to these strangers to arbitrate thek dispute. 
Gradually they find themselves the object of a lawsuit kom Miller E. and flee to the 
next village.
The satire continues in the next scene, “In Eselsdorf.” Eselsdorf, the name of the 
village, is German, signifying “the village of asses.” (The village they have just left 
was called Lügenwald, “the forest of liars.”) In part the satke is aimed at 
contemporary political wrangling, and in part at one of Strindberg’s Swedish critics.
Strindberg, Samlade Ver/c, vol. 62, pp. 119-20 
Ibid., p. 119
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It also makes the broader point that the world is run by idiots. The Schoolmaster, 
although amiable, spouts dubious learning while the Smith, the village’s despot, rules 
by intimidation. The Wanderer, tiying to talk his way out of the village without 
getting aiTested, engages in a kind of vaudeville double-act with the Smith. The 
following is typical of their exchanges:
Smith: [...] well, go then! But make sure you come back!
Wanderer: Don’t you understand that if you go then you have to come back 
again...
Smith: But wait a minute: what goes and goes and never comes back? 
Wanderer: That’s a clock, but we’re not clocks, so we’ll come back!
[...]
Smith: [...] That’s logical; I like everything in life to be logical; and I can 
only follow a strict logical argument...
Wanderer: Then you mustn’t follow us, as we are not a logical argument!"^^  ^
The lines are short, fast-paced and full of gags. The humour of the lines comes from 
the literal-mindedness with which they apply logic. There may, then, be another 
satirical target here. In his naturalistic phase Strindberg had embraced science and 
rationality with an irrational fervour. After his Inferno crisis he had stopped believing 
that the rational mind could apprehend reality. Thus the school-scene in A Dream 
Play uses the strict application of logic to make a nonsensical mess."^ *^
In scene 4 (“An Arcade in the City”) the tone becomes darker. The settmg is the city 
Thofeth, a name Strindberg found in the Old Testament. The Hunter has lived here
Ibid., pp. 151-2
Li this scene, the Officer “proves” by analogy that since one times one equals one, two times two 
must equal two. The Schoolmaster replies that although the proof accords entirely with the laws of 
logic, the answer is wrong. Strindberg, Till Damaskiis/EttDwmspel, pp. 158-161
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many years before, and finds himself surrounded by painful memories, as well as a 
nightmarish collection of shopkeepers. About half-way tlnough the scene, the Hunter 
meets the only sympathetic character in Thofeth, the Japanese Man. Like the Hunter 
at this point, he has grown tired of life and asks the Hunter’s help in dying. In the 
play’s most extraordinary passage (remember that this was written in 1909), the 
Japanese Man, who says he comes fi'om Hiroshima, describes how he wishes to die; 
Japanese Man: [...] I will take a sleeping draught so that I seem to be dead -  
you will have me put into a coffin, which will be driven to the 
crematorium...
Hunter: But what if you wake up - ?
Japanese Man: That is just what 1 am counting on! For one moment I want to 
feel the cleansing redeeming power of the fire -  suffer a short time -  
and so experience the bliss of liberation - 
Strindberg clearly knew something of Japanese funerary customs, even if his 
knowledge was faulty. The Japanese Man tells the Hunter (coiTectly) that in Japan 
you take on a new name when you die, and that is the name to appear on your 
gravestone. The Japanese Man wants the name “Harahara to. That is: ‘rustling 
leaves, rustling silk. He also requests an inscription, which he fnst gives in 
Japanese and then translates -  somewhat awkwardly -  as follows:
The diverting flowers -  
why should I be angry?
I also -  like them -
in accord with the will of the gods must perish
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 62, p. 173 
Ibid., p. 174
Ibid. The Japanese Man first speaks this  ^
before translating it for the Hunter. The Samlade Verk contains, also, a more elegant translation into
verse in Japanese -  transliterated into the Latin alphabet -
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The “eternal name” chosen by the Japanese Man signifies that he has become, like a 
leaf in the breeze, a transient part of nature. This is further emphasized in the above 
verse. Just as flowers fall and die, so must he. He can only follow the path of the 
world, and there is nothing to get angry about in this. The beauty of the images 
implies that there is something aesthetic in a graceful acceptance of impermanence. 
As images of nature, they also imply that we are part of the natural order, unable to 
stand outside it or to move beyond it. The Japanese Man’s self-annihilation is, then, 
the destruction of his ego. In the fire, he will find liberation from his sense of 
selfhood. This fire, however, leaves only ashes. The wish of the Japanese Man to 
awaken in the fire then perish reiterates the aesthetic self-anniliilation hinted at in 
scene 1. In his liberating transformation in the flames, he will also have sacrificed 
himself and ceased to exist.
The following two scenes are relatively brief. In scene 5 (“In the Park outside the 
Crematorium”) the Hunter finds an occasion for reflecting on death. This includes an 
attack on the Swedish writer Gustaf af Geijerstam. The import of this scene is the 
finality of death. Observing all the urns in niches, the Hunter asks 
Wliat do I see? A collection of urns 
[...]
A columbarium, a dove-house;
But no dove, no olive branch -
Merely husks, the corn grows somewhere else."^ ^^
modern Swedish, which makes the import clearer: “How can I be bitter if  the flowers fall,/ when I 
myself can only follow the world’s path ...?” p. 275 
Ibid., p. 183
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He sees death as the end, here, seemingly without hope of redemption. The scene 
continues in this sombre vein, as the Hunter and the Japanese Man reflect on the 
vanity of life. The Hunter reveals that he had been a preacher, but his idealism simply 
did not fit the world. Life requir es painful compromises, as both the Japanese Man 
and the Hunter have discovered.
In scene 6, the Hunter revisits his family home, finding to his relief that his own child 
does not recognize him, but considers someone else her father, and is happy. The 
overall effect is mawkish, although it held a personal significance for Strindberg, who 
had suffered terrible pangs of guilt over his bad relations with his children.
The final scene takes place in a dark forest. The Hunter is now utterly alone. The 
Wanderer has long since left him, the Japanese Man is dead, and his family have 
become strangers. The scene consists in large part of the Hunter expressing his 
disillusionment and scepticism. His first interlocutor is the Woman (who may be 
supernatural -  at fust only her voice is heard, and at the end of thek conversation she 
“disappears.” The Hunter calls her “Satan,” and while this may simply be an insult, it 
may mean the Woman is either supernatural, or possibly a hallucination.) The 
Woman asks the Hunter about the various stages of his life. He had at one time been 
an advocate, “but when they tricked me into pitying an unjust person [...] I 
abandoned the cause of the unrighteous.”'^ '^' The Hunter had similarly given up 
preaching, after he found that he could not live what he taught. He also found that 
even his best feelings led him into committing injustices.
476 Ibid., p. 203
Ibid.
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Much of the scene consists of a more or less veiled defence of Strindberg himself. He 
had had a tempestuous life, much of it spent either attacking others or defending 
himself. Thus when the woman accuses the Hunter of lacking compassion for his 
fellow man, the Hunter angrily replies “Did you ever see anyone have compassion for 
me?”'^ ^^  He asserts that he has confessed his faults in public, and that the whole of 
society benefited, largely because hearing of another’s faults made people feel 
themselves to be more virtuous.
Finally the Tempter enters, attempting to lure the Hunter away from the forest with 
the offer of a well-paid job, on condition that he behaves like “a person, an ordinary 
p e r s o n . T h e  Hunter replies that he could not behave in accordance with his ideals 
in society, but under others’ influence believed lies, “counted with false terms, used 
counterfeit currency without knowing it; that’s why I am not who 1 am.”'^ ®^ For this 
reason, he has decided to become a woodsman, standing outside society in an attempt 
to recapture an authentic sense of selfliood.
The plot as a whole evokes a number of motifs: a descent into the material world 
reminiscent of the Neo-Platonic descent into generation in A Dream Play\ life as a 
vale of tears; the world as a ship of fools. The sociologist Max Weber, in his lecture 
“Science as a Vocation,” declares that the progress of European rationality has caused 
the world to become “disenchanted.”'^ ’^ Modernity has thus inlierited a world 
denuded of divine beings and bairen of deeper meaning. According to Weber, we 
face a stark choice: face up to a life in this disenchanted world or, if we are not sti’ong
Ibid., p. 206 
Ibid, p. 207
480 Ibid.
Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in: Lawrence Cahoone, From Modernism to Postmodernism: 
An Anthology {OsAord:. Blackwell, 1996), p. 170 J
203
The absence of depth, the world as a meaningless surface without any centre, is the
the world, though he wishes to maintain his separation and thereby some small piece 
of personal independence.
3enough, retreat into the arms of traditional religion. He regards the latter as an
honourable alternative, although here the Church becomes essentially a home for the 
weak-minded.
nihilism born as Christianity fades. In this sense, the play consists of the Hunter’s 
attempt to overcome nihilism. Does he succeed? The answer, in the end, must be no. 
The Great Highway reverses the trajectoiy of Dante’s Divine Comedy. The latter 
begins with its protagonist lost in the forest of the material world, but after a descent 
into the inferno, he ascends tlirough purgatory and the heavens to reach the
Empyrean. The Great Highway begins half-way up a mountain as the Hunter pauses 
on his ascent out of the world, and ends in a dark forest. He finds himself trapped in
#€- *
The play’s title, then, is deeply ironic. The “great highway” leads nowhere. In the 
final scene, the Hunter finds himself
Alone! -  Lost the way -  
In the dark! -
It is all the more ironic, given the play’s subtitle; Ett vandringsdrama medsju 
stationer (“a wandering-play with seven stations”). Like the Unknown in the latter 
half of 7b Damascus, the Hunter moves tlirough seven stations. Yet the final 
destination is not redemption, but exile.
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 62, p. 201
204
It could be argued that this predicament is peculiarly European and Cliristian. In his 
reading of Kafka’s short story “Metamorphosis,” Kiyoshi Tsuchiya finds a basic
impermanence. This is emphasised by his choice of “eternal name” and the verse he 
wishes to have inscribed on his gravestone, as we have seen. The mutability and
contrast between the Christian response to a “disenchanted world” and that of Chinese 
Buddhism (although Tsuchiya’s viewpoint is perhaps closest to Taoism here). The 
writings of the Taoist sage Chuang Tzu contains, like Kafka, an account of a 
metamorphosis;
Once Chuang Chou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering 
around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn’t know he was 
Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable 
Chuang Chou. But he did not know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt 
he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang Chou.'’^ ^
In contrast Gregor Samsa, the protagonist of Kafka’s tale, awakens in his bedroom to 
find that he has become a beetle. He lies helplessly on his back, waving his useless 
legs in the air. Chuang Tzu’s butterfly remains, like himself, a part of nature and 
change does not trouble him. And while the butterfly flies freely Samsa finds himself 
imprisoned in his room. As Tsuchiya points out, the butterfly is in its place and in 
harmony with the cosmos, while the beetle is out of place, imprisoned and “entfrely 
stripped of his cosmological relevance.”'’^ '’
Strindberg clearly saw that the Taoist/Buddhist acceptance of change was an option. 
By embracing his own transformation by fii'e the Japanese Man accepts
I
; |
IQuoted Kiyoshi Tsuchiya, “Human Existence in Buddhism and Christianity: A Buddhist 
Perspective,” in Perry Schmidt-Leukel (ed.). Buddhism and Christianity in Dialogue: The Gerald 
WeisfeldLectures 2004 (London: SCM Press, 2005), pp. 59-60 
Ibid., p. 62
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this refusal to gi'asp and preserve his ego is represented here as self-annihilation. The 
Hunter’s insistence on trying to find and then hold onto a peimanent unchanging self
485
mortality of worldly things is accepted, as is the corollary of the mutability and 
perishability of his own ego. Strindberg treats this character with great respect. His 
ending is dignified and even, from a certain point of view, beautiful. Nevertheless,
I
makes this option impossible.
'
Tsuchiya characterises the difference between Kafka and Chuang Tzu as the contrast 
between the cosmological and the relational ego: “Since the Tao is ‘a thing’, at the 
event of our union we are no longer a person. In contrast, if the absolute is a person, 
even at our union with the absolute we remain personal and relational.”'’^  ^ In the first 
scene, we saw, the Hunter sees the possibility of a self-transcendence that would also imean an abandonment of ego. He wishes to become like the snow and the rock. But 
in the end he must reject this, because he wishes to preserve his ‘relational ego.’
The Hunter then wanders tlnough the world accompanied by his alter ego. This is not 
the joyful fluttering of a butterfly, but the anguished journey of one who has cast off 
his moorings and finds himself adrift. He says he has “tlnown out my ballast, 
everything that weighed me down.”'’^  ^ Later, having lost the Wanderer, he declares
.
“Man ove r b o a r d ! De s p i t e  his efforts to steer a course, he drifts along at the whim 
of tides and breezes.
face of his own profound disillusionment. The Japanese Man, tiying to console the
.All that is left to the Hunter, in the end, is an assertion of faith by sheer will in the
Ibid., p. 59 
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 62, p. 106 
Ibid., p. 163
The play experiments with ways of dealing with this predicament, but ultimately the 
Hunter can find no way out. He holds onto a faith in an external, personal deity by an 
act of will. By retaining a personal God, he may also preserve his self. But his final 
statement of faith, movmg as it is, moves ultimately as pathos.
488 Ibid., p. 189
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Hunter, tells him his ideals are “a reminder, / A hope, a beacon to sail t o w a r d s . S o  
in the final scene, he tells the Woman “you should believe in God.”'’^  ^ Given his 
situation, this utterance becomes unintentionally ironic. In the play’s closing 
monologue, the Hunter prays:
O Eternal one! I will not release your hand.
Your hard hand, before you bless me!
Bless me [...]
Who suffered most from the pain 
That I could not be who I wanted!'’^ ’’
He utters this monologue lost and alone in a dark forest. The world has trapped him.
3
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Ibid., p. 202
Ibid., pp. 210-11
sounds incoherent, Strindberg could well reply that he is reflecting the incoherence of
207
6. Conclusion.
.This thesis explores the paradoxical religious turn in some of Strindberg’s later plays - 
a religious turn that issued in doubt, ambiguity and pessimism. Thus in his final play, 
The Great Highway, he turns Dante on his head: the Hunter begins the play heading 
out of the world towards an airless Empyi ean, and ends it lost in a forest at night. 
Wliatever faith Strindberg the man embraced, in his plays he again and again 
undercuts himself. While these plays are certainly modernist, in the sense that the 
locus of meaning has become the individual self inhabiting a cosmos denuded of 
significance, we can also discern in them an anticipation of the postmodern rupturing 
of grand narratives. All these plays contain an internal antagonism, as viewpoints are 
tested and found wanting. Thus the pilgrimage reluctantly undergone by the
Unknown in To Damascus ends exactly where the play began. He has not, I argue,
% 'i::.moved forward; rather he has ultimately remained in the same place. This 
undermines the manner in which the play itself tries to force you to read it as moving 
towards a telos. A Dream Play measures the vision of a cosmic harmony against the 
mundane experience of everyday life. Wliile it certainly does not dismiss the former, 
nor does it finally resolve the tension between them. The Chamber Plays all in their 
various ways display an uncomfortable awareness of a void that may be the nihilistic 
negation of all values -  or may be a liberating groundlessness. In all these plays, no
single interpretation of the world is adequate. Nor is any rational synthesis attainable. 
We are left with experiences of the world, confi'ontations with the abyss, and 
sometimes with intimations of a divine groundlessness. If someone objects that this
Î
*,1
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Furthermore, although the locus and measure of any meaning in life has 
shifted to the individual self, the self is continually tlireatening to fall apart. Thus 
some of these plays proliferate with alter egos, tlireatening the unity of the self. This 
internal rupturing of the self caused Strindberg pain, and we saw how, in The Great 
Highway, his protagonist struggles to locate and maintain an enduring, authentic 
selfliood. Rather than a point-like, autonomous self, these plays discover a self that is 
always conditioned and always reactive. No-one is inherently good or inherently evil. 
Character is by and large a product of ckcumstances, the result of being bom into the 
kind of world we inliabit. In this sense Strindberg’s vision endorses original sin. 
However, he also has difficulty seeing the justice in the condemnation of human 
beings for an act they did not themselves commit.
These plays thus anticipates the predicament confronting some of those broadly 
postmodern thinkers who have attempted to construct a non-foundational theology. 
Paul Tillich’s Christian existentialism, while not yet postmodern, finds that theology 
must begin from the individual’s orientation towards an “ultimate concern.” This 
ultimate concern is itself embodied in a language of symbols,'’^  ^ This is theology that 
begins, as it were, fr om below. Don Cupitt, the “bad boy” of Anglican theology, in 
his Taking Leave o f God advances an internalised Christianity. He rejects the realist 
idea of an external, law-making God, instead turning God into an internalised voice, a 
kind of ideal. Wliile he leaves the door just very slightly open towards some kind of 
transcendent God, his view is almost indistinguishable fi'om atheism. Jean-Luc 
Marion uses postmodernism to try to recapture a God anterior to metaphysics. More 
recently, the “Radical Orthodoxy” group that formed around John Milbank has used
491 He made a similar claim about the apparent ‘incoherence’ of the character of Hamlet. See above, p. 
184
See above, pp. 78-9, 80
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postmodern thinking in a profoundly conservative move to circumvent the 
Enlightenment critique of religion and re-establish the legitimacy of an old-fashioned 
ecclesial Cluistianity. This is a small and not necessarily representative sample, but
Strindberg was at his most brilliant as a destructive thinker. In this he resembles his
We will return to this below, but first, having looked at Strindberg in a postmodern 
context, I want to place him in the context of the post-postmodem condition. This is
I
S
a
they share an attempt to circumvent the history of western metaphysics, which has in
general equated God and being and tried to use this as a foundation stone for an all- 
encompassing metaphysical system. It is also notable how many postmodern 
theologians have had recourse to the negative theology of Christian mysticism, 
especially that of Eckliart and Dionysus the Areopogite.
one-time correspondent, Friedrich Niet zsche.However ,  he was also a deeply
paradoxical thinker. His destructive attacks were di'iven by a sincere and anguished 
seeking for transcendence. This lends Strindberg’s religious turn its visionary 
apocalyptic strain. It almost seems that he cannot hope to find transcendence except 
at the end of a total and destructive negation. In this, as in other ways, he resembles 
the founder of the Theatre o f Cruelty, Antonin Artaud (1896-1948). Ai'taud despised 
what he saw as the conmption of western civilization, and sought a renewal of the 
west from mythic and ritual roots -  a renewal, however, that can only come at the cost 
of destmction. Thus he became theatre’s apocalyptic visionary.
Î
■sHarold Borland argues convincingly that while the specifically Nietzschean influence on 
Strindberg’s writings was thin, their temperaments and viewpoints converged around the time of their 
correspondence (which occurred just before Nietzsche went mad). The emotional impact of 
Nietzsche’s thinking was, however, explosive. Indeed, as Borland puts it, Nietzsche’s main effect on 
Strindberg was “providing hhn with dynamite!” Borland, Nietzsche’s Influence on Swedish Literature, 
pp. 45-6
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,in part because, for all that he anticipates certain features of postmodernism, 
Strindberg is not in the end postmodern. He is not postmodern because, for 
Strindberg, the death of God is a profoundly religious moment, both liberating and 
tragic. The death of God also has the potential to become a rebirth -  a rebirth of, in 
David Klemm’s phrase, the God who appears when the God of theism disappears.
In this respect, Strindberg has some resonance with the concerns of the emerging 
Theological Humanism. Broadly speaking. Theological Humanism tries to steer a 
middle course between the postmodern emptying of culture into a surface play of 
signs on the one hand, and a retrenchment into a highly conservative theism on the 
other. As outlined by David Klemm, Theological Humanism entails an engagement 
with Socrates’ basic question; what sort of life should human beings live. In 
Klemm’s words, it confronts “the fundamental challenges ... to the possibility of 
sustainable life on this planet and to a human life worth l i v i ng . Sec ond l y ,  it 
rejects exclusivist claims on behalf of any particular religious tradition. Thirdly, it
recognises an innate human “spfritual capacity to long for and respond to divine
transcendence.”'’’’'^  This capacity finds expression in the world’s religious traditions, 
but not only or even primarily there. Now Strindberg’s religious turn speaks to each
of these themes. The first, a broad ethical and even existential engagement, pervades 
all the plays examined in this thesis. Each of them questions whether there is, or can 
be, any moral ordering in the world. This is at times used as an indictment against a 
Creator that is apparently indifferent to suffering. Wliilst Strindberg’s concern for 
human suffering found expression in his socialism, in his plays he reaches the 
pessimistic conclusion that suffering is inherent in life and fundamentally
#
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irremediable. As he puts in A Blue Book, “it isn’t easy to be a human being. It is 
almost i m p o s s i b l e . I t  is perhaps because of this that, while Strindberg the man 
could be wildly vituperative towards his enemies, especially if they had once been 
friends, Strindberg the playwright rarely judges or condemns anyone. As playwright 
he adopts the position of the dreamer in the foreword to A Dream Play, he neither 
condemns nor acquits, he only relates his narrative. This issues in a compassion for 
all, including even the vampiric Hummel in Ghost Sonata and the Dean of Theology 
in A Dream Play.
The second theme, above, the rejection of exclusivist claims also finds a response in 
Strindberg. Strindberg’s eclecticism would, in any case, have disinclined him from 
making exclusive religious claims for any sect or tradition, but this rejection goes 
deeper. For Strindberg, religion is important because it responds to the existential 
conditions of being human. Chi'istianity as a doctrinal system held little interest for 
him. For Strindberg, religion does not begin with the presumption of an ontological 
God, which could then be treated as a prepositional truth that founds a system of 
ideas. Rather, religion begins with the experience of being human. So, while religion 
became for Strindberg a necessity, theology was for him impossible. I explore this 
further below.
Flowever it is the third theme, the longing for and response to divine transcendence 
that I want to focus on here above all. Theological Humanism has tried to retrieve the 
language of transcendence, a kind of language that postmodernism has brought into
497 Sti'indberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 65, p. 56
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disrepute. With it has returned a concern for “depth of meaning.”'”’^  What is 
interesting here is the way this language is used. Klemm, in particular, shies away 
from positive statement. He has taken account of postmodernism to the extent that he 
does not use the language of transcendence as a transcendental signifier whose role is 
“to center and regulate systematically the processes of interpretation, the unveilings of 
t r u t h . R a t h e r ,  he approaches transcendence by way of negations.
Indeed, the kind of God-language emerging in Klemm bears at least a family 
resemblance to apophatic discourse. As used by, for instance, Michael Sells this 
refers not to a particular tradition but to a mode of discourse that emerges in, it seems, 
virtually all religious traditions at certain points. This is language that confronts the 
dilemma of transcendence -  that the transcendent cannot be named -  by turning back 
on itself and undoing its own statements.^’’’’ For Sells, the fundamental apophatic 
gesture is exemplified in a passage from Plotinus’ Ennead 6.4.7. Plotinus asks us to 
imagine a glowing mass in the centre of a hollow sphere, so that light is present over 
every part of the sphere.
If someone should take out the corporeal mass, but preserve the power of the 
light, would you then speak of where the light was? ... No longer can you say 
where it was first located, and no longer can you say whence and how it 
came.^”’
As Sells puts it, the hand of the author reaches back into the image to remove a 
delimiting element. It “reach[es] into the notion of contemplating something, and
Klenun, “Theology of Culture as Theological Humanism,” p. 240
Vincent B. Leitch, Deconstnwtive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 
1983), p. 32
Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages ofUnsa}>ing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
pp. 2-10
Quoted in ibid., p. 18
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withdraw[s] the ‘some-thing.’” ”^^  Such linguistic moves undo reference to a realist
Apophasis involves then a dis-ontology -  an undoing of the language of substance
502 Ibid.
God. We must either remain silent, or live within the paradoxical tension of an 
apophatic unsaying. The appeal of an apophatic form of discourse in an age when 
positive statements about God have come to seem suspect is obvious. In a 
disenchanted, post-metaphysical world, unsaying seems to offer the only remaining 
path towards transcendence. But this is a transcendent emptied of content. It offers 
little scope for a transcendent personal God with whom we can have a relationship.
s
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and being. As noted, it has become a resource for a number of broadly non- 
.foundational theologies precisely because of this. Strindberg, I have argued.
' " ' ■ y
confronts his audience with the dilemmas that have made a non-foundational theology 
seem necessary, a situation that has made apophasis attractive to many recent 
religious thinkers. Indeed, Strindberg seems in his plays uncomfortably aware of the 
potential for a theological unsaying. It causes discomfort because it leaves no room 
for the kind of personal God Strindberg craved. It therefore tln eatens to open an 
abyss, and the prospect this opens may turn out to be indistinguishable from atheism.
A
But apophasis is, as Sells emphasises, performative. The tension between saying and 
unsaying is inlierently dramatic. As a dramatist, Strindberg does not end by leading 
his audience to a mono logical conclusion. At his best, he places his audience within 
contradictions -  and the audience finds that it has to live within these contradictions. 
Might Strindberg, potentially, open onto the possibility of a theatrical unsaying? I
return to this in my broader consideration of theatre below.
*
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But first I ought to say explicitly here, because it is implicit in what follows, that 
postmodern thinking implies an antliropology no less than theological thinking. That 
is to say, postmodernism implies a view of what a human being is and above all of 
what a human mind is: constituted in language and constrained by the net of signifiers 
which it can never escape. In what follows, I take issue with this.
.:P',
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The agonised tension within Strindberg’s later work is summed up by Strindberg 
himself in a passage from Inferno, in which he addresses the Powers that seemed 
alternately to guide and to chastise him, although he could never be sure of their
beneficence : -S'
In my youth I was a fr ee-thinker. Of the fi*ee-thinker you made an atheist, of
the atheist a monk. Inspired by the humanitarians, I extolled socialism. Five
■years later you showed me the absurdity of socialism. You have cut the 
ground from under all my enthusiasms, and suppose that I now dedicate 
myself to religion, I know for a certainty that before ten years have passed you 
will prove to me that religion is false.
This passage is a tightly-wound self-contradiction, declaring to the Powers in whom 
he believes in a quite literal way that he camiot become a believer -  he could not 
sustain his belief because they would undermine it. This reluctance to commit 
himself arises in part from fear that if he submits to a system it will trap him. Wlien 
he reverted to Clmistianity (for despite the passage above he did, in the end, count 
himself a Cliristian), he did so because he found it “the only possible form of spfritual
-'7:3
I
'3/3
■■
215
put forward a coherent view of the world, and this is an advantage. He poses 
questions and leaves us with dilemmas. He does not offer certainty. To this extent,
507
life fo r  me. In my great need I took what lay to hand.. Strindberg looked to 
Cliristianity to meet his acute psychological and religious crises. Indeed, in Inferno 
he describes Swedenborg’s role in overcoming these crises as something between an 
exorcist and a physician.^”^  Cliristianity was not, for Strindberg, a coherent set of 
doctrines about God and the world to which he assented. It was a palliative medicine 
that allowed him to endure his ilhiess. In Religios Renassans^^^' (Religious 
Renaissance) he describes religion as, fundamentally, a binding together of two 
worlds. For Strindberg this “makes it possible to live.” ”^^  The pamphlet, subtitled 
“Religion against Theology,” goes on to reject the systematic edifice of dogma. The 
systematic formulation of religious belief seeks to fix the invisible and make it 
material. Religion then turns into private property that must be defended from the 
property-owners of other sects and other religions. The resulting conflict arises partly 
fr om a desfre for power (an expression of Nietzsche’s will to power), partly from the 
attempt to avoid enslavement by someone else’s system. Strindberg points out that
“Clirist never propounded any system or any theology and nor did the Apostles.” 
Strindberg, then, explicitly rejects religion as a system. He finds suspect anything that 
might enslave him. Besides, he is too interested in conflict to find comfort for long in 
one all-embracing view. As Gumiar Brandell says, Strindberg was not interested in 
building a system but in competing visions of the world.^”^  Strindberg’s plays do not
August Sti’indberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 68 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1988) p. 213. Strindberg’s 
emphasis.
Strindberg, Inferno, pp. 256-7, 261
Subtitled Religion mot Teologi (Religion against Theology) -  this was a pamphlet Strindberg 
published in 1910, very near the end of his life.
Strindberg, Samlade Verk, vol. 68, p. 205 
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he resembles Peter Baelz’s half-religious man: he has “heard ‘a mmour of angels’, 
and seen what look like signals of the transcendent. But the world without and the 
world within also speak of a divine absence, threatening destruction and opening up 
an ultimate emptiness and void.” ’^” Given this deep-seated suspicion of world- 
encompassing systems, it is little wonder that Strindberg so often alludes in his plays 
to Clirist as liberator. He comes to free humanity, and in return the ‘right-thinking 
people’ kill him. Divine intervention disrupts established hierarchies. Always in 
Strindberg it undermines the social order, but it also undercuts systematic dogma and 
claims to power based on this. In short, it undermines the authority of the usual kind
■of metaphysical God-language, in which God becomes the name for an ultimate 
being, a cosmic father-figure who props up the worldly order. It is a short leap from 
this to Gnosticism.
■1
This broadly Gnostic tendency becomes rather interesting in light of the postmodern 
appropriation of Antonin Ar taud. As well as a poet and an actor, Artaud was a S
theatrical visionary seeking an escape from what he saw as the smallness of 
contemporary theatre. Western theatre seemed to him trapped in narrow social and 
psychological concerns, “whether we will become aware of our ‘complexes’. .. or 
whether on the contrary our ‘complexes’ will do us in.”^” He sought, in contrast, a 
kind of poetry of the stage that would lead us “away from the human, contemporary, 
and psychological meaning of the theatre and back to the religious and mystical 
acceptation of which our theatre has lost all sense. Like Strindberg in his more 
pessimistic moments, Ar taud “shares with the Gnostics a conviction that the world of
-------------------------------------------  I t
Baelz, The Forgotten Dream, p. 36
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forms is a false creation, that it continues to be governed and directed through the 
work of evil, and that he is trapped in it.” ’^  ^ In fact, so similar are many of their 
concerns, it is no surprise that Artaud considered some of Strindberg’s late work to 
belong to the repertory of an ideal theatre/’'’ Ai'taud wanted a theatre that escaped the 
tyranny of dialogue with all that it entailed, which embraced a language of movement It
and gesture, as well as turning the spoken word into something closer to music, and in 
fact into incantation. It was for this reason that he caught the attention of Jacques 
Derrida, who sees in Artaud an escape from what he calls the “theological stage. 
Artaud’s theatre of cruelty no longer serves “as the sensory illustration of a text
I
alieady written ... [The stage] will no longer re-present a present that would exist
elsewhere and prior to it.” ”^* Now while Strindberg’s late plays are still dominated by
language, they do attempt to move beyond a theatre of dialogue. In Swedish, his
dramatic writing is full of dashes and ellipses. He had a particular rhythm in miad.
The sound, rhythm and register of the language becomes at times as important as its 
.meaning. Indeed, Strindberg gives a description of the process of composition in a
scene fr'om To Damascus. In it the Unknown says that he fust hears a rhythm, before 
particular words arise to fit that rhythm.^’^  His evocative use of music and his 
attention to visual changes onstage (particularly notable in A Dream Play) also reflect 
a move beyond a purely psychological, or indeed social theatre. These latter are 
precisely the kind of “theological theatre” that Artaud attacks. We have seen the way 
in which Strindberg’s plays disrupt or indefinitely prolong the redemptive drama of 
the Passion, leaving the theistic God forever out of reach. These plays then do not 
only undermine the coherence of their own salvific narratives, they also move away
A
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from a theological, logocentric theatre. Now according to one recent interpretation of 
Aitaud’s Gnosticism, Gnosticism itself functions as a repressed but disruptive force 
within the orthodox discourse of Cliristian theology.^’® Like the Freudian 
unconscious it forever thi'eatens to break out and disrupt the rational ordering of the 
cosmos. This sort of language, the language of disruption, combined with a language 
obsessed by the holy, characterises a strain of modernist writing on the theatre, and, I 
believe, has something to say to our current situation at the end of postmodernism.
As a way of approaching this, I want to set this language against a modern attempt at 
an objective language of theatre criticism. I have picked on Colin Counsell here 
because he formulates his argument with particular clarity.
In the introduction to his Signs o f Pejformance, Colin Counsell addresses the question 
“what is theatre”? It is, he answers, a system of signs used to communicate messages 
and, more importantly, ideologies (in the Marxist sense) to an audience. “The key 
characteristic of such [cultural] products, the quality which makes them cultural, is 
that they all encode meaning. Cultural objects are r e a d a b l e . T h e  sign system 
employed by theatre involves not just words but posture, movement and staging. The 
most important thing here is that a theatrical event is readable as a whole. So strong is 
the force of this that the audience will interpret accidents onstage as intentional parts 
of the play. Even performances that are deliberately fragmentary do not escape this 
“Law of the Text” for those discords and fragments will themselves be woven into 
one coherent meaning. For Counsell, a theatrical event, like the subjectivity of the 
audience that watches, is conditioned by and passes on the historically bound 
conditions of its production.
Goodall, Artaud and the Gnostic Drama, passim
Colin Counsel], Signs o f Performance: An Introduction to Twentieth Century Theatre (London;
Routledge, 1996), p. 6
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Now Counsell’s project is explicitly political, and to the extent that he wants 
suppressed voices to be heard, one can only sympathise, despite the contempt with 
which he writes of “Dead White Bourgeois Males. And of course there is a great 
deal in what he says about theatre as a sign system (many of the same points were 
originally made by Brecht). However, his attempt at a more or less ‘objective’ view 
of theatre as a system of material signs excludes from theatre both the aesthetic and 
the ‘spiritual’. The two tenns are related, and although the latter is vague it points 
towards something of great importance. We will tiy to get closer to the relation 
between these two, and to then significance.
Counsell’s insistence that a theatrical event is always ‘read’, and ‘read’ as a seamless 
whole is only partially true. Indeed, the rare experience of a timly exceptional 
theatrical performance contradicts this interpretation, both of theatre and of 
subjectivity. As a member of the University of Wales’ drama department, Daniel 
Meyer-Dinkgrâfe has noted that drama students typically become very fluent in 
analysing bad or mediocre plays in terms of staging, geni'e and so forth -  precisely the 
kind of analysis that Counsell describes. This is an extended and refined version of 
what Counsell describes the ordinary theatre-goer as doing. When it comes to truly 
outstanding performances, however, this analytical activity stops: “The extraordinary 
performance, the performance that makes the spectators forget they are in the theatre, 
that makes them forget the passing of time, that engages them fully in the here and 
now, the present moment, somehow seems to escape the immediate analytical abilities
520 Ibid., p. 2
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of the i n t e l l e c t . E v e n  in retrospect, terminology becomes vague and those who 
experienced these events retain a reluctance to analyse them. Dinkgrafe’s students 
agreed unanimously that these rare theatrical experiences were much more desirable 
than those open to immediate critical a n a l y s i s . I t  seems, then, that theatre at its best 
does something that Counsell camiot account for, or more accurately does not even 
allow for. The spectator seems, under exceptional circumstances, to suspend the 
normal activity of ‘reading’ a performance. This suggests a parallel with Donald 
Kuspit’s description of aesthetic experience in The End o f Art, It is, he says, “an 
altered state of consciousness, as it were, and thus an abnoimal or at least a non­
normal and unconventional consciousness of reality. It allows an escape from 
“everyday consciousness of the l i f e - w o r l d . W i t h  echoes of Schopenhauer, Kuspit
Î
claims that the aesthetic has a healing effect, however temporary, and that in essence
it gives us a reprieve from socially prescribed roles in defiance of the adult social 
world “which demands that one ... identify oneself completely with that role.”^^  ^ In 
other words, it seems to afford a momentary liberation. There is a close parallel here 
with Grotowski’s avowed aims for his “Poor Theatre”. His theatre was poor in the 
sense that it stripped away everything extraneous. Grotowski concluded that the only 
necessary conditions for theatre were an actor and a spectator: “we found that theatre 
can exist without make-up, without autonomic costume and scenography, without a 
separate performance area (stage), without lighting and sound effects, etc. It cannot 
exist without the actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, “live”
•1:
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coiîimunion.”^^ ’^ But his theatre’s poverty did not consist in stripping away only the 
external paraphernalia of performance. It also aimed to strip away the actor’s ‘bag of 
tricks’; “In this struggle with one’s own truth, this effort to peel off the life-mask, the 
theatre with its full-fleshed perceptivity, has always seemed to me a place of 
provocation. It is capable of challenging itself and its audience by violating acted 
stereotypes of vision, feeling and judgment ... This defiance of taboo, this 
transgression, provides the shock which rips off the mask, enabling us to give 
ourselves nakedly to something which is impossible to define but which contains Eros 
and Caritas.”^^  ^ He wishes, he says, to approach the holy by way of transgression and 
blasphemy. He aims to transmit this “secular holiness” (he disclaims any religious 
allegiance) to the audience: “If the actor ... tluough excess, profanation and 
outrageous sacrilege reveals himself by casting off his everyday mask, he makes it 
possible for the spectator to undertake a similar process of s e l f -pene t ra t ion . He  
describes this sacrilege also as sacrifice and atonement. For Grotowski theatre 
involves spiritual freedom, a freedom from roles, a removal of social masks. He uses 
notably violent language to talk about this, as well as language that is notably 
religious. Kuspit uses language that is less violent, but nevertheless deals with 
disruption. He says of Cézamie, for instance, that he “is intimidating and 
discomforting because [he] disrupts everyday c on s c i o u sn e s s . T h e  painter Georgio 
De Chirico speaks in similarly disruptive terms of the role of madness in art, defining 
madness after Schopenhauer as a loss of memory:
Jerzy Grotowski, Towards a Poor Theatre (London: Methuen, 1991), p. 19 
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.. .that which constitutes the logic of our normal acts and our normal life is a 
continuous rosary of recollections of relationships between things and 
ourselves and vice versa.
We can cite an example: I enter a room, I see a man sitting in an armchair, I 
note a bii'd cage with a canary hanging from the ceiling ... None of this 
startles nor astonishes me because a series of memories which are connected 
one to the other explains to me the logic of what I see. But let us suppose that 
for a moment, for reasons that remain unexplainable and quite beyond my 
will, the tlu'ead of this series is broken. Wlio knows how I might see the 
seated man, the cage, the painting, the bookcase! Who knows with what 
astonishment, what terror and possibly also with what pleasure and 
consolation I might view the scene.^^^
In all these cases, neither the artist nor the audience is entirely constrained by cultural 
codes. Indeed, for all these artists and critics, the arts achieve most when the codes 
and the reading of codes break down. Grotowski actually calls his theatrical method a 
“via negativa.”^^  ^ Grotowski’s appropriation of the term refers in part to his attempt to 
remove all that is extraneous to theatrical performance, but as we have seen, his 
theatrical method is also a disruption of roles, a ripping off of masks. His use of the 
teim suggests a parallel with the apophatic disruption of semantics that occurs in a 
number of mystical writers, practitioners, properly speaking, of the via negativa. 
Grotowski seems to suggest that theatre too, in certain rare moments, reaches an 
apophatic disruption of its ordinary codes. Apophatic language operates, as Sells
Herschell B. Chipp (ed.), Theories o f Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1996), p. 450 
Grotowski, Towards a Poor Theatre, p. 17
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notes, with a performative intensity/^^ It is writing that does not say something, but 
does something. Can theatre provoke, at its greatest, a wordless groundless freedom? 
Peter Brook seems to allude to this possibility when he says “...for me, the theatre 
starts and ends within a bowl of emptiness, which is an empty space and a great 
silence.”^^ ^
At first glance this might seem distant from the concerns of Theological Humanism.
In Klemm’s formulation, Theological Humanism involves a recognition of and 
rational balance between the demands of the “I”, the “you”, the “they” and the natural 
world and its creatures.^^^ And yet, he is concerned for the continued possibility of 
doing theology, and in the broadest sense for the continued possibility of religion. He 
explicitly rejects the path taken by what he calls post-liberal theology, which defends 
the special status of one particular sect or grouping against all others. Although he 
commits himself to working with the tradition he has inherited (in his case Roman 
Catholicism), he is concerned with the possibility of religious life whether or not 
contained within the Church -  that is, with experience of the holy as potentially a 
universal human experience. As he does so, Klemm also resorts to the language of 
disruption. He invokes Rudolph Otto for whom religious experience occurs when the 
“Wliolly Other, both divine and demonic, beyond good and evil, breaks into the 
stmctures of ordinary experience, disrupting its worldly contents and overturning our 
judgments about them.”^^  ^ Klemm speaks tantalizingly of “the God who appears
Sells, Mystical Languages o f  Unsaying, pp. 5-6, 9-10 
Quoted Counsell, Signs o f Perfonnance, p. 146
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when the God of theism disappears”^^ ,^ and comments that “for postmodern theology 
nothing is sacred -  or, I should say, not even nothing is sacred.
In A Dream Play the revelation that the cloverleaf door, the door that hides the secret 
of existence, has nothing behind it scandalises the four Deans. For the Dean of 
Theology, the shock is so profound that he thi'ows his book into the fire and abandons 
theology. Yet this emptiness is revealed by the daughter of God, who then tells the 
Deans that they have failed to understand. She seems to hint that this nothing is the 
‘great silence’ Peter Brook alludes to, the nothing that is sacred.
In Chapter 2 ,1 alluded to David Jenkins’ assertion that theology needed to stand 
under the judgment of literature. It needed to be answerable to the mess of life, and 
until it was it would be glib. Strindberg again and again does precisely this - he tests 
religious claims against the mess of life. As ever, he does not do this in a systematic 
way that works towards a concluding statement, whether of atheism or belief. To do 
so would be antithetical to his way of thinking. It is important that A Dream Play, for 
instance, with its Neoplatonic overtones, includes so much of the ordinary diit, 
poverty and injustice of life. To parapluase David Klemm, Strindberg does not 
provide answers, but he does keep certain questions alive.
As I have said, Strindberg inhabits the desert. He may not like this, but ultimately he 
is too honest to deny it. I want to bring in here David Jasper’s Sacred Desert, a book 
that wanders tluough deserts literal and metaphorical and their resonances in literature
Ibid., p. 7
Ibid., p. 11
Ibid., pp. 6-7
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Iand religious writings.^^^ I do this in part because Strindberg would seem to imply that the only possible religion, now, is a religion of the desert. David Jasper, in turn, 
perhaps implies that the space of literature is the only viable religious space left. In 
fact the desert is an apt metaphor for a writer who resists simple univocal readings the 
way Strindberg does. The desert itself, in David Jasper’s description, resists 
categories - or rather categories collapse into each other in the desert. The desert is 
implacable, indifferent to human concerns. It is the implacable other to the human 
world, yet also offers an escape into silence and solitude. The journey into the desert 
caiTies a sense of nakedly confr onting existence. It is a place also of strange 
meetings, of encounters with beings both holy and demonic. In the desert blessedness 
and damnation become indistinguishable. Now in a lot of the figures discussed 
earlier, the holy and the demonic intermingle. For Otto, the experience of the holy is 
an encounter with the absolutely other, both divine and demonic. It breaks into the 
world and disrupts our consciousness, indeed our subjectivity. Grotowski, again, 
sought holiness by way of sacrilege. A deliberate assault on the categories of holiness
;
seems necessary in order to reach towards transcendence. Now Strindberg assaults 
conventional notions of piety, even as he seeks to submit to religious authority. But
he also confronts the paradox present in Grotowski, and indeed in Otto. In Chapter 1 
I discussed Falander, the character fr-om the Red Room who is both saintly and 
d iabol i ca l .Thi s  kind of character recurs in the plays. In To Damascus it is the 
protagonist himself who resembles Falander. The Unknown is marked, like Cain, and 
feels himself cursed. Yet his curse also marks him as holy. He finds himself 
persecuted because he opposes the unjust ordering of the world. His writings threaten
to undermine the social fabric that holds people in then place. But this opposition
— ________________________
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Here social injustice becomes symptomatic of a broader sense of outraged 
compassion at the meaningless suffering of humanity. The God of theism fails. As
Altizer puts it, the God of a fallen humanity is a fallen God.^ "^  ^ Instead, the Daughter
thinking people” for attempting to free them.
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226
extends to a protest against the ordering of nature and God’s handiwork, also. The
Unknown dreams of remaking the cosmos so that no-one will suffer. His alter-ego,
the madman Caesar, busies himself reordering nature, finding God’s design deficient.
.In this case, the Unknown’s challenge to the divinely ordained order of the cosmos 
seems intended to show how depraved and connpt the Unknown has become, before, 
in the play’s second half, he follows Clirist at least part-way to Golgotha. Unlike the
more radical version of Chiist, present in To Damascus as elsewhere, this is the Jesus
'■.mediated by the Church, the version of Christ propounded by Dostoyevsky’s Grand 
Inquisitor to whom the Unknown finally, if reluctantly, yields. And yet, the Unknown
.S'
in his unregenerate state has a great deal of justice on his side. The play camiot 
entirely conceal its protest against conventional religiosity and ethical norms behind 
the mask of piety it tries to force onto its face. A Dream Play amplifies this protest.
discloses a void -  apparently a sacred void, though it may be the void of nihilism. 
There is really no way of knowing. Certainly it undermines the authority of the 
Deans, and threatens the order upheld by the “right-thinkers.” Indeed, they wish to 
kill the Daughter, in an echo of the Poet’s reference to Chr ist, murdered by the “right-
A number of Strindberg’s plays, then, express a longing for transcendence. Yet the 
closest they come to it is an intimation of an ambiguous emptiness. It seems that the 
transcendence sought -  a transcendent God whose discovery also entails a
----------------------------------
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transfomation of the se lf-  cannot be reached. A divine gi onnd as presence cannot be 
found. The only path left seems to lie at the end of a total negation and reversal -  this 
entails a reversal of morality, a rejection of ecclesial Christianity, a negation of God. 
The possibility of this reversal, and the groundlessness it promises and threatens, 
haunts Strindberg’s dieam plays. In the end, Strindberg cannot quite commit himself 
to the ultimate risk of this reversal. His play writing has to end, therefore, with the 
Hunter alone in the forest of the world, praying to an absent God.
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